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From the Editor in Chief
Our Winter 2020–21 issue of Parameters begins with an In Focus
contribution by Tim Hoyt and Pamela Holtz entitled, “Challenging
Prevailing Models of US Army Suicide.” The authors examine the
inability of current models to capture accurately or predict suicides
among US Army soldiers. Hoyt and Holtz recommend the Army take a
more collaborative approach to this tragic health concern.
Our first forum, War, Gender, and Civilians, features three articles that
analyze the interactions of civilians and combatants in modern campaigns.
In “Gender Blindness in US Doctrine,” Jody Prescott argues the US
military needs to revise the gender assumptions imbedded in its doctrine
to reduce risk to mission accomplishment and improve force protection.
In “Civilians, Urban Warfare, and US Doctrine,” Andrew Bell proposes
changes in doctrine to better sustain soldier health and well-being in the
face of civilian mass casualties and civilian noncombatants common in
today’s urban battlespaces. In “Stability Operations in WWII: Insights
and Lessons,” Ray Millen reveals how skilled civil-military affairs teams
can prove indispensable in the wake of successful combat operations.
The second forum, Lessons from Afghanistan, includes analyses of the
lessons learned by two nations that participated in the International
Security Assistance Force effort during the conflict in Afghanistan
(2002–14). In “Contribution Warfare: Sweden’s Lessons from the War
in Afghanistan,” Jan Ångström contends Sweden learned case-specific,
tactical lessons, not strategic lessons, from its involvement in the war.
In “Never Again? Germany’s Lessons from the War in Afghanistan,”
Philipp Münch maintains Germany should not involve itself in wars
intended to transform foreign societies.
The issue’s final forum, Regional Challenges, offers one contribution
concerning India-Pakistan and one pertaining to the Middle East. In
“India and Pakistan: Managing Tensions,” Philip Kao considers the
recent history of border conflict between these nuclear-armed neighbors
and determines they have averted nuclear crises through means other
than the framework of conventional deterrence theory. In “Diverging
Interests: US Strategy in the Middle East,” Christopher Bolan, Jerad
Harper, and Joel Hillison suggest ways for US foreign policy to adjust
to the geopolitical realities of four key nations in the region: Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Israel, and Turkey. ~AJE
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In Focus

Challenging Prevailing Models
of US Army Suicide
Tim Hoyt and Pamela M. Holtz
ABSTRACT: Statistics behind reported suicide rates in the military
are often insufficiently analyzed and portray a distorted picture of
reality. Several models for identifying individuals at risk for suicide
have been proposed but few show adequate predictive power to be
actionable. Instead, a collaborative and consistent effort to address
core drivers at the individual level may be more useful.

S

ince the drawdown of combat action in Iraq and Afghanistan,
suicide and self-inflicted injury account for more deaths annually
across the armed forces than all other factors except accidents.1
Accordingly, suicide prevention has been a strategic priority for more
than a decade. The 2015 National Military Strategy emphasized suicide
prevention as a core aspect of ethical leadership requiring a culture of
trust and mutual respect.2 Despite the sustained emphasis on prevention,
however, the rate of suicide in the US Army remains largely unchanged.3
This article highlights several key findings in the scientific literature
in an effort to dispel myths regarding suicide rates in the US Army.
It thereby provides a touch point for military leaders as they prioritize
prevention initiatives and programs. Specifically, six questions
are addressed:
1. What is the current trend in suicide death rates?
2. How do US Army suicide rates compare to civilian rates?
3. Can predictive models be used to predict suicide deaths?
4. What risk factors can leaders influence?
5. Have prevention programs been effective?
6. What is an appropriate target for suicide reduction?

Current Trends

Recent publications erroneously describe current trends of suicide
among servicemembers as “steadily rising.”4 Popular media similarly

1. Armed Forces Health Surveillance Branch, “Surveillance Snapshot: Manner and Cause of
Death, Active Component, U.S. Armed Forces 1998–2013,” Medical Surveillance Monthly Report 21, no.
10 (October 2014): 21.
2. US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015
(Washington, DC: JCS, June 2015), 14–15. The unclassified summary of the 2018 National Military
Strategy does not refer to suicide prevention.
3. Larry D. Pruitt et al., Department of Defense Suicide Event Report (DoDSER): Calendar Year 2016
Annual Report, no. 0-A2345E0 (Washington, DC: Defense Health Agency, June 20, 2018), iv.
4. James Griffith and Craig J. Bryan, “Preventing Suicides in the U.S. Military,” Psychological
Services 15, no. 3 (2018): 251.
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report, “suicide among troops spiked [to] crisis proportions.”5 Analysis
of data, however, shows the suicide rate for the Army has not significantly
changed since 2011.6 Indeed, annual suicide rates per 100,000 personyears for the US Army of 29.8 (2019), 29.9 (2018), 24.7 (2017), 27.4
(2016), 24.4 (2015), 24.6 (2014), 23.0 (2013), 29.6 (2012), and 24.8 (2011)
are within the same statistical margin of error.7 These data, which
contradict the typical narrative surrounding military suicide, warrant
the attention of leaders who may otherwise incorrectly interpret small
arithmetic changes in rates as significant.
Further, stable trends may take several years to establish and
interpret—quarterly or monthly reports inherently are prone to greater
uncertainty and instability of estimates. Defense Suicide Prevention
Office reports, collected monthly and issued to the public quarterly,
result in problematic statements such as “Army suicide deaths are up”
for a given reporting period.8 Such statements can be misinterpreted
by senior leaders as representing reliable trends and can, therefore,
misinform efforts to formulate a strategic approach to military suicide.
Similarly, literature on military suicide suggests rates across the
services nearly doubled from 10.1 per 100,000 in 2002 to 19.7 per
100,000 in 2009.9 But several intervening factors during this time period
call this interpretation into question. Prior to implementation of the
DoDSER in 2008, there were few systematic and standardized studies
of military suicides.10 Thus, rate calculations that include data prior to
the implementation of DoDSER differ depending on the case definition
utilized in a particular setting.11
5. Tom Vanden Brook, “Troops at Risk for Suicide Not Getting Needed Care, Report Finds,”
USA Today, August 7, 2017. Popular media might report a “20 percent spike” in military suicide
deaths in a given quarter. This number is a simple comparison of number of suicide events from a
given quarter compared to the previous quarter. This number does not account for normal variability
in the number of suicide deaths on a quarterly basis. If there were 71 suicide deaths in Quarter 2
of 2019, and 85 suicide deaths in Quarter 3 of 2019, then numerically this is a 20 percent increase.
But this comparison fails to report that any given quarter from 2017 through 2019 might have as
few as 57 suicide deaths, or as many as 99 suicide deaths. In that context, 85 suicide deaths is within
the typical range of quarterly suicide deaths over the previous three years and does not portray a
“spike” as reported in the media.
6. Jennifer Tucker, Derek J. Smolenski, and Carrie H. Kennedy, DoDSER: Calendar Year 2018
Annual Report, no. 4-B4E204C (Washington, DC: Defense Health Agency, July 2020), 12.
7. Larry D. Pruitt et al., Department of Defense Suicide Event Report (DoDSER): Calendar Year
2017 Annual Report, no. F-C3EE053 (Washington, DC: Defense Health Agency, July 2019), 18;
and Defense Suicide Prevention Office, Annual Suicide Report, Calendar Year 2019 (Washington, DC:
Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, October 2020), 12.
8. Rennie Vazquez, Department of Defense (DoD) Quarterly Suicide Report (QSR): 2nd Quarter, CY
2018 (Washington, DC: Defense Suicide Prevention Office, 2018), 3.
9. Joseph Logan et al., “Characteristics of Suicides among US Army Active Duty Personnel in
17 US States from 2005 to 2007,” American Journal of Public Health 102, Supplement 1 (March 2012):
S41; and Armed Forces Health Surveillance Branch, “Deaths by Suicide While on Active Duty,
Active and Reserve Components, U.S. Armed Forces, 1998–2011,” Medical Surveillance Monthly Report
19, no. 6 (June 2012): 8.
10. David S. C. Chu to Assistant Secretaries of the Military Departments for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs, memorandum, “Standardized DoD Suicide Data and Reporting,” June 2006, Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Washington, DC.
11. Kenneth L. Cox et al., “An Examination of Potential Misclassification of Army Suicides:
Results from the Army Study to Assess Risk and Resilience in Servicemembers,” Suicide and LifeThreatening Behavior 47, no. 3 (June 2017): 261.
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Reports prior to this time also relied primarily on medicolegal
determinations by the Armed Forces Medical Examiner System and may
have biased reporting toward accidents as a cause of death rather than
suicide.12 As a further complicating factor, policy changes during the
Obama administration ensured Servicemembers’ Group Life Insurance
would be paid to designated beneficiaries regardless of line-of-duty
determination for suicide deaths.13 Taken together, these biasing factors
make problematic any direct comparison of suicide rate data between
time periods before and after systematic data collection.

Suicide Rates

In contrast to the US Army suicide rate, which has remained
consistent since 2011, the suicide rate for the US population has
significantly increased.14 Recent statistics show suicide is now the tenth
leading cause of death and accounts for approximately 45,000 deaths
in the United States annually.15 Despite these facts, the most common
statement in the media is the military suicide rate is “well above the
national rate” for the US population.16
Similarly, the academic literature frequently cites the statistic that the
2008 Army suicide rate exceeded the crude rate of the US population.17
Due to demographic differences between the US population and the
subset of the population that serve on active duty in the US Army, a
direct comparison of crude or unadjusted suicide rates between the two
groups is inaccurate—the military is generally younger than the overall
US population and has a greater proportion of men.18 Thus any statistical
comparison between the two groups must be adjusted to be age- and
sex-matched.19 But no consensus has been reached or policy guidance
provided on which methods should be utilized when comparing rates—
for example, direct versus indirect standardization.20
An analysis of US Army suicide data from 2004 to 2015 using direct
standardization to match age and sex to the US population showed
12. Joel R. Carr, Charles W. Hoge, and Robert Potter, “Suicide Surveillance in the U.S. Military—
Reporting and Classification Biases in Rate Calculations,” Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior 34, no.
3 (Fall 2004): 233–41.
13. Cox et al., “Examination of Potential Misclassification,” 261.
14. Deborah M. Stone et al., “Vital Signs: Trends in State Suicide Rates—United States, 1999–
2016 and Circumstances Contributing to Suicide—27 States, 2015,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
Report 67, no. 22 (June 8, 2018): 617–24.
15. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Web-Based Injury Statistics Query and
Reporting System: Leading Causes of Death Reports 1981–2016,” Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, accessed November 28, 2018.
16. Gregg Zoroya, “U.S. Military Suicides Remain High for 7th Year,” USA Today, updated May
4, 2016, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2016/04/01/us-military-suicides-remain
-stubbornly-high/82518278/.
17. Griffith and Bryan, “Preventing Suicides,” 251.
18. Larry D. Pruitt et al., “Suicide in the Military: Understanding Rates and Risk Factors across
the United States’ Armed Forces,” Military Medicine 184, no. 3/4, Supplement 1 (2019): 432–37; and
Pruitt et al., (DoDSER): Calendar Year 2016, 21.
19. Pruitt et al., (DoDSER): Calendar Year 2016, 22.
20. Eren Youmans Watkins et al., “Adjusting Suicide Rates in a Military Population: Methods to
Determine the Appropriate Standard Population,” American Journal of Public Health 108, no. 6 (June
1, 2018): 770.
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the US Army rate was below the comparable civilian rate for 8 of the
12 years included in the data.21 The annual DoDSER utilizes indirect
standardization to make similar comparisons of suicide rates between
the two groups in order to account better for age differences.22 These
data show the age- and sex-adjusted suicide rates in the US Army did
not significantly differ from the rates for the US population for calendar
years 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2017.
For three reporting years—calendar years 2011, 2012, and 2016—
the adjusted US Army suicide rates were slightly higher than the US
population rates.23 The magnitude of difference between the rates may
also be of importance when considering these exception years. When
comparing the calendar year 2012 data—the year in which crude rates
for the Army differ most from the civilian population—there is only a
one-hundredth of 1 percent difference between the two rates.24 These
findings cast doubt on reports suggesting suicides in the US Army
significantly exceed those for the US population.

Predictive Models

Models purporting to identify suicide deaths accurately are unlikely
to show sufficient predictive power to be useful for developing suicide
prevention programs. As the number of identified potential risk factors
for suicide increases and these factors are better measured, the number
of false positives will statistically increase due to the poor specificity of
predictors.25 In fact, the likely upper limit of positive predictive power
(the likelihood that an identified “positive” case will actually engage in
suicide behavior) for suicide assessment instruments is 78 percent based
on simulation studies among civilian psychiatric patients with a history of
self-inflicted injury.26
Thus even in the best identified statistical scenarios in high-risk
populations, false positives on validated screening measures will occur
22 percent of the time. In civilian settings, a false positive prompting
additional psychiatric evaluation may be considered a minor cost
compared to potentially lifesaving intervention.27 But in the Army
context, a false positive identification of suicide risk may inappropriately
preclude assignment to certain missions such as recruiting duty, flight
status, or assignments requiring a security clearance. These stigmaincreasing outcomes are in addition to the cost of the evaluation and the
opportunity cost of lost training associated with unneeded, additional
21. Watkins et al., “Adjusting Suicide Rates,” 771.
22. Pruitt et al., (DoDSER): Calendar Year 2016, 13.
23. Pruitt et al., (DoDSER): Calendar Year 2017, 33.
24. Watkins et al., “Adjusting Suicide Rates,” 776.
25. Joseph C. Franklin et al., “Risk Factors for Suicidal Thoughts and Behaviors: A MetaAnalysis of 50 Years of Research,” Psychological Bulletin 143, no. 2 (2017): 188.
26. Bradley E. Belsher et al., “Prediction Models for Suicide Attempts and Deaths: A Systematic
Review and Simulation,” JAMA Psychiatry 76, no. 6 (2019): 646.
27. Peter Denchev et al., “Modeling the Cost-Effectiveness of Interventions to Reduce Suicide
Risk among Hospital Emergency Department Patients,” Psychiatric Services 69, no. 1 (January 2018): 23.
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assessments.28 Furthermore, false negatives may provide a false sense of
security for commanders and clinicians who assume a particular soldier
is not at risk.29
The relatively low base rate of suicides also prevents adequate
verification or cross-validation of predictive models. In order to
appropriately develop predictive models, the base rate in an initial
sample should be approximately 50 percent.30 Problems with predictive
models are further exacerbated when trying to expand predictive
models to groups with fewer risk factors or lower rates. Considering only
crude rates, the 2016 US Army suicide rate was 27.4 per 100,000, but
patients with a history of inpatient psychiatric admission have an average
suicide rate of 646 per 100,000.31 This difference in base rates makes the
use of previously validated scales for any prediction problematic.32
The false positive problem is pervasive across studies of
servicemembers and veterans and limits the utility of most clinical
risk assessment techniques.33 Even the Army Study to Assess Risk and
Resilience in Servicemembers (Army STARRS), the large longitudinal
study of prospective suicide risk, showed an overwhelming number
of false positives—96.3 percent—when attempting to model
high-risk prediction.34
The US Army has recently adopted the Columbia-Suicide Severity
Rating Scale (C-SSRS) as a primary suicide risk assessment measure.35 The
C-SSRS is a mandatory suicide risk screening used in a variety of Army
medical settings including emergency departments, inpatient psychiatric
facilities, and outpatient clinics.36 Nonetheless, the designation of this
measure by the Defense Suicide Prevention Office and other civilian
hospital settings as the gold standard for suicide risk assessment may
communicate a false sense of assurance.37 Screening samples from the
C-SSRS indicate only 8 percent of the individuals who go on to engage
28. AC Davis, “How Classroom Training is Hindering Army Readiness,” Task & Purpose,
January 20, 2016.
29. Jacinta Hawgood and Diego De Leo, “Suicide Prediction—A Shift in Paradigm Is Needed,”
Crisis 37, no. 4 (2016): 252.
30. Takaya Saito and Marc Rehmsmeier, “The Precision-Recall Plot Is More Informative than
the ROC Plot When Evaluating Binary Classifiers on Imbalanced Datasets,” PLoS ONE 10, no. 3
(2015): e0118432, 3.
31. Pruitt et al., (DoDSER): Calendar Year 2016, 24; and Matthew Michael Large and Nav Kapur,
“Psychiatric Hospitalisation and the Risk of Suicide,” British Journal of Psychiatry 212, no. 5 (May
2018): 269.
32. Belsher et al., “Prediction Models for Suicide,” 646.
33. Heidi D. Nelson, et al., “Suicide Risk Assessment and Prevention: A Systematic Review
Focusing on Veterans,” Psychiatric Services 68, no. 10 (October 2017): 1003–15.
34. Olav Nielssen, Duncan Wallace, and Matthew Large, “Pokorny’s Complaint: The Insoluble
Problem of the Overwhelming Number of False Positives Generated by Suicide Risk Assessment,”
BJPsych Bulletin 41, no. 1 (February 2017): 18–20.
35. US Army Medical Command (MEDCOM), Behavioral Health At-Risk Management Policy,
MEDCOM Policy Memo 16-096 (Fort Sam Houston, TX: MEDCOM, 2016), 8.
36. MEDCOM, MEDCOM Policy Memo 16-096.
37. Tim Hoyt and Diana M. Repke, “Development and Implementation of U.S. Army
Guidelines for Managing Soldiers at Risk of Suicide,” Military Medicine 184, no. 3/4, Supplement 1
(November–December 2019): 428.
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in suicide behaviors would be identified by this screening, and 4 percent
of individuals would be identified as false positives.38
Other studies using this assessment measure have shown similar
findings, namely, the potential for classification errors and missed cases
of suicide attempts.39 Thus, leaders receiving risk recommendations
from sources utilizing the C-SSRS must know the likelihood of
false positives and false negatives. Moreover, more recent techniques
(such as machine learning and predictive modeling) do not overcome
the inherent weaknesses caused by a low base rate event and poor
predictive power.40

Role of Leaders

For the reasons discussed, identifying risk factors through mass
screening may be of little utility in predicting the acute suicide risk of
an individual soldier.41 In contrast, leaders should focus on the core
drivers of suicide—stressors an individual associates with suicidality,
which may acutely increase suicide risk.42 For example, at the individual
soldier level, financial problems such as loss of pay due to misconduct or
reduction in rank could be a significant driver.43
In one of the few direct comparison studies of potential drivers
for suicide death among soldiers, researchers compared groups of
soldiers who died by suicide, and those who attempted suicide but did
not die, with demographically matched control soldiers.44 The study
identified that soldiers who exhibited suicide behaviors (both suicide
deaths and nonfatal suicide attempts) had greater odds of experiencing
legal and substance-abuse problems and failed intimate relationships
in the 90 days preceding the incident, with legal problems the most
significant differentiator of those servicemembers who died by suicide.45
Occupational problems such as nonselection for promotion or poor
performance evaluations were significantly associated with nonfatal
suicide attempts.46

38. John H. Greist et al., “Predictive Value of Baseline Electronic Columbia-Suicide Severity
Rating Scale (eC-SSRS) Assessments for Identifying Risk of Prospective Reports of Suicidal
Behavior during Research Participation,” Innovations in Clinical Neuroscience 11, no. 9–10 (September–
October 2014): 26.
39. Kelly L. Zuromski et al., “Assessment of a Risk Index for Suicide Attempts among US
Army Soldiers with Suicide Ideation: Analysis of Data from the Army Study to Assess Risk and
Resilience in Servicemembers (Army STARRS),” JAMA Network Open 2, no. 3 (2019): e190766.
40. Belsher et al., “Prediction Models for Suicide,” 642–51.
41. John Sommers-Flanagan and Sidney L. Shaw, “Suicide Risk Assessment: What Psychologists
Should Know,” Professional Psychology: Research and Practice 48, no. 2 (2017): 99.
42. Raymond P. Tucker et al., “Risk Factors, Warning Signs, and Drivers of Suicide: What Are
They, How Do They Differ, and Why Does It Matter?” Suicide & Life-Threatening Behavior 45, no. 6
(2015): 681.
43. Caitlin A. Goodin et al., “Financial Hardship and Risk of Suicide among U.S. Army
Personnel,” Psychological Services 16, no. 2 (May 2019): 287.
44. Nancy A. Skopp et al., “Risk Factors for Self-Directed Violence in US Soldiers: A CaseControl Study,” Psychiatry Research 245 (November 2016): 196–97.
45. Skopp et al., “Case-Control Study.”
46. Skopp et al., “Case-Control Study.”
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These drivers of suicide behavior—financial, legal, relationship,
substance-abuse, and occupational problems—are not novel, but each
issue provides leaders with a potential opportunity to mitigate emerging
risk.47 As soon as the financial or legal problems of a soldier are identified,
leaders can ensure protected time during duty hours for soldiers to
resolve these issues before they become drivers of suicide behavior.
Also, leaders can assign unit mentors to check in regularly with soldiers
facing relationship or occupational problems to ensure these stressors
have not overwhelmed them.
Commanders can also take steps to decrease risk when soldiers
experience an acute driver of suicide. Throughout the past decade,
personally owned firearms are the leading mechanism of injury in
military suicides, accounting for 68.7 percent of all calendar year 2017
suicide deaths in the US Army.48 This statistic is complicated by recent
findings that only one-third of servicemembers store personal firearms
in their homes in a safe manner—locked and unloaded. Servicemembers
reporting recent thoughts of suicide were significantly less likely to
follow safe storage practices.49
Restriction of firearms has been shown to reduce the risk of some
suicides, but significant cultural and readiness barriers impede such
restrictions for soldiers experiencing stressful life events (that may or
may not become drivers for suicide).50 Still, commanders can mitigate
this risk by emphasizing safe storage practices for personally owned
firearms and by offering (rather than directing) temporary storage of
these firearms in unit arms rooms when soldiers experience potential
drivers of suicidal behavior.51 These actions can decrease the likelihood
a soldier will act impulsively during a moment of crisis, as any delay
allows more opportunity for the soldier to seek help.52

Prevention and Treatment Programs
Outside the Clinic
The Army has invested significant time and resources on suicide
prevention programs provided outside behavioral health clinics. As such,
these programs should be evaluated for efficacy in preventing suicide
deaths. Until May 2018, mandatory suicide prevention training was
conducted using the Ask, Care, and Escort program, and gatekeepers—
commanders, medical personnel, and chaplains—additionally received

47. Tim Hoyt et al., “Development of a Leader Tool for Assessing and Mitigating Suicide Risk
Factors,” Military Medicine 185, Supplement 1 (January-February 2020).
48. Pruitt et al., (DoDSER): Calendar Year 2017, 74.
49. Craig J. Bryan et al., “Firearm Availability and Storage Practices among Military Personnel
Who Have Thought about Suicide,” JAMA Network Open 2, no. 8 (2019): e199160.
50. Tim Hoyt and Vicki Duffy, “Implementing Firearms Restriction for Preventing U.S. Army
Suicide,” Military Psychology 27, no. 6 (2015): 386.
51. Department of Defense (DoD), Defense Suicide Prevention Program, DoD Instruction (DoDI)
6490.16 (Washington, DC: DoD, November 2017), 19.
52. Hoyt and Duffy, “Implementing Firearms Restriction,” 386.
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Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training (ASIST).53 (The requirement
for mandatory suicide prevention training was eliminated in May 2018,
replaced with command discretion regarding such training.)54
Despite these training requirements, none of these intervention
programs have been systematically evaluated in military settings, and
there is minimal evidence regarding their effectiveness.55 The evidence
base is limited to several small-scale studies related to the facilitation
of suicide prevention training. One study evaluated the use of ASIST
in a small reserve unit sample and found the training was minimally
effective in reducing hopelessness among participants.56
Another study showed over 90 percent of Army chaplains and
chaplain assistants had received mandatory gatekeeper suicide prevention
training—ASIST—over the course of a year, and these gatekeepers
reported greater efficacy in responding to suicide risk among soldiers
than noncommissioned officers with similar gatekeeper training.57 A
study of noncommissioned officers showed they had a greater ability
to intervene than trained civilians in similar settings, such as resident
advisers receiving gatekeeper training in university residence halls.58
These same noncommissioned officers, however, indicated more
reluctance to intervene than gatekeepers in university settings due to
the perception they would be blamed for the death of an at-risk soldier,
or that their intervention could have deleterious effects on the soldier’s
career.59 These findings notwithstanding, there is no evidence gatekeeper
training has a direct effect on suicide rates.60 Thus the implementation of
gatekeeper training in the US Army should be clear regarding intended
outcomes: whereas the training may increase knowledge, it may not
necessarily increase likelihood of intervention and cannot be assumed
to reduce suicide deaths.

Clinical Treatment Settings
The treatment of suicidality in US Army clinical settings generally
focuses on soldiers experiencing acute or chronic suicidal ideation, plans,
or intent.61 This focus can limit the applicable scope of these activities
53. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Health Promotion, Army Regulation
(AR) 600-63 (Washington, DC: HQDA, April 2015), 20–21.
54. Mark Esper, Prioritizing Efforts—Readiness and Lethality Update 7 (Washington, DC: Secretary
of the Army, May 25, 2018).
55. Rajeev Ramchand et al., “Noncommissioned Officers’ Perspectives on Identifying, Caring
For, and Referring Soldiers and Marines at Risk of Suicide,” Psychiatric Services 66, no. 10 (October
2015): 1057.
56. Alexa Smith-Osborne, Arati Maleku, and Sarolyn Morgan, “Impact of Applied Suicide
Intervention Skills Training on Resilience and Suicide Risk in Army Reserve Units,” Traumatology 23,
no. 1 (2017): 49–55.
57. Rajeev Ramchand et al., “Army Chaplains’ Perceptions about Identifying, Intervening, and
Referring Soldiers at Risk of Suicide,” Spirituality in Clinical Practice 2, no. 1 (March 2015): 36–47.
58. Ramchand et al., “Noncommissioned Officers’ Perspectives,” 1061.
59. Ramchand et al., “Noncommissioned Officers’ Perspectives,” 1059.
60. Crystal Burnette, Rajeev Ramchand, and Lynsay Ayer, “Gatekeeper Training for Suicide
Prevention: A Theoretical Model and Review of the Empirical Literature,” RAND Health Quarterly
5, no. 1 (2015): 16.
61. MEDCOM, MEDCOM Policy Memo 16-096.
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for the Army since less than half of soldiers that died by suicide between
2004 and 2009 had sought behavioral health care.62 Notwithstanding
this limitation, several interventions have shown empirical support in
reducing suicide behavior in clinical settings.63
Several former military officers developed a type of brief cognitive
behavioral therapy to address suicide behavior among soldiers who
had been treated for suicidality in an inpatient psychiatric facility.64
Soldiers who received this intervention in addition to the usual standard
of care showed significantly lower rates of suicide attempts over the
two years following treatment compared to soldiers receiving the usual
treatment.65 A core component of this military-specific intervention is
the development of an individualized safety or crisis response plan for
each soldier.66
These safety plans are developed collaboratively and individually
with each soldier, often in consultation with command, and identify
coping strategies and sources of support that have proven effective in
reducing distress.67 The implementation of safety and crisis response
plans are not the sole purview of treating clinicians. Army policy requires
a safety plan for any soldier identified with any significant suicide risk
in behavioral health care and encourages working collaboratively with
command to ensure safety plans do not overly limit a soldier’s gainful
employment in the unit.68 The overall goal of a safety or crisis response
plan is to ensure the soldier has a tangible, concrete plan of action when
facing a distressing situation.69
A similar approach—the Collaborative Assessment and
Management of Suicidality (CAMS)—also has shown promise in
the scientific literature, including with military populations.70 This
integrative treatment emphasizes a problem-focused approach,
developing a treatment plan that reduces the underlying hopelessness
and stress that drive suicide behavior.71 Clinical trials have shown
the CAMS approach can significantly reduce suicidal ideation in
62. Ronald C. Kessler et al., “Predicting Suicides after Outpatient Mental Health Visits in the
Army Study to Assess Risk and Resilience in Servicemembers (Army STARRS),” Molecular Psychiatry
22, no. 4 (April 2017): 544–51.
63. Esther L. Meerwijk et al., “Direct versus Indirect Psychosocial and Behavioural Interventions
to Prevent Suicide and Suicide Attempts: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis,” Lancet Psychiatry
3, no. 6 (June 2016): 544–54.
64. M. David Rudd et al., “Brief Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy Effects on Post-Treatment
Suicide Attempts in a Military Sample: Results of a Randomized Clinical Trial with 2-Year FollowUp,” American Journal of Psychiatry 172, no. 5 (May 2015): 441–49.
65. Rudd et al., “Brief Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy Effects,” 445.
66. Rudd et al., “Brief Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy Effects,” 444.
67. Craig J. Bryan et al., “Effect of Crisis Response Planning vs. Contracts for Safety on Suicide
Risk in U.S. Army Soldiers: A Randomized Clinical Trial,” Journal of Affective Disorders 212 (April
2017): 64–72.
68. MEDCOM, MEDCOM Policy Memo 16-096, 5.
69. Bryan et al., “Effect of Crisis Response Planning,” 67.
70. David A. Jobes, Rene Lento, and Katherine Brazaitis, “An Evidence-Based Clinical
Approach to Suicide Prevention in the Department of Defense: The Collaborative Assessment and
Management of Suicidality, (CAMS),” Military Psychology 24 (2012): 607.
71. Jobes, Lento, and Brazaitis, “An Evidence-Based Clinical Approach,” 606.
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soldiers and reduce emergency department visits related to suicide and
psychiatric hospitalization.72
Despite these findings, military clinicians have been slow to adopt
these collaborative approaches and similar empirically supported
clinical techniques.73 Strategic leaders must emphasize training in
these modalities to reduce the impact of suicide behavior on readiness.
Population-wide meta-analysis indicates the most powerful strategies for
suicide prevention (for example, gatekeeper training and psychosocial
treatment) each could account for up to a 7 percent reduction in suicide
deaths.74 These tailored treatments are more effective than broad
treatments that include suicide behavior as a secondary treatment target.75
Indeed, former Air Force officer and leading military suicide
researcher Dr. Craig Bryan indicates it is unlikely new treatments are
needed to address the current rates of suicide in the Army, and “the next
step in suicide prevention should be to adapt and refine what already
works to make [treatment] work even better.” 76 But meta-analysis also
suggests these treatments may be most effective for up to three months
following cessation of treatment.77 Leaders cannot, therefore, assume a
soldier’s risk of suicide has been resolved simply because the soldier has
successfully terminated treatment and is no longer required to be on a
duty-limiting profile.78

Suicide Reduction

Zero suicides have been the stated goal of many suicide reduction
initiatives during the past two decades.79 Since suicide rates in the
US Army have not significantly changed since 2011, it may be more
reasonable to focus on a strategic target for reduction supported by
the empirical literature. As discussed, small year-to-year changes in
the suicide rate should not be interpreted as a significant increase or
decrease unless backed by statistical analysis that demonstrates an index
of reliable change. For example, when comparing the suicide rate for
2016 against the average rate for the previous three-year period, in
order to reliably identify a statistical decrease in the US Army suicide
rate, the total number of suicide deaths would need to be reduced from

72. David A. Jobes et al., “A Randomized Controlled Trial of the Collaborative Assessment
and Management of Suicidality versus Enhanced Care as Usual with Suicidal Soldiers,” Psychiatry:
Interpersonal & Biological Processes 80, no. 4 (2017): 339–56.
73. David A. Jobes, “Clinical Assessment and Treatment of Suicidal Risk: A Critique of
Contemporary Care and CAMS as a Possible Remedy,” Practice Innovations 2, no. 4 (2017): 212.
74. Helen Christensen, Pim Cuijpers, and Charles F. Reynolds III, “Changing the Direction of
Suicide Prevention Research: A Necessity for True Population Impact,” JAMA Psychiatry 73, no. 5
(May 2016): 435–36.
75. Meerwijk et al., “Direct versus Indirect,” 550.
76. Craig J. Bryan, “Adjusting Our Aim: Next Steps in Military and Veteran Suicide Prevention,”
Spirituality in Clinical Practice 2, no. 1 (2015): 84–85.
77. Meerwijk et al., “Direct versus Indirect,” 550.
78. MEDCOM, MEDCOM Policy Memo 16-096, 9.
79. David W. Covington and Michael F. Hogan, “Zero Suicide: The Dogged Pursuit of
Perfection in Health Care,” Psychiatric Times 36, no. 1 (January 2019).
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127 (2016) to 92 (in a future year) assuming an equivalent military end
strength for that year.80
To put this difference in context, a reliable 28 percent decrease
would be required; this decrease would be equivalent to comparing
the highest recent count of 164 suicides in 2012 to the lowest recent
count of 120 suicides in 2015 (a 27 percent change).81 This reduction
target should be considered in the context of the overall literature
on suicide prevention techniques. Indeed, a recent meta-analysis on
reducing the population suicide rate detailed a statistical model that
combined all current, evidence-based suicide prevention strategies
into a single, integrated strategy.82 If implemented with perfect fidelity,
these data suggest a multiyear strategy hypothetically could reach a
25 percent reduction.

Recommendations

In summary, the data on US Army suicides differs from the typical
narrative in popular media: the rate of soldier suicide does not differ
from the general US population and has been at a steady state since
2011.83 This steady state indicates Army-wide interventions to decrease
suicide have been ineffective at reducing the suicide rate despite the
lack of specific studies evaluating the impact of prevention efforts. It is
possible the comparison of trends between the US population suicide
rate, which has increased over the past decade, and the US Army suicide
rate, which remains steady, could be interpreted as US Army efforts
being successful in preventing a corresponding increase.
But due to the very low base suicide rate in the Army, the relatively
small population of soldiers compared to the general population, and
year-to-year measurement error over a relatively short period, the most
likely interpretation of this data is in line with more robust research
findings that the US population suicide rate does not differ from the
US Army suicide rate. Leaders must strive to understand that current
suicide rates in the United States are not unique to the military and are
occurring as part of broader societal trends. In pursuit of this goal, the
authors offer four recommendations.

Research
First, despite demands for increasingly immediate data, any suicide
rate calculations should focus on annual numbers, not quarterly
reporting, and trends should only be interpreted based on multiyear
comparisons rather than year-to-year variation. As the US Army seeks to
eliminate suicide, interim targets for significant decreases should be set.

80. Pruitt et al., (DoDSER): Calendar Year 2016, 31.
81. Larry D. Pruitt et al., Department of Defense Suicide Event Report (DoDSER): Calendar Year 2015
Annual Report, no. E-6A4ED71 (Washington, DC: Defense Health Agency), 17.
82. Christensen, Cuijpers, and Reynolds, “Changing the Direction,” 435–36.
83. Pruitt et al., (DoDSER): Calendar Year 2016, iv.
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Second, prevention efforts must be validated before widespread
implementation. Whereas unit-wide suicide prevention training
programs have raised awareness during the past two decades, none have
been shown to reduce suicide behavior or suicide deaths.84 Additional
prevention programs should not be emphasized; instead, research should
be dedicated to clear demonstrations of program efficacy and adherence
to implementation science practice.

Prevention
Third, the Army must continue to address the drivers for suicide
at the individual level. The recent elimination of mandatory suicide
prevention training requirements at the unit level provides leaders with
an opportunity to focus on risk mitigation among those soldiers facing
the greatest occupational, interpersonal, and social risks. Emerging tools
to assist leaders in addressing suicide concerns among servicemembers
similarly focus on a one-on-one assessment that mitigates risk at the
individual level.85 Like airmen in the Air Force Limited Privilege
Suicide Prevention program, soldiers facing investigations or other
legal problems should be allowed to seek behavioral health support
during crises without this information becoming admissible as part
of the medical record or adversely affecting the soldier during legal or
administrative proceedings.86
Furthermore, formal unit-level mentoring programs for soldiers
facing divorce or occupational problems can ensure individuals are aware
of support options such as legal, financial, and housing assistance.87 The
Army should mandate empirically supported treatment techniques in
clinical settings with an emphasis on individualized safety planning
that involves collaboration between the servicemember, the chain of
command, and treatment providers.88
Fourth, the US Army must become a learning organization in its
approach to suicide prevention. The effectiveness of some prevention
efforts during the past decade may have been hampered by frontline
leaders assuming they would be held responsible if they intervened and
the soldier subsequently died by suicide.89 Commanders at all levels
cannot abdicate responsibility for suicide deaths in their formations, but
their accountability must remain within the bounds of their control.
Commanders’ critical incident reporting and fatality review boards can
focus on best practices to mitigate risk associated with known drivers
of suicide behavior.
Additionally, professional military education programs should set
aside time for seminar discussions about frontline approaches to suicide
84. Burnette, Ramchand, and Ayer, “Gatekeepers Training for Suicide Prevention,” 16.
85. Hoyt et al., “Development of a Leader Tool.”
86. Department of the Air Force, Medical Operations: Mental Health, Air Force Instruction 44-172
(Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 2015), 39.
87. Hoyt et al., “Development of a Leader Tool.”
88. Hoyt and Repke, “Managing Soldiers at Risk,” 429.
89. Ramchand et al., “Noncommissioned Officers’ Perspectives,” 1059.
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risk mitigation. It is the authors’ experience that all senior leaders have
direct familiarity with individual cases of suicide behavior in their
formations. Leaders must share the successes and failures of frontline
approaches to risk mitigation in order to disseminate best practices and
drive innovative approaches. By addressing these areas through a culture
of learning, strategic leaders may be able to facilitate a reliable decrease
in the number of suicide deaths in the US Army.
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ABSTRACT: US military Joint and Army civil affairs doctrine has
failed to consider the operational relevance of gender, posing a risk
to mission accomplishment and force protection. A comparison
of NATO and Australian Defence Force doctrine reveals gender
considerations have been included in Allied doctrine in recent years.
US land-force operational planning can provide an example of how
a focus on civil affairs doctrine could jump-start the process to
address the larger doctrinal gender deficit quickly and effectively.

T

he US military’s failure to consider gender as an operational
factor will result in incomplete operational pictures from the
tactical to the strategic. Moreover, because US Allies such as
NATO partners and Australia already factor gender into their doctrine
and operations, this gap in doctrine degrades interoperability.1 All military
doctrine must include analysis informing commanders, planners, and
operators what the operational risks of failing to consider gender could
be, and how these omissions could impede mission accomplishment
unless appropriately mitigated.
In his influential book, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern
World, General Sir Rupert Smith introduced the idea of “war amongst
the people” as an evolving characteristic of conflict in the modern
international security environment.2 In Smith’s view, conflict was
becoming ever more civilian-centric, and adversaries found themselves
contending less for key terrain on the ground and more for influence
over the people living there. This evolution is in part the result of trends
such as the continuing growth of the world’s population, increased
urbanization, the flowering of the megacity, the global reach of the
Internet, the negative impacts of climate change, and the use of social
media platforms to mobilize individuals and communities of interest.3
Importantly, about half of these people are female.
The Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Act of 2017 carves out a
role for the US military in operationalizing certain aspects of gender.4
Although the Department of Defense has made progress incorporating

1. Jody M. Prescott, Armed Conflict: Women and Climate Change (London: Routledge, 2018), 130–
51, 168–69, 212–14.
2. Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Knopf,
2007), xiii, 269–307.
3. Prescott, Armed Conflict, 8–9.
4. UN Security Council, Resolution 1325 (2000); and Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017,
Pub. L. No. 115-68, 131 Stat. 1202 (October 6, 2017).
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gender considerations into military activities and operations,
implementation has been uneven and slow.
This article assesses the status of the incorporation of gender
considerations into US military doctrine, highlighting recent progress
and continuing overall deficits. To provide a concrete example of
such deficits, this article examines the failure of US civil affairs (CA)
doctrine to consider gender adequately and, by way of comparison,
explores approaches taken by NATO and the Australian Defence Force
(ADF) in their respective civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and
civilian-related doctrines.
Next by way of remedy, this article analyzes US land-force planning
doctrine to identify where and how gender considerations could be
effectively included in the mission, enemy, terrain, troops available,
time and civilian considerations (METT-TC) component of the
planning process.5 Because civil affairs is the staff section expected to
bring the C of “civilian considerations” into the land-force METT-TC
planning tool, updating both Joint- and land-force-level CA doctrine
is a profitable point from which to jump-start a reassessment of US
operational doctrine in terms of gender.6 Finally, the article explores
recently updated ADF doctrine to describe the gap that still exists
between an evolving modern doctrinal approach to gender and a
methodology facilitating the assessment of operational risk posed by
neglecting gender considerations.

Gender in US Strategy and Doctrine

The 2019 national WPS strategy promotes “the meaningful inclusion
of women in processes to prevent, mediate, resolve, and recover from
deadly conflict or disaster.” To accomplish these aims, the strategy sets
out four lines of interrelated efforts across the government, primarily
focused on increasing the “meaningful participation of women . . . in
decision making processes related to conflict and crisis” in US programs
and by partner nations, promoting “the protection of women and girls’
human rights,” and adjusting international programs to boost outcomes
in women’s equality and empowerment.7
To accomplish its overarching objectives, the June 2020 DoD
implementation plan (required by the national strategy) outlines
intermediate objectives, each with effects that can be measured. One
important effect is the establishment of “policy, doctrine, and training,
as appropriate, to enable implementation of the WPS Strategy.”8 This
emphasis on WPS augments meaningful work already underway at the
combatant command level, such as gender-related training programs,
5. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), C2, Commander and Staff Organization and
Operations, Field Manual (FM) 6-0, (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2016), 9-22.
6. HQDA, Commander and Staff Organization, 9-37.
7. White House, United States Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security (Washington, DC: White
House, June 2019), 4, 6, 16.
8. US Department of Defense (DoD), Women, Peace, and Security Strategic Framework and
Implementation Plan (Washington, DC: DoD, June 2020).
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considerations of gender in training exercises with international partner
militaries, and gender coaching programs for combatant command
senior leadership.9 At the Joint service level, doctrine is being updated
during the regular review process to include gender considerations.10
Doctrine is one area where it is possible to assess the magnitude
of the challenge facing the Department of Defense in meaningfully
incorporating gender considerations across the spectrum of military
operations and activities with some degree of quantitative certainty. The
military has made important progress in some areas, such as updated
joint foreign humanitarian assistance doctrine in 2019 that includes
substantive references to WPS and the most recent iteration of Joint
stability operations doctrine.11 In general, however, gender considerations
barely register.
For example, Joint urban operations doctrine notes only that
“culturally inappropriate interaction with women” by US soldiers might
antagonize a population, and that a population analysis should include
“delineating its primary attributes, such as age, wealth, gender, ethnicity,
religion and employment statistics.”12 Thus it is not clear the regular
review process is as effective as it should be. A better approach would
be using US civil affairs doctrine to jump-start the inclusion of gender
considerations in all levels of US military doctrine.

US Civil Affairs Joint Doctrine

On the ground, US civil affairs operations consistently consider
gender. There are numerous examples of CA units and troops in the field
taking a gendered approach to promote the growth of social, economic,
and political stability in different areas of operation. For example, these
troops assisted combat units in sponsoring women’s bazaars in Iraq so
local women could earn hard currency to help support their families and
learn business skills.13 What is missing from CA doctrine, however, is a
methodology that would provide civil affairs units with a platform for
more consistent implementation of these efforts and promote greater
interoperability with Allied forces in conducting them.
One might expect joint CA doctrine would be first and foremost
in dealing with the operational relevance of gender. Joint Publication
(JP) 5-37, Civil Military Operations dashes such assumptions. Women
are mentioned only three times and only in the planning context. For
example, planners are advised to consider including logistic support for
civil-military operations that normally falls “outside military logistics,
9. Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, Stability & Humanitarian Affairs and Joint
Staff J5, Global Policy & Partnerships, “Department of Defense Women, Peace, & Security”
(December 2019), Briefing Slides.
10. Dr. Elizabeth Lape, e-mail to author (May 22, 2019).
11. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Joint Publication (JP)
3-29 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2019), I-4, III-11, IV-9, 16, 31–32, A-1–A-3; D-4–D-5; and JCS, Stability,
JP 3-07 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2016), II-7, III-12, III-51, IV-25.
12. JCS, Joint Urban Operations, JP 3-06 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2013), III-15, A-6.
13. Specialist Jamie Vernon, “Women’s Bazaar Helps Local Iraqi Families,” US Army, February
24, 2009, https://www.army.mil/article/17381/womens_bazaar_helps_local_iraqi_families.
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such as support to the civilian populace (e.g., women, children, and
the elderly).”14 Lastly, in preparing for negotiations, planners are
advised to consider culture in setting the “appropriate construct” for a
meeting, asking themselves “for example, what role do women play in
the society?”15
One could argue although women are only mentioned three times,
men are not mentioned at all—thus the doctrine is intended to be gender
neutral, and perhaps therefore nondiscriminatory. A closer review,
however, confirms the doctrine is not gender neutral—it is instead
male normative. The lens through which the operational environment
is analyzed is male, apparently based on an assumption that what is
applicable to the men in a civilian population is equally applicable to
the women.
Consider, for example, the perspective conveyed in the JP 3-57
section dealing with civil information management
(figure 1).
Civil Information Management
Notional Civil Information Management Connects-the-Dots
between People in the Operational Environment
Commander

Mayor

Religious
Leader

Insurgent
Leader
Relative or
Associate

Key Leader Engagement
Town Populace

Legend
joint force

civilians

insurgents

Figure 1. Civil information
3. Civil Affairs management (reprinted from Joint Chiefs of Staff ( JCS),
Civil-Military Operations,
DC: JCS,
CIM is aJP
core3-57
task of[Washington,
CA, the primary responsibility
of the2018])
civil affairs officer or
noncommissioned officer in the CIM cell, and an essential task for all CA in coordination
with the J-2. The JFC should task supported units’ intelligence and maneuver elements
with CIM to support JFC decision making though enhancing the COP and supporting the
JIPOE process.

This diagram illustrates what JP 3-57 sets out as an innovative
a. Civil Affairs CIM Database. Various organizations at all levels use different
approach to interacting
with local civilian leaders. This approach
databases and applications for CIM. The Services and CCMDs, including United States
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), conduct ongoing efforts to identify and
relates to “understanding
who local leaders are; how they relate
develop systems and processes to conduct CIM using common doctrine and technical
to others; andstandards.
the populace’s needs, strengths, weaknesses, and
limitations.”16 In this example, the Joint force commander, “[in
accordance with] conventional wisdom,” chooses to “conduct [key
C-3
leader engagement] with the [male] town mayor to influence public
17
attitudes toward the local insurgency.” Joint Publication 3-57 instead
14.
15.
16.
17.

JCS, Civil-Military Operations, JP 3-57 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2018), III-12.
JCS, Civil-Military Operations, II-12, B-15.
JCS, Civil-Military Operations, C-2.
JCS, Civil-Military Operations, C-2.
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suggests the more fruitful path to accomplish the commander’s intent
is to work through the local male religious leader, because he is related
by marriage to the local insurgent leader and has more influence on
the townspeople.
While this is a plausible scenario, let us look instead at the story the
diagram tells visually rather than textually and assess whether the lesson
it seeks to convey is truly innovative. First, the primary actors in this
civilian-centric situation are the Joint force commander and troops on
one side and the insurgent leader and his force on the other. The mayor,
the religious leader, and the “relative or associate” have male silhouettes.
The civilian populace is represented by a mixture of smaller silhouettes,
and two of the five figures appear to be female.
Visually, in this civilian-centric environment in which the
commander wishes to influence the attitudes of members of the
population, less than 8 percent of all the actors are recognizable as
female and at most only 40 percent of the population itself is female.
Further, although the civilian population’s attitudes are the primary
objective, the arrows between the religious leader and the populace
flow only from him to them—there is no feedback loop indicating the
town citizenry have input to or opinions on the matter. Further, to the
extent the women have different perspectives, not only do their opinions
apparently matter less than the men’s, but their views are at risk of not
being conveyed back to the Joint force commander.
Finally, this scenario pivots on an unexamined assumption: the
relation by marriage provides a possible influence vector simply because
two key leaders have a common brother-in-law. This assumption ignores
the fact a woman is likely the reason for this linkage. Her attitudes
toward her brothers-in-law may have a significant impact on whether
and how any information is transmitted between the men in question.
The diagram and its textual explanation ignore this possibility, but
human nature suggests it is entirely plausible. Rather than presenting
an innovative scenario, this example reflects the conventional malenorming seen throughout the rest of the document.

US Civil Affairs Land-Force Doctrine

If the unspoken male-normative nature of Joint CA doctrine creates
an unnecessary blind spot in operational analysis, it unfortunately
is replicated in land-force-level doctrine. Some land-force-level
doctrine publications simply make no mention of operational gender
considerations. Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-57.20, Multi-Service
Support Techniques for Civil Affairs Support to Foreign Humanitarian Assistance;
ATP 3-57.30, Civil Affairs Support to Nation Assistance; and ATP 3-57.70,
Civil-Military Operations Center fall into this category.18

18. HQDA, Multi-Service Support Techniques for Civil Affairs Support to Foreign Humanitarian
Assistance, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-57.20 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2013); HQDA,
Civil Affairs Support to Nation Assistance, ATP 3-57.30 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2014); and HQDA,
Civil-Military Operations Center, ATP 3-57.70 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2014).
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In other CA doctrine, operational gender considerations register, but
barely. Although revisions that include gender will be published soon,
Field Manual (FM) 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, does not mention gender
explicitly; it only notes, in the context of populace control in providing
humanitarian assistance, that women may be in the category of at-risk
persons who have greater needs than others.19 ATP 3-57.10, Civil Affairs
Support to Populace and Resources Control, and ATP 3-57.60, Civil Affairs
Planning, note only that “if applicable,” the gender of host-nation persons
who might be helpful to the mission be included in their descriptions.20
These formulations, too, reflect the male-normative nature of these
doctrinal publications and suggest considering the women in the local
population is optional, perhaps even unnecessary.

NATO Doctrine

NATO doctrine does not reflect this gender blindness. Since the
2009 publication of the first bi-strategic command directive on gender
in military operations, NATO has continued to refine requirements
and expectations for dealing with the operational relevance of gender.21
Under Bi-Strategic Command Directive 040-001 (2017), NATO
emphasized the need for Alliance members to increase the number of
women they provide to NATO missions and to provide qualified staff
to fill headquarters-level gender adviser (GENAD) positions and civil
engagement teams to work with women in the field.22
Sweden is a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, and
its Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations has been appointed
by NATO as the department head for education and training for gender
in military operations.23 The Centre conducts courses on gender in
operations for commanders and trains GENADs and tactical-level
gender focal points—troops who work on gender matters as a collateral
duty.24 Graduates of the Centre’s courses have served as gender advisers
in deployed NATO headquarters.25 Further, in the civil affairs context
specifically, the NATO-recognized CIMIC Centre of Excellence located
in The Hague, Netherlands, has strongly advocated for the inclusion

19. HQDA, Civil Affairs Operations, FM 3-57 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2019), 2-29.
20. HQDA, Civil Affairs Planning, ATP 3-57.60 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2014), B-12; and
HQDA, Civil Affairs Support to Populace and Resources Control, ATP 3.57.10 (Washington, DC: HQDA,
2013), A-12, A-21, A-30.
21. Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation (ACO and ACT),
Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspectives in the NATO Command Structure including Measures for
Protection during Armed Conflict, Bi-Strategic Command Directive 040-001 (Norfolk, VA: ACO & ACT,
2009).
22. ACO and ACT, Integrating UNSCR 1325.
23. ACO and ACT, Integrating UNSCR 1325, 16.
24. Forvarsmakten, “Courses and Seminars at NCGM,” Nordic Centre for Gender in Military
Operations, https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/swedint/nordic-centre-for-gender-in-military
-operations/courses-at-ncgm-and-how-to-apply2/.
25. Megan Bastick and Claire Duncanson, “Agents of Change? Gender Advisors in NATO
Militaries,” International Peacekeeping 25, no. 4 (2018): 554–77.
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of gender considerations into CA operations, supplying practical,
deployment-tested examples and best practices.26
Doctrinally, NATO sees gender as “an integral part of” crosscutting
topics—such as children, armed conflict, and WPS—in the operational
environment and linked “to the social attributes associated with being
male and female learned through socialization . . . [which] determines a
person’s position and value in a given context.”27 Accordingly, “integration
of gender perspective is a way of assessing gender-based differences of
women and men reflected in their social roles and interactions, in the
distribution of power and the access to resources.” This integration is
operationalized in an overarching manner by making gender advisers
and gender focal points responsible for bringing this perspective into the
“planning, execution and evaluation processes of military operations.”28
Importantly, the CIMIC staff is still responsible for providing
the commander the CIMIC estimate of the operational situation to
be used in planning, which is a “comprehensive analysis of the civil
environment, all its components and actors and their relationships
(including an integrating gender perspective).”29 Thus doctrinally,
the gender advisory staff will work with and through the CIMIC
staff to incorporate gender considerations into the staff analysis for
the commander. This civil-military cooperation effort, however,
only produces gender analysis not an operational risk analysis of
neglecting gender.

Joint Australian Defence Force Doctrine

NATO’s efforts to include operational gender considerations in
its civil affairs doctrine mark a significant advance over the US CA
doctrinal approach, but the Australian Defence Force outpaces even
NATO’s efforts in many instances. Australia, which has an individual
partnership arrangement with NATO, has taken the lead in efforts to
incorporate the operational relevance of gender into both nonkinetic
and kinetic military operations.30
The ADF has established its own GENAD training course, which
allows it to develop a bench of deployable gender advisers to assist in
operations, and its Peace Operations Training Centre has conducted
weeklong gender seminars for mixed civilian and military audiences.31

26. Captain Stephanie Groothedde, Gender Makes Sense: A Way to Improve Your Mission, 2nd ed.
(Den Haag: Civil-Military Co-operation Centre of Excellence, 2013), https://issuu.com/ccoe_pao
/docs/a5-g2nd-main-body_cover-v0.7.
27. NATO Standardization Office (NSO), Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation, AJP
3-19, ed. A ver. 1 (Brussels: NSO, 2018), 1-10, 1-11.
28. NSO, Civil-Military Cooperation, 1-12.
29. NSO, Civil-Military Cooperation, 5-3.
30. Australia Department of Defence, Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme between
Australia and the North Atlantic Trade Organization (Canberra, Australia: Department of Defence,
2013), http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/docs/Australia-NATO-Individual-Partnership
-Cooperation-Program.pdf.
31. Australian Defence Force (ADF), “Operational GENAD Course,” (2017), syllabus, copy on
file with author; and Major Attila Ovari, e-mail to author, August 29, 2019.
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The ADF provided course materials to assist the United States in
developing and conducting its own operational gender course.32 The
ADF has ensured the role of the gender adviser and the operational
relevance of gender figure prominently in the large-scale biennial training
exercise it holds with the United States, Talisman Saber.33 Finally, the ADF
has provided several senior-ranking GENADs to the multinational
missions in Afghanistan and Iraq.34
The ADF has undertaken a whole-scale revision of existing joint
doctrine including the operational relevance of gender. Australian
Defence Force Procedures (ADFP) 5.0.1, ed. 2, The Joint Military
Appreciation Process (August 2019)—equivalent to the US Joint Operation
Planning Process—recognizes the role of the senior gender adviser
in the command group and identifies the lack of appropriate gender
proportions in the force. This doctrine makes special provisions for
the protection of women as potential risk elements and provides a
hypothetical scenario in which the senior gender adviser consults with
the J5 plans staff as part of the framing and scoping process to clarify
operational problems posed to the mission.35 Other ADF doctrine has
been, or will be, revised.36
Importantly, the ADF has also created new doctrine specifically
focused on gender in military operations. These documents, Air Force
Doctrine Note 1-18, Gender in Air Operations, and Joint Doctrine Note
(JDN) 2-18, Gender in Military Operations, are pioneering efforts to
establish practicable and methodological approaches for leveraging
gender matters in operations.37 In particular, JDN 2-18 outlines the role
civil-military cooperation units can play in taking a gendered approach
to joint and multinational operations.
Joint Doctrine Note 2-18 recognizes actions which effect people
differently on the basis of gender can have a negative impact on mission
efforts to establish peace or stability, and “[a] detailed analysis of
sex disaggregated reporting and data using this gender lens can also
provide the commander with a richer intelligence picture and deeper
understanding of the operational environment.” In this regard, JDN
2-18 distinguishes between “gender analysis” and “gender assessment.”
It notes although some organizations see the terms as synonymous, “the
32. US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), “U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Delivers
First U.S. Operational Gender Advisor Course,” USINDOPACOM, June 8, 2018, https://www
.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1545572/us-indo-pacific-command
-delivers-first-us-operational-gender-advisor-course/.
33. Vince Lowery, “Coping with Noncombatant Women in the Battlespace,” Military Review 97,
no. 2 (May-June 2017), 39–42.
34. Prescott, Armed Conflict, 218–19.
35. Chief of Joint Operations (CJO), Joint Planning, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication
(ADDP) 5.0, ed. 2 (Canberra, Australia: CJO, 2014), 3-16–3-17; and Vice Chief of the Defence
Force (VCDF), Australian Defence Force Procedures, (ADFP) 5.0.1, ed. 2, The Joint Military Appreciation
Process (Canberra, Australia: VCDF, 2019), 1B-3, 1C-14, 2-28, 2B-2.
36. Prescott, Armed Conflict, 164.
37. Director, General Strategy and Policy, Air Force (DGSP-AF), Gender in Air Operations, Air
Force Doctrine Note 1-18 (Canberra, Australia: DGSP-AF, 2018); and VCDF, Gender in Military
Operations, Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 2-18, (Canberra, Australia: VCDF, 2018).
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ADF considers a gender assessment to be standing information about a
context, whereas the gender analysis entails applying that information
to draw out deductions relevant to an operational context.” Importantly,
these deductions are not just the impacts military forces might have
on local populations, but they are also aimed at “understanding how
different sections of a population might affect all phases of an operation
at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.”38
Joint Doctrine Note 2-18 also recognizes that gender analysis
has many purposes—grounding planning decisions on facts rather
than attitudes and assumptions, identifying otherwise overlooked
key community actors with whom to engage, and shaping “force
protection and population engagement strategies.” Importantly, gender
considerations are not to become planning orphans, relegated to some
obscure annex at the back of the operations plan. Instead, “gender
considerations and the key implications from the gender analysis should
be incorporated into the main body of all operational planning products
and documents to every extent possible.”39
The factors to be evaluated in this analysis are holistic: population
demographics, health demographics, power structures and leadership,
control and access to resources, and sex- and gender-based violence in
the area of operations. What the gender analysis seems to lack, however,
is a rigorous methodology for its creation. In particular, a review of
the figures used to explain the development of the analysis provide a
cautionary note in the development of gender analysis as it pertains to
operational risk—such analysis is crucial, but at the current time it is
perhaps underdeveloped.40
Although joint doctrine notes are not official doctrine in the
Australian doctrine hierarchy, JDN 2-18 is surprisingly directive in terms
of specific responsibilities for military leaders. Not only are commanders
tasked with ensuring their staffs and units have “a clear understanding of
gender issues and gender awareness at all levels,” they must also ensure
gender expertise is integrated at all decision-making levels and applied in
all planning and decision-making processes. Senior officers and specific
commanders in the ADF are charged with taking steps to incorporate
gender considerations in their staffs’ and commands’ work, including
the vice chief of the Defence Force, the chief of joint operations, the
service chiefs, and the Australian Defence College commander.41 These
steps are already complemented by efforts underway to consult with
intelligence staff to ensure better integration of gender considerations
with intelligence processes.42
In contrast with US civil affairs and NATO civil-military cooperation
doctrine, the entry point for gender analysis in the Australian military
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

VCDF, Gender in Military Operations, 4, 6–7.
VCDF, Gender in Military Operations, 8, 9.
VCDF, Gender in Military Operations, A-1, A-3, A-4–A-7; and Prescott, Armed Conflict, 11.
VCDF, Gender in Military Operations, 10–13.
Major Attila Ovari, e-mail to author, January 23, 2020.
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appreciation process is through the intelligence staff (with the gender
adviser assisting), rather than through the CIMIC staff, as part of the
joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment. The
CIMIC staff is expected to undertake actual actions ensuring “funding
is provided for specific gendered activities and programs,” such as key
leadership engagement meetings, providing “engagement and liaison
with local women,” and promoting projects geared toward local women.43
This division of labor reflects the tendency of GENADs to work at the
operational level, while CIMIC staff tends to work at the tactical level.44

Australian Land-Force Doctrine

Although ADF joint civil-military cooperation doctrine is not
available in the public domain, Australian Army doctrine is. Published
in 2017, Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD) 3-8-6, Civil-Military Cooperation,
combines its discussion of gender perspectives with the crosscutting
theme of WPS. On a full page, it explains the Australian National
Action Plan on WPS and related UN Security Council Resolutions.
It notes as an example that quick impact projects among the local
population should be “sensitive to considerations of gender, ethnicity,
age and vulnerability.”45
In apparent contrast with the scheme set out in JDN 2-18, LWD
3-8-6 confirms civil-military cooperation is expected to contribute
a civil estimate to the intelligence preparation of the battlespace,
which includes an assessment of “operational risks from threat force
civil space objectives and actions, as well as consequences of friendly
force actions.”46 Land Warfare Doctrine 3-8-6 presents a thorough
methodology for developing individual key leader engagement briefing
packs. This methodology includes conducting a residual assessment to
determine what risks remain after mitigation actions have been taken
regarding the key leader and assessing the mission and its personnel,
relationships with other individuals, and unintended consequences, such
as physical damage and intangible second- and third-order effects.47
This appendix is complemented by an annex specifically dealing with
nonkinetic-effect target risk assessment.48
Interestingly, LWD 3-8-6 assesses the variables present in the area
of operations using the political, military, economic, social, information,
infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) rubric
coupled with the Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People,
and Events (ASCOPE) analysis approach, revealing perhaps a slight
disconnect between Australian and US planning doctrine, since the US
Army would ordinarily use PMESII-PT-style analysis in Joint planning

43. VCDF, Gender in Military Operations, A-1, B-5.
44. Major Attila Ovari, e-mail to author, January 23, 2020.
45. Commander, Headquarters, 2nd Division (HQ 2nd Div.), Civil-Military Cooperation, Land
Warfare Doctrine (LWD) 3-8-6 (Sydney, Australia: HQ 2nd Div., 2018), 42, 95.
46. HQ 2nd Div., Civil-Military Cooperation, 58.
47. HQ 2nd Div., Civil-Military Cooperation, 77–85.
48. HQ 2nd Div., Civil-Military Cooperation, 157–64.
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and ASCOPE to determine civil considerations in METT-TC for mission
planning.49 This may not make a significant functional difference in the
Australian Defence Force since both GENADS at the operational level
and CIMIC staff at the tactical level use this tool.50 Similarly, although
none of the information collection categories for PMESII-PT analysis
explicitly include gender, assessments of the humanitarian situation in
areas of operations do include information about at-risk populations.51
From a multinational perspective, ASCOPE could include gender in the
people category, but as noted earlier, US civil affairs planning doctrine
only suggests nonmilitary personnel supporting CA in the area of
operations have their gender noted, “if applicable.”52
In sum, at the combined and joint levels, NATO and ADF CIMIC
doctrine have taken significant steps to include the operational relevance
of gender into planning and operations, recognize the role of gender,
and emphasize educational and training efforts to address gender. At the
ADF land-force level, some gender information already exists in civilmilitary cooperation doctrine, and importantly, it already engages with
the idea of risk as an integral part of civil-military cooperation analysis.
Although the United States has undertaken important educational and
training efforts, largely at the combatant command level it appears,
gender is missing in most Joint and land-force civil affairs doctrine.
This gap suggests while gender considerations might get attention at
the highest US military planning levels, any connections between such
planning measures and what is actually occurring in any given area of
operations are modest.

Conclusion

The absence in current US civil affairs doctrine of any meaningful
description of the operational relevance of gender in CA planning and
operations is puzzling. Some might say this absence is purposeful because
the doctrine is intended to be gender neutral. This rationalization is
weak because civil affairs doctrine at its heart is male-normative.
Further, while gender neutrality is important in staffing a force and
affording career advancement opportunities to qualified personnel, it is
a very naive lens through which to view civilian-centric missions in an
area of operations. Among the different cultures and societies deployed
US military personnel are expected to work with, life is rarely gender
neutral. In these situations, ostensible neutrality regarding gender is not
an operational virtue—as stated earlier, it is gender blindness.
Blindness to the potentially different security needs of women and
girls—such as physical, food, energy, and water security—in an area
of operations is imprudent and detrimental to mission accomplishment
and force protection. Presuming all security needs of a population are

49. HQ 2nd Div., Civil-Military Cooperation, 204, 209–10; and HQDA, Doctrine Primer, ADP 1-01
(Washington, DC: HQDA, 2019), 4-4, 5-1; and Lowery, “Women in the Battlespace,” 90.
50. Major Attila Ovari, e-mail to author, January 23, 2020.
51. HQ 2nd Div., Civil-Military Cooperation, 174–75, 203–4.
52. HQDA, Civil Affairs Planning, B-12.
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homogenous irrespective of gender is inconsistent with the granular
level of cultural understanding special operations forces members, such
as civil affairs personnel, are expected to achieve and exercise.53
Further, failing to address the operational relevance of gender
in a meaningful way could lead to operational inconsistencies with
some of our closest allies and thereby compromise interoperability in
multinational missions. Such failures could also negatively affect crucial
domestic support in host countries for these missions. Having identified
the gap, however, and recognizing the operational risks presented by
neglecting gender in US civil affairs doctrine, what is the remedy?
Some might be satisfied just to include content about women, peace,
and security in CA doctrine. This would be a significant improvement,
but it risks implementing what Dharmapuri has cogently described as
the “add women and stir” approach—by itself, it is unlikely to result
in any meaningful improvement in providing commanders, planners,
and operators with actionable analysis they can use to further their
missions.54 Instead, the doctrinal treatment of gender considerations
should be purposeful. Addressing gender in doctrine should focus on
developing gender analysis for the operational environment and then
analyzing risks to the mission and personnel posed by neglecting to
consider gender. This comprehensive approach would allow civil affairs
units at the land-force level, for example, to use the C component of
METT-TC to address the full range of threats posed to the mission in
any civilian-centric area of operations.
Staff planners could develop and propose solutions to mitigate these
risks, and commanders and operators could then weigh the benefits and
costs of these solutions in the same context as other risks. Importantly,
using gender-related content in doctrine to drive an analytical
methodology that could be shared with valued allies and multinational
partners would help build a bridge of common understanding in shared
operational environments. In this way, a targeted focus on civil affairs
doctrine could push positive systemic impacts across DoD efforts and
help achieve US goals for peace and security as they relate to women.

53. HQDA, Army Special Operations, ADP 3-05 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2019), 8-12.
54. Sahana Dharmapuri, “Just Add Women and Stir?” Parameters 41, no. 1 (Spring 2011), 65–66.
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ABSTRACT: The US military must prepare for the realities of
densely populated areas as it plans and conducts campaigns. This
planning must include considerations of soldiers’ health and wellbeing. An engaged analysis of urban battlespaces in the midtwentieth and early twenty-first centuries highlights the need for
essential updates to US military doctrine and training, particularly in
the areas of civilian mass casualties and civilian noncombatants in
the urban battlespace.

T

he accelerating urbanization of human society and the locations
of recent conflicts indicate future combat will likely occur
within urbanized environments or even in a rising megacity.1
Spurred by the Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Group and the United
States Military Academy’s Urban Warfare Project, the US military is
beginning to identify the implications of such warfare and the effects of
the use of force in urban environments.2 As the 2017 Joint publication
Urban Operations recognizes, military operations in cities are now “both
inevitable and the norm.”3
Despite this increased focus, the military has largely neglected an
engaged analysis of the most salient aspects of this emerging warfare
challenge: the presence of large-scale civilian populations within
the battlespace, the likelihood of mass civilian casualties resulting
from such warfare, and the implications of these factors for military
operations. In addition to the battles of Manila (1945) and Grozny
(1994–95), the campaigns in Fallujah, Mosul, Raqqa, and Marawi
remind us of the inherent harm to civilians and to civilian infrastructure
resulting from urban warfare.4 The increasing population density of
future urban battlefields, therefore, increases the probability of mass
civilian causalities.
1 Kevin M. Felix and Frederick D. Wong, “The Case for Megacities,” Parameters 45, no. 1 (Spring
2015): 20.
2 William G. Adamson, “Megacities and the US Army,” Parameters 45, no. 1 (Spring 2015):
45–54; Marc Harris et al., Megacities and the United States Army: Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain
Future (Arlington, VA: Chief of Staff of the Army, 2014); and “Urban Warfare Project,” Modern
War Institute, United States Military Academy (USMA), accessed December 17, 2019.
3 Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) and Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC),
Urban Operations, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-06/Marine Corps Techniques Publication
(MCTP) 12-10B (Washington, DC: HQDA/HQMC, 2017), 1-1.
4 Emma Gilligan, Terror in Chechnya: Russia and the Tragedy of Civilians in War (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2009), 45; and Robert Ross Smith, Triumph in the Philippines (Washington,
DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1963), 307.
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Moreover, current US military guidance generally fails to examine
fully the possibility adversaries waging conflict in cities will leverage the
asymmetric advantage of at-risk civilians to counter America’s superior
military firepower and technology.5 Instead, the presence of civilians
and civilian infrastructure is treated as a secondary complication that
can be adequately mitigated through campaign planning and execution.
The guidance also neglects direct and sustained investigation
of the specific impacts civilian presence and harm on the battlefield
pose to America’s operations and its fighting force. As one analysis of
urban warfare explains, “the human dimension of cities” is essential to
discussions of urban operations.6 Thus America’s military must begin
preparing for the potential impacts of large-scale civilian populations
on the military’s ability to initiate and maintain city-based campaigns.
This preparation includes planning and conducting strategic, tactical,
and combatant operations that preserve the health and well-being of
servicemembers.

Urbanization

The demographic trends resulting from global population growth
and migration have been well cited. The United Nations estimated more
than 54 percent of the world’s population (4 billion people) resided in
cities during 2015 and predicted the figure to increase to two thirds of
the world’s population by 2050.7 By 2050 populations in global cities are
expected to increase by 2.5 billion people, with close to 90 percent of
this urban growth taking place in Africa and Asia—a daunting fact for
US security planning.8
This growth is transforming the scale and space of human
geography. Urbanization increases population densities and city sprawl
as more people and structures expand from the centers of cities. The
area of urban land in developing countries is predicted to triple by 2030,
greatly outpacing city population growth.9 Indeed, in just over a decade,
the number of megacities with 10 million inhabitants is predicted to
increase from 33 to 43.10 Given this growth in urban density and scale,
US forces will likely be called upon to conduct major operations in urban
environments that include small-sized towns or ultra-large megacities.11
This trend coincides with another important aspect of US military
operations—the shift in doctrinal focus from population-centric to
5 Charles J. Dunlap Jr., “Lawfare 101: A Primer,” Military Review 97, no. 3 (May–June 2017).
6 John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus, “Command of the Cities: Towards a Theory of Urban
Strategy,” Small Wars Journal, September 26, 2011, 10.
7 United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), World Cities Report 2016:
Urbanization and Development–Emerging Futures (Nairobi: UN-Habitat, 2016), 6; and United
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-EconSocial), 2018 Revision of World
Urbanization Prospects (New York: United Nations, 2018), 23.
8 UN-EconSocial, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2018 Revision (New York: United Nations,
2018).
9 UN-Habitat, World Cities Report 2016, 7.
10 UN-EconSocial, World Urbanization.
11 Michael Evans, “The Case against Megacities,” Parameters 45, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 35.
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enemy-centric operations as embodied in the Army’s emerging focus
on lethality and multidomain operations. The population-centric model
of counterinsurgency, illustrated by the Army’s Iraq War–era adoption
of Counterinsurgency, focused explicitly on protecting civilians as the key
center of gravity for achieving victory.12
Lessons developed from this period were based in a
counterinsurgency environment characterized generally by small-unit
actions, often conducted outside of populated areas, in which US forces
largely held operational initiative. In this environment, combined
strategic, ethical, and legal imperatives led to prioritizing civilian
protection, which resulted in relatively low numbers of civilian casualties
from US operations.
In a post–Iraq War era increasingly focused on near-peer
adversaries, the US military is shifting emphasis from victory through
civilian support to victory through high-intensity, kinetic operations. In
this new era, the US Army—the branch most likely to be called upon to
carry out large-scale urban ground operations—has embraced a vision
of warfare that is, in the words of former Army Chief of Staff and current
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark A. Milley, “a perfect
harmony of intense violence.”13
Under this new operational focus, US commanders emphasize
“sharp” war, force, and speed to annihilate the enemy even when it is
embedded in civilian populations. Civilians, conversely, are no longer
perceived to be the enemy’s center of gravity but are secondary to kineticbased efforts.14 Such a shift is exemplified in the 2017 Army publication
of Field Manual 3-0, Operations, which envisions future campaigns to
be “more chaotic, intense, and highly destructive” than the conflicts of
recent decades.15 In short, in the post-counterinsurgency era, civilians
are no longer the primary consideration for US forces on the battlefield,
and US commanders will likely conduct operations accordingly.
Such a shift will exacerbate the harm already experienced by civilians
in urban operations. The battles of Mosul (2016–17), Ramadi (2006),
and Raqqa (2017) reveal even conflicts in which combatants attempt to
limit civilian casualties inherently generate high levels of noncombatant
fatalities. These conflicts demonstrate limitations advanced,
professionalized militaries face in protecting civilians in high-intensity
urban combat. As these examples show, precision strike capability and
law of armed conflict (LOAC)-based operational planning can reduce

12 HQDA/HQMC, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, Field Manual (FM) 3-24/Marine
Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5 (Washington, DC: HQDA/HQMC, 2014).
13 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “‘A Perfect Harmony of Intense Violence’: Army Chief
Milley on Future War,” Breaking Defense, October 9, 2018, https://breakingdefense
.com/2018/10/a-perfect-harmony-of-intense-violence-army-chief-milley-on-future-war/.
14 Daniel R. Mahanty and Annie Shiel, “Protecting Civilians Still Matters in GreatPower Conflict,” Defense One, May 3, 2019, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/05
/protecting-civilians-still-matters-great-power-conflict/156723/.
15 HQDA, Operations, FM 3-0 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2017), 1-2.
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but not prevent significant harm to civilians in densely populated
urban terrain.
Despite a focus on limiting civilian casualties in the campaign
against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), independent estimates
have found 8,000 to 13,000 civilians have been killed by US-led coalition
operations since 2014 (coalition forces have confirmed the deaths of
1,359 civilians).16 Similarly, a report by the International Committee of
the Red Cross found urban operations in the counter-ISIS campaign
accounted for eight times more civilian fatalities—78 percent of all
civilian deaths—than nonurban combat.17 These examples preview
urban conflicts to come, revealing the extent to which high-intensity
urban warfare inherently produces harm for civilians and destroys
civilian infrastructure.

Implications

The infliction of harm on civilians in urban warfare creates
significant strategic, operational, and tactical implications for US
operations and has specific effects on the mental and psychological
well-being of the military’s fighting force.

Strategic Implications
High-density populations and the likelihood of mass civilian
harm have the potential to constrain the military’s ability to
initiate and sustain urban campaigns.18 This effect has been welldocumented and is outlined only briefly here: large-scale civilian
casualties influence global public opinion and can shape strategic
decision making for the use of force.19 Such influence has been exemplified
in the Israeli Defense Forces campaigns in Gaza, for instance, or in the
US military’s first Fallujah campaign during the Iraq War.20
In Fallujah the potential for mass civilian casualties and concerns
about Iraqi leadership support contributed to the George W. Bush
administration’s April 2004 decision to halt the Marine Corps’ push into
the city, delaying operations and ultimately necessitating a second major
campaign in November 2004.21 Additionally, in an increasingly legalized
global environment, civilian casualties will be the subject of greater
16 “US-Led Coalition in Iraq & Syria,” Airwars, accessed January 9, 2020, https://airwars.org
/civilian-casualties/?country=iraq,syria&belligerent=coalition.
17 “US-Led Coalition”; and “New Research Shows Urban Warfare Eight Times More Deadly
for Civilians in Syria and Iraq,” Red Cross, October 1, 2018.
18 Russell W. Glenn, Managing Complexity during Military Urban Operations: Visualizing the Elephant
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004), 9.
19 Dunlap, “Lawfare 101,” 9.
20 Raphael S. Cohen, From Cast Lead to Protective Edge: Lessons from Israel’s Wars in Gaza (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), 178–79; and William Knarr, Robert Castro, and Dianne
Fuller, The Battle for Fallujah: Al Fajr–the Myth-Buster, Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) Paper
P-4455 (Alexandria, VA: IDA, September 2009), 24.
21 Peter R. Mansoor, Surge: My Journey With General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq
War, 1st ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), 15, 21; and Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The
American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin, 2006), 342.
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reviews by international legal actors—and the use of “lawfare”—to
constrain increasingly US strategic operations.22
With US forces operating more frequently in urban environments,
the potential for mass civilian casualties—and the resulting domestic
and international opposition such casualties can produce—will constrain
the military’s capacity to initiate and sustain major urban campaigns.

Operational and Tactical Implications
More directly for US military personnel, the presence of civilian
populations and the potential for mass civilian casualties will impact
the military’s ability to conduct kinetic operations. These impacts
include repercussions for operational planning, intelligence collection
and analysis, targeting, and legal review. Additionally, high-density
civilian populations shift the balance of risk in force employment for
commanders and combatants, influencing the operational pace and
freedom of maneuver.
Urban warfare requires combined arms integration of ground
and air forces at all levels of operations, which necessitates intricate
coordination that is difficult to achieve in the easiest of operational
environments.23 Because legal, ethical, and political factors generally lead
US commanders to limit civilian casualties, dense civilian populations
significantly complicate operational and tactical planning necessary for
such integration. Thus the congested nature of the urban battlespace
requires commanders devote significant resources and time to determine
appropriate, feasible courses of action to minimize loss of civilian life.
Such operations also place high demands on intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance collection and analysis capabilities
required to map the urban battlespace and accurately distinguish
civilians and civilian objects from enemy combatants and objects. The
intricate infrastructure of cities combined with complex human terrain
further increases these demands.24
The complex battlespace of urban warfare, including the density
of structures and line-of-sight obstructions, similarly complicates
targeting and executing ground- and air-based fires, creating challenges
for target identification, communication, and command and control.25
Urban settings hinder positive identification of targets, and the dense
infrastructure increases the propensity for collateral damage. Such
infrastructure creates particular problems for close air support and
indirect fire.

22 Bryan Frederick and David E. Johnson, The Continued Evolution of U.S. Law of Armed Conflict
Implementation: Implications for the U.S. Military (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 12.
23 Russell W. Glenn and Gina Kingston, Urban Battle Command in the Twenty-First Century (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005).
24 US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain
Operations 2028, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 2018), 28.
25 ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B, I-8, I-9.
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Additionally civilian-dense environments test the military’s
capability to conduct effective operational legal review. Under the
“precautions principle” of LOAC, commanders are obligated to conduct
operations in a manner that minimizes civilian casualties.26 The sheer
number of civilians and civilian objects in the urban battlespace, along
with the fast-paced, decentralized nature of tactical urban combat, can
strain the ability of judge advocates general to provide effective legal
guidance for targeting and operations.
Finally, the potential for high levels of civilian casualties in
densely populated areas can fundamentally influence the ability of
US commanders and combatants to balance the risks of employing
force—a balance I call the combatant’s trilemma. Every commander
and combatant faces a crucial force employment calculation based
on balancing three fundamental values: military advantage, force
protection, and civilian protection. Military advantage, as defined under
LOAC, is the goal of achieving military objectives during combat. Force
protection is the goal of protecting friendly forces from attack or loss.
And civilian protection is the goal of protecting civilian lives by limiting
direct targeting and indirect, collateral damage.27 These principles lie in
inherent tension with each other, making it impossible to prioritize one
without impacting the other.28
Civilian-dense environments hold major implications for influencing
this trilemma—balancing civilian protection against the goals of
military advantage and force protection. Force employment calculations
derived in less dense environments, such as those that predominate
in Afghanistan and Iraq, shift significantly in urban, civilian-dense
environments where operations can inflict much greater harm on
civilian populations.
The presence of large numbers of civilians in the urban battlespace
may influence operational and tactical US commanders and combatants
in varying ways. Embracing the values of military advantage and force
protection, some commanders and combatants will prioritize military
objectives and security over civilian protection, accepting increased
risk to the civilian population. Anecdotal evidence and combatant
surveys have revealed combatants generally prioritize force protection
over military advantage and civilian protection, and combatants in

26 Geoffrey S. Corn, “War, Law, and the Oft Overlooked Value of Process as a Precautionary
Measure,” Pepperdine Law Review 42, no. 3 (2014): 437.
27 Robin Geiss, “The Principle of Proportionality: ‘Force Protection’ As a Military Advantage,”
Israel Law Review 45, no. 1 (March 2012): 71–89; Gary D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International
Humanitarian Law in War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 252, 259, 284; and Lorenzo
Zambernardi, “Counterinsurgency’s Impossible Trilemma,” Washington Quarterly 33, no. 3 (July 1,
2010): 21–34.
28 Zambernardi, “Impossible Trilemma,” 22; and Maurice Obstfeld, Jay C. Shambaugh, and
Alan M. Taylor, “The Trilemma in History: Tradeoffs among Exchange Rates, Monetary Policies,
and Capital Mobility,” Review of Economics and Statistics 87, no. 3 (August 1, 2005): 423–38.
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high-threat environments often revert to using firepower to reduce risk
to friendly forces.29
During the Iraq War, for instance, US forces in Fallujah responded
to stiff insurgent resistance by shaping the battlefield with direct and
indirect fire, clearing insurgent threats by preemptively destroying
everything in the path of US infantry forces.30 Such tactics can limit US
losses but increase risk to civilians on the ground, ultimately creating
further strategic and operational impacts.
Conversely, other commanders and combatants will oppose
increasing risk to noncombatants, instead placing greater priority on
civilian protection and reducing emphasis on military objectives or
force protection. In the former case, US commanders will alter or forego
military actions with high risk of collateral damage to shield civilians
from harm. In the latter case, US commanders will expose friendly
forces to greater risk to mitigate collateral damage.
In both cases, these outcomes can reduce freedom of maneuver or
operational pace, impacting the military’s ability to achieve battlefield
objectives. Both responses—prioritizing or de-emphasizing civilian
protection—show large-scale civilian populations and the potential for
mass civilian casualties produce significant impacts for commanders
and combatants that complicate operations.
These factors—complexity of city environments; demands of
planning, targeting, and operations in confused urban warfare; and
balancing risk between civilians and combatants—together significantly
impact US military tactical operations in urban battlespaces.

Combatant Implications
Finally, civilian populations and the potential for mass civilian
casualties can directly affect the mental and psychological well-being
of the military’s fighting force.31 It has been almost 50 years since
large numbers of US combatants have been exposed to warfare with
engagements resulting in hundreds or thousands of civilian casualties.
The mass civilian casualties inflicted during the Vietnam War produced
significant psychological trauma for a generation of servicemembers.
Future urban combat operations and resulting civilian casualties have
the potential to produce similar trauma.32
29 Fiona Terry and Brian McQuinn, The Roots of Restraint in War (Geneva: Red Cross, June
2018); Andrew Bell, “Leashing the ‘Dogs of War’: Examining the Effects of LOAC Training at
the U.S. Military Academy and in Army ROTC,” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting-American Society of
International Law 108 (2014): 370–73; and Amos C. Fox, “Precision Fires Hindered by Urban Jungle,”
Association of the United States Army, April 16, 2018.
30 Jake Miraldi, “Podcast: The Spear—The Second Battle of Fallujah,” Modern War Institute,
USMA, May 8, 2019.
31 Todd C. Helmus and Russell W. Glenn, Steeling the Mind: Combat Stress Reactions and Their
Implications for Urban Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005).
32 Robert S. Laufer, Ellen Frey-Wouters, and Mark S. Gallops, “Traumatic Stressors in the
Vietnam War and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,” in Trauma and Its Wake Volume I: The Study and
Treatment of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, ed. Charles R. Figley (Bristol, PA: Brunner/Mazel, 1985),
73–89; and Bruce P. Dohrenwend et al., “The Psychological Risks of Vietnam for U.S. Veterans: A
Revisit with New Data and Methods,” Science 313, no. 5789 (August 18, 2006): 979–82.
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Recent medical and psychological studies outline the psychological
trauma produced by the killing of civilians or the exposure to civilian
casualties. Such harm manifests in two different dimensions. First, harm
to civilians can cause significant mental trauma and post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) in combatants: such trauma has been widely
documented in US veterans from conflicts in Vietnam, Iraq, and
Afghanistan, and this trauma generates long-lasting effects for the
psychological well-being of many servicemembers.33
Second, urban warfare can produce moral trauma, or moral injury,
which can result from exposure to civilian casualties or acts that
“transgress deeply held moral beliefs.”34 While this class of mental
harm is only beginning to be understood, emerging research shows it
can produce negative health effects similar to PTSD. The potential for
this harm is exacerbated by the Army’s failure to prioritize training in
the ethics of killing, which can result in subsequent confusion over the
morality of participating in violent acts in combat.35
Military campaigns and mass civilian casualties in urban
environments may produce significant psychological harm for large
many servicemembers—harm that potentially lasts for years or even
decades following combat. Thus the US military must prepare for the
impact of mass civilian casualties on operations as well as its combatants.

Military Guidance

Military doctrine on urban warfare generally inadequately examines
the impact of dense civilian populations and civilian harm directly.
Doctrine is a vital aspect of how military organizations conceptualize
operations and the employment of force, helping to develop common
perspectives and frames of reference that serve as guidance for action.36
Doctrine is not intended to establish fixed rules or one-size-fits-all
checklists for action; instead, the goal of doctrine is to foster intellectual
tools for accomplishing organizational tasks that respond to challenges
in security environments.
Reflecting this, current US military operational guidance primarily
emphasizes maneuver and operations within urban environments,
with an obvious focus on achieving military objectives and some
discussion on protecting US forces. The picture such guidance
paints, however, is one where civilians are secondary considerations

33 Alan Fontana and Robert Rosenheck, “A Model of War Zone Stressors and Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder,” Journal of Traumatic Stress 12, no. 1 (1999): 111–26; and Shira Maguen et al., “The
Impact of Reported Direct and Indirect Killing on Mental Health Symptoms in Iraq War Veterans,”
Journal of Traumatic Stress 23, no. 1 (February 2010): 86–90.
34 Brett T. Litz et al., “Moral Injury and Moral Repair in War Veterans: A Preliminary Model
and Intervention Strategy,” in “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,”
ed. Brian P. Marx, special issue, Clinical Psychology Review 29, no. 8 (December 2009): 695–706; and
Joshua E. Wilk et al., “Relationship of Combat Experiences to Alcohol Misuse among U.S. Soldiers
Returning from the Iraq War,” Drug and Alcohol Dependence 108, no. 1–2 (April 2010): 115–21.
35 Pete Kilner, “A Moral Justification for Killing in War,” Army Magazine (February 2010):
55–60.
36 HQDA, Operations, FM 3-0 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2008), D-1.
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on the battlefield, if considered at all. (Importantly, this article primarily
examines US military doctrine on combined arms operations, particularly
operations involving the application of ground forces in urban warfare.)
The current Army-Marine Corps urban warfare manual, ATP
3-06/MCTP 12-10B, avoids an in-depth review of the civilian-dense
battlespace, limiting its brief guidance to advice on analyzing risk to
civilians, minimizing collateral damage, and separating combatants
and noncombatants.37 Similarly, Army manual Combined Arms Operations
in Urban Terrain echoes the brief focus of ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B
on minimizing collateral damage, omitting a direct, sustained
examination of the role of civilians in operations, targeting, or other
aspects of combat.38
While not focused specifically on such warfare, ATP 3-21.8, Infantry
Platoon and Squad, does examine tactical aspects of urban operations.
Such review, however, focuses on small-unit tactics and does not directly
examine the role of large-scale civilian populations in urban combat.39
The Army training circular Training for Urban Operations does proscribe
the use of civilian in specific training exercises.40 But as noted elsewhere,
existing US military urban warfare training sites lack the scale and
density to simulate adequately realistic urban operations scenarios.41
This neglect is also evidenced in the Army’s newest version of
its capstone doctrine publication Field Manual 3-0, Operations, which
similarly reflects the shift from population-centric to enemy-centric
warfare. The new version of the manual eschews direct exploration of
civilian harm or collateral damage, eliminates a section on the law of war
and rules of engagement, and decreases its references to noncombatants
from 21 in the 2008 edition to 5 passing references in the 2017 edition.42
Perhaps more tellingly, the newest Army guidance on conflict, The
U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, similarly overlooks the role
of civilian populations in influencing US operations. The document
devotes some analysis to urban operations, focusing on developing
“the capability to conduct Multi-Domain Operations in dense urban
terrain.”43 It fails, however, to address civilians, collateral damage, or
other vital aspects of combat in civilian-dense environments. In 102
pages of analysis, the document makes only minimal reference to
civilians on the battlefield.

37 ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B, 2-4, 2-7.
38 HQDA, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain, Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
(ATTP) 3-06.11 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2011), 2-4, 2-9, 3-13, 3-14.
39 HQDA, Infantry Platoon and Squad, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-21.8 (Washington,
DC: HQDA, 2016).
40 HDQA, Training for Urban Operations, Training Circular (TC) 90-1 (Washington, DC: HQDA,
2008).
41 John Spencer, “The Army Needs an Urban Warfare School and It Needs It Soon,” Modern
War Institute, USMA, April 5, 2017.
42 HQDA, Operations, 3-0; and Mahanty and Shiel, “Protecting Civilians.”
43 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, xi, D-1–D-6.
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The Marine Corps Reference Publication 12-10B.1, Military
Operations on Urbanized Terrain, likewise provides limited guidance. The
chapter on “Noncombatant Considerations in Urban Operations” does
note civilians “can have a significant impact on the conduct of military
operations” and “greatly impede tactical operations.”44 But it sketches
only brief operational guidance on conduct regarding civilians and the
mitigation of civilian harm. It similarly eschews any discussion of the
impact of mass civilian casualties on US forces in urban operations.
Of all existing US military doctrine on urban operations, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 3-06, Joint Urban Operations,
places the greatest emphasis on discussing the role of civilians in urban
warfare. This publication devotes attention to civilians on the battlefield,
addressing their role in planning, targeting, intelligence collection, and
other aspects. While it does note “combat operations in urban areas
may result in large ratios of civilian to military casualties,” it provides
little guidance as to the implications of such mass civilian casualties for
commanders and combatants.45 Notably, the publication is silent on the
impact of large-scale civilian casualties on US operations or US forces
as well as other aspects in which mass civilian harm can affect combat.
In total, existing doctrine provides minimal direction for handling
the challenges of the populated urban battlespace. It provides almost no
guidance on the impact of mass civilian casualties for US forces engaged
in urban operations. How should US forces react to situations in which
civilians are drawn to the battlefield and interfere with operations and
fires? How should US combatants respond to the use of human shields,
both voluntary and involuntary? How should tactical units handle mass
civilian casualties, including those with life-threatening injuries, in
the midst of combat operations? How should US forces prepare and
implement population-control practices in “feral” cities in which basic
governance structures have dissolved?46
These are just a few examples of the complications large-scale civilian
populations present on the battlefield. While doctrine is not designed
to provide specific recommendations for every foreseeable operational
context, civilian-related issues such as these and others vital to the urban
battlefield cannot be found within current US military guidance.
Recognizing this situation, a 2017 RAND analysis of US Army
readiness for urban warfare assessed the Army’s “doctrine, tactics, and
training have not absorbed the lessons” of previous urban operations.47
The source of such neglect, according to the report, is the general

44 HQMC, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), Marine Corps Reference Publication
(MCRP) 12-10B.1 (Washington, DC: HQMC, 2016), 6-1.
45 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Urban Operations, Joint Publication 3-06
(Washington, DC: CJCS, 2013), I-6, III-5–III-6.
46 Kyle Rempfer, “Why Us Troops ‘Flattened’ Raqqa and Mosul, and Why It May Herald an
Era of ‘Feral City’ Warfare,” Military Times, April 29, 2019.
47 Gian Gentile et al., Reimagining the Character of Urban Operations for the U.S. Army: How the Past
Can Inform the Present and Future (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017).
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perception within the military that urban combat is “messy and
destructive” and “something to be avoided.”48
Indeed, high-intensity warfare among civilian populations is messy
and destructive. For this reason, substantive doctrine and guidance
are required to guide US forces in such contexts. Instead, US doctrine
appears to be based on assumptions that US forces can generally avoid
the problems of large-scale civilian populations by either bypassing
population centers or, conversely, evacuating city residents prior to
combat operations.
Such assumptions are flawed; history shows US forces must often
fight where urgent crises require, and urban infrastructure, human
behavior, and the fog of war often combine to limit forces’ ability to
disperse civilians from cities before fighting begins.49 As such, it is
increasingly likely adversaries will seek out combat in urban settings
to maximize asymmetrical advantages, such as the presence of human
shields, provided by urban environments. In light of such realities, urban
warfare experts have increasingly raised the alarm at the deficient state
of current warfighting doctrine.50
Unfortunately, current US military guidance provides little direct
analysis to forces that must confront the challenges of dense civilian
populations in conflict, thus affirming the assessment by RAND: “The
Army is not ready to fight in urban combat.”51

Recommendations

Ultimately, this analysis paints a picture of a military coming to
terms with a growing security challenge for this century. While the
combined services can be commended for beginning to push urban
warfare thinking forward, the central challenge of such operations—the
presence of large-scale human populations—remains beyond direct and
sustained analysis within US military operational guidance.
In light of the challenges examined above, what is the way forward?
How can the US military begin to better prepare its forces to handle
the challenges of operating in civilian-dense city environments? While
there are a number of initiatives that can help mitigate the multifaceted
problems presented by city warfare, three policy foci will produce the
greatest benefit.
First, US military doctrine and guidance, particularly within the
Army and Marine Corps, must be updated to apply the hard-won lessons
of recent and historical cases of urban combat. As noted by defense

48 Gentile et al., Reimagining the Character.
49 Yuna Huh Wong, Ignoring the Innocent: Non-Combatants in Urban Operations and in Military Models
and Simulations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006); and Rory Beaumont and Peter
McCarthy, “Civilian Cost of Battle for Falluja Emerges,” Guardian, November 13, 2004.
50 John Spencer, “Crossing the Street,” Modern War Institute, USMA, October 30, 2018;
Margarita Konaev and John Spencer, “The Era of Urban Warfare Is Already Here,” Foreign Policy
Research Institute, March 21, 2018; and John Spencer, “Army Doctrine and the Urban Battlefield,”
Modern War Institute, USMA, January 1, 2020, podcast, accessed January 10, 2020.
51 Gentile et al., Reimagining the Character, xiii.
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experts, the military’s lack of understanding cities and their human
architectures will eventually lead to strategic incoherence and operational
failure.52 Importantly, the most salient aspects of city environments—
high-density human populations and the likelihood of mass civilian
casualties—must be directly and systematically incorporated into
such warfighting doctrine. To provide effective guidance, US military
doctrine on urban warfare must systematically address the various
impacts outlined in this article and, in particular, the operational and
tactical challenges civilians present in conflict.
Second, the US military must rapidly develop operational and
tactical training that emulates as realistically and authentically as
possible the challenges posed by urban operations in population-dense
environments. Current training environments such as the Asymmetric
Warfare Training Center at Fort A. P. Hill, the Shughart-Gordon training
complex at Fort Polk, or even the Atterbury-Muscatatuck Urban Training
Center in Indiana are too small and sparsely developed to simulate the
true complexity and demands of large-scale urban operations.53
As part of this initiative, the Department of Defense must allocate
major resources to ensure training reflects the operational and tactical
challenges of urban combined arms operations. Such training must be
conducted in a large setting densely populated with enough “civilian”
and “enemy” actors to approximate the chaotic urban terrain of global
cities. Above all else, scenarios must provide intensive and realistic
urban training to US forces.
Third, the military must begin systematically preparing
servicemembers for the psychological and moral challenges complicating
combat in civilian-dense environments. Far beyond annual PowerPoint
briefings on LOAC, the Defense Department must develop programs
that integrate the efforts of commanders, chaplains, behavioral health
specialists, and even ethicists, philosophers, and other salient actors
to prepare combatants for urban combat. Such programs will mitigate
psychological harm resulting from combat operations. Additionally, US
military leadership must prioritize reintegration efforts that mitigate
psychological and moral harms combatants face upon returning home
from urban warfare.

Conclusion

American military planners are beginning to understand that
continued engagement in major combat operations is a matter of when,
not if. In the words of General Stephen J. Townsend, former commander
of the Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve, “We’re
going to see battle in megacities and there’s little way to avoid it.”54

52 Alice Hills, “Deconstructing Cities: Military Operations in the Urban Era,” Journal of Conflict
Studies 22, no. 2 (August 1, 2002): 99.
53 John Spencer, “The Army Needs an Urban Warfare School and It Needs It Soon,” Modern
War Institute, USMA, April 5, 2017.
54 Stephen J. Townsend quoted in Joe Lacdan, “Warfare in Megacities: A New Frontier in
Military Operations,” US Army, May 24, 2018.
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Given this growing likelihood of urban conflict in the coming
decades, large-scale human populations and the potential for mass
civilian casualties have significant implications for the US military.
Strategic, operational, tactical, and combatant impacts will affect
the military’s ability to achieve victory on the battlefield and the
health and well-being of the fighting force. Current doctrine,
however, omits the impacts of civilian populations and the potential
for mass civilian casualties. The military has begun to focus on these
new operational realities.55 But for the success of the military, US
commanders must incorporate the information into their military
doctrine and training before America is again called to engage in
grueling urban combat.

55 Todd South, “The Future Battlefield: Army, Marines Prepare for ‘Massive’ Fight in
Megacities,” Military Times, March 6, 2018.
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Stability Operations in WWII:
Insights and Lessons
Raymond A. Millen
ABSTRACT: The stability achieved by the US military in the
European Theater of Operations after D-Day was the direct result
of good military governance concurrently deployed with combat
operations. The role of civil affairs in securing this stability has
been under-emphasized in analyses of these operations. But an
examination of the historical record of these events reveals the
necessity of a skilled, effective civil-military effort through civil
affairs/military government detachments, civil affairs specialty
pools, and G-5 staff sections.

D

uring the Second World War, the US Army gained extensive
knowledge of stability operations as it fought through
France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany. While stability
operations do not receive the same attention as other features of the war,
they were instrumental to Allied military victory. Indeed, stability in the
rear areas, largely a function of good military governance, was important
because it allowed the Allies to maximize combat power at the front.1
The US Department of War began preparations for military
government in 1942, recruiting and training thousands of civil affairs
soldiers for the liberation of Axis-occupied Europe and the invasion
of Germany. For the vast majority of soldiers with backgrounds in
civil administration, the training only further enhanced their skill sets
for civil-military operations. They served in civil affairs staff sections
(G-5) within all major headquarters, provided specialty expertise in
large civil affairs pools, and implemented military government in
task-organized detachments.2
Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower keenly
appreciated the value of the civil-military mission for the war effort.
Speaking to civil affairs soldiers a month before D-Day, he explained:
You have got to get the rear areas organized—electric lights, roads, and
supply—and you must keep them working and get them restored as quickly
as possible to some semblance of peacetime standards, so that they can
support to the utmost the armies that are fighting at the front. You must
take that responsibility for dealing with civilian affairs, whether it is restoring
public utilities or helping a nursing mother who cannot get milk, and if you

1. Raymond A. Millen, “Bury the Dead, Feed the Living:” The History of Civil Affairs/Military
Government in the Mediterranean and European Theaters of Operation during World War II (Carlisle, PA:
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, US Army War College, February 2019).
2. F. S. V. Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government in North-West Europe, 1944–1946
(London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1961), 21; and Raymond Joseph Parrott, “An Education
for Occupation: Army Civil Affairs Training and Military Planning for Postwar Germany” (thesis,
University of Virginia, 2008), 58–59.
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don’t do your job, the armies will fail [emphasis added]. A modern army is of great
depth in the field. The fighting front of an army is a fringe of a tremendous
organization. . . . You are part of an Allied team. Always remember that.
Because your section of the army is called “Civil Affairs” you must not make
the mistake of thinking you are politicians.3

With three major campaigns as Supreme Allied Commander
behind him, Eisenhower understood that creating stability throughout
the great breadth and depth of northwest Europe would be a colossal
effort—and it was. During active combat operations, security activities
largely defined stability operations though the line between security and
stability often became blurred. For instance, restoring governance, law
and order, and the economy in local communities enhanced stability,
but at the same time it secured military lines of communication and
supplies from civilian interference. Regardless, the establishment of
military government was the most assured means for achieving stability
in the theater rear zone.4
This article explores the nexus between military government and
the achievement of stability in the European Theater of Operations.
First, it recounts the War Department’s rationale for stability as it related
to military necessity. Second, the article reviews task organization
considerations, which justified the investment in military government.
Last, it examines the implementation of stability tasks by civil affairs/
military government (CA/MG) detachments. Accordingly, this article
argues stability was not a by-product of combat operations; rather, it was
the fulfillment of a considerable civil-military effort.

The Rationale for Stability

As the War Department recognized early, the war would lead to the
occupation of territory resulting from the liberation of enemy-controlled
countries and direct invasions of Italy, Germany, and Japan. The War
Department reasoned that military necessity, along with international
law and humanitarian obligations, prescribed the employment of military
government for occupied territories. Doctrinally, military necessity
encompassed all activities in occupied territories that facilitated the
successful prosecution of military operations and swift termination of
the war.5
Since a military invasion disrupted local civil government,
international law obligated occupation forces to assume the functions
of civil authority, including the establishment of security and public

3. Cited in Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, United States Army in World War II: Special
Studies, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors, US Army Center of Military History Publication 11–3
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1964), 679.
4. Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946, US Army Center of
Military History Publication 30–6 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1990), 11; and
F. P. Huddle, Military Government of Occupied Territory (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1943), 7.
5. For a definition of military necessity from 1943, see: US Army and US Navy, Manual of
Military Government and Civil Affairs, War Department Field Manual 27-5/Navy Department Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations 50E-3 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 22
December 1943), 5.
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order; resumption of essential services; the provision of sustenance,
potable water, and medical care; and the restoration of the local
economy.6 Due to political sensitivities, the Allies described stabilization
activities in liberated countries as “civil affairs,” and in enemy countries
as “military government.” 7 But in execution, these activities were
virtually indistinguishable.
While the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration initially wanted
civilian agencies to administer occupied territories, senior War
Department leaders and Eisenhower successfully argued the overlapping
authorities of multiple civilian agencies undermined efficiency and unity
of effort, thereby compromising military necessity.8 The purpose of
military government was to impose temporary control of the populace in
order to prevent civilian interference in military operations, disruptions
to the lines of communication, pilferage of supplies, and civil unrest.9
In the end, both the Roosevelt administration and the War Department
agreed once hostilities ended, military government would transition to
civil control at the earliest opportunity.10
For Operat ion Overlord, Supreme Headquarters A l l ied
Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) adopted a different organizational
approach to civil-military operations than in the Mediterranean
Theater of Operations, where Allied military governments were ad hoc
arrangements, meager in numbers, and underresourced. Informed
by these experiences, SHAEF created a sophisticated civil-military
mechanism: numerous, well-organized CA/MG detachments; civil
affairs staff sections (G-5) in each division, corps, army, and army group
headquarters as well as at SHAEF; and a large civil affairs specialty pool.
On a practical level, the establishment of military government
permitted Eisenhower to optimize ground forces at the front thereby
reducing the traditional need to detach units for garrison and security
duties along the lines of communication.11 Additionally, military
government pursued two supporting goals. First, it sought to minimize
the diversion of military supplies and resources to indigenous populations
by restoring self-government, public safety, and the local economy.
6. US Forces European Theater (USFET), The General Board, Civil Affairs and Military
Government Organization and Operations, Study No. 32 (Headquarters, USFET, Frankfurt, Germany,
May 15, 1946), 3; Joseph P. Harris, “Selection and Training of Civil Affairs Officers,” Public Opinion
Quarterly 7, no. 4 (Winter 1943): 700; and Robert W. Komer, Civil Affairs and Military Government in
the Mediterranean Theater (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, US Army, 1950),
I-3, I-7.
7. John J. Maginnis, Military Government Journal: Normandy to Berlin (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1971), viii; Ziemke, Occupation of Germany, 3n2; Cristen Oehrig, Civil Affairs in
World War II (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), 2; and USFET,
Civil Affairs and Military Government, 1.
8. Parrott, “Education for Occupation,” 15, 58–59; USFET, Civil Affairs and Military Government,
3; Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, Chapter 22n20, 56, 139–41, 214n7, 215, 315; Ziemke, Occupation
of Germany, 11, 13, 15–16; Huddle, Military Government, 7; Oehrig, Civil Affairs, 7; and Komer, Civil
Affairs and Military Government, I-3.
9. Komer, Civil Affairs and Military Government, I-3; and Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 77.
10. Ziemke, Occupation of Germany, 11; and Huddle, Military Government, 3, 7–8.
11. Harris, “Selection and Training,” 697; and Komer, Civil Affairs and Military Government,
II-12–II-13.
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Second, it sought to utilize indigenous resources to support military
activities, such as abandoned supplies and equipment, local labor, and
human intelligence. Arguably, these efforts in combination contributed
to the massing of sufficient combat power along the German frontier
for the final offensive.

Task Organization Considerations

Graduates of the US School of Military Government and the Civil
Affairs Training Schools program reported to the European Civil
Affairs Division in Shrivenham, England, for assignments to CA/MG
detachments, G-5 staffs, and the specialty pools. For field deployments on
the continent, the European Civil Affairs Division assigned detachments
to companies within three European Civil Affairs Regiments (ECAR).
Designating the 1st ECAR for France, SHAEF then earmarked 2nd and
3rd ECAR for Germany.12 Experience in the Mediterranean Theater of
Operations demonstrated CA/MG detachments should receive logistical
support directly from tactical units operating in their areas of operation.
This proved prudent since the ECARs were unable to provide logistical
and often other support due to the geographic separation between
ECAR companies and their assigned CA/MG detachments, especially
during fluid operations.13
To underscore military government as a command responsibility,
SHAEF established civil affairs staff sections (G-5) throughout
the military echelons of command to administer the following
functional areas:14
• internal affairs: local government and civil administration; public
safety; education and religion; postal, telephone, and telegraph
services; public health; information and public relations; and
monuments, fine arts, and archives
• economics: food and administration, civilian requirements and
allocations, price control and internal trade, imports and exports,
labor (manpower), transportation, and public utilities
• dislocated persons, refugees, and welfare: liaison officers
and welfare agencies (that is, international organizations,

12. USFET, Civil Affairs and Military Government, 25–29, 35, 107–8; and H. McE. Pendleton,
“The European Civil Affairs Division,” Military Review 26, no. 1 (April 1946): 49–50.
13. Pendleton, “European Civil Affairs Division,” 49–50; and Donnison, Civil Affairs and
Military Government, 31.
14. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 677–78.
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nongovernmental organizations, and indigenous populations and
institutions if available)
• legal: counsel, courts, and prisons
• finance: public finance, financial institutions, currency, foreign
exchange, financial intelligence, accounts and audits, and property
control
• reparations and restitutions15
The G-5 staff advised commanders on stability policy; issued theater
stability policy directives, proclamations, and ordinances; formulated
and reviewed stability plans; and supervised the implementation of plans
and policies.16 Further, the G-5 staff harmonized stability activities with
military plans, ensuring tactical units interacted with and supported
CA/MG detachments operating in their immediate areas of operation.17
The CA/MG detachments were the workhorses of military
government, operating in local communities, districts, and provinces.
Commanded by either a major, lieutenant colonel, or colonel, they
were tasked and organized for local conditions, focusing on the
following functions:
• local government administration
• public safety: police, fire, and civil defense
• public health: medical facilities, casualty evacuation, burial, and
disease prevention
• public utilities: energy, water, sewage, communications (for
example, postal and telephone), transportation, and refuse disposal
• public welfare: food, water, shelter, and refugee control
• legal: judiciary, claims, and prisons
• fiscal: banks, post offices, and depositories
• labor: burial, road clearance, building repairs, and supply in
support of military operations18
The size of a CA/MG detachment varied according to the level of
government administration and the size of the population. While the
average size was eight soldiers for towns, detachments for major cities
15. USFET, Civil Affairs and Military Government, 6–10; and Komer, Civil Affairs and Military
Government, I-11.
16. USFET, Civil Affairs and Military Government, 48–49; Komer, Civil Affairs and Military
Government, II-13–II-14; and US Army and US Navy, FM 27-5, 15–16, 45–50.
17. Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government, 22.
18. Harris, “Selection and Training,” 703; Rebecca Patterson, Revisiting a School of Military
Government: How Reanimating a World War II-Era Institution Could Professionalize Military Nation Building,
Kauffman Foundation Research Series: Expeditionary Economics no. 3 (Kansas City, MO: Ewing
Marion Kauffman Foundation, June 2011), 7; and Harold Zink, American Military Government in
Germany (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), 59.
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would number well over 100 personnel.19 For Operation Overlord, initial
CA/MG detachments received pinpoint assignments in the Normandy
beachhead. As the beachhead developed, detachments expanded their
jurisdictions to cover several towns within a district.20 Once the front
moved onward, particularly after the breakout of Normandy (Operation
Cobra), specific CA/MG detachments remained in their assigned areas,
serving in the corps and army rear zones and eventually the theater
Communications Zone.21 Follow-on CA/MG detachments staged in
the beachhead, observing and assisting deployed CA/MG detachments,
and then followed along in the wake of the US military to establish
immediate stability along the lines of communication.22
To create efficiencies, the SHAEF G-5 staff established a specialist
pool for temporary assistance to CA/MG detachments and SHAEF
country missions. The pool of personnel possessed unique skills of
particular concern to the occupied country as a whole or a region of
the country. Some specialists deployed to address technical problems
beyond the expertise of CA/MG detachments and returned to the
pool once they had rendered assistance. Through the SHAEF country
missions, other civil affairs specialists helped provisional governments
reestablish national functions.23
Designed by SHAEF, country missions assisted provisional
governments of liberated countries and later imposed military
government on Germany. 24 Incidentally, Italy had no country
mission. After Italy surrendered and joined the Allies, Allied
military government regarded those portions of Italy under Allied
control as liberated. Since the Italian government lacked ministers
and civil servants until the liberation of Rome, Allied military
government administered the government. Also, SHAEF country
missions published country handbooks to familiarize CA/MG
detachments with Allied policies and facts about the assigned
country. SHAEF expected the country missions to govern assigned
countries until a national government assumed responsibility or, in
the case of Germany, until civilian agencies assumed responsibility.
As long as the conflict raged, their primary mission was to support the
war effort with host-country resources. As an index of greater tactical
cooperation, country missions fell under the command and control
of the senior military headquarters in the area of operations.25
19. USFET, Civil Affairs and Military Government, 29, app. 1, 1; and Coles and Weinberg, Civil
Affairs, 678, 742–45.
20. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 725; and Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 17, 66,
89–90, 95–96.
21. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 721.
22. Ziemke, Occupation of Germany, 149–53.
23. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 14–15, 17, 769, 790; Ziemke, Occupation of Germany, 18–20;
and Zink, American Military Government, 59.
24. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 225–26, 229; and Komer, Civil Affairs and Military
Government, III–13, III–15, III–17.
25. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 677–78; Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government,
13–14, 18, 26; and USFET, Civil Affairs and Military Government, 50.
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For the final offensive into Germany, SHAEF envisioned the need
for hundreds of military government detachments following closely
behind the Allied offensive and deploying into predesignated towns and
cities like the unfurling of a giant carpet—the Carpet Plan.26 In addition
to the regular military government detachments, special mobile teams
(that is, I detachments) comprised of three officers and five enlisted
soldiers in two jeeps with trailers, accompanied divisions to establish
immediate stability in urban areas as a stopgap measure.27 They were
followed by temporary military government detachments during the
duration of the invasion and then by permanent MG detachments for
the postwar period.
Following Germany’s surrender on May 7, 1945, the widely dispersed
US military units and military government detachments in northern and
eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Austria withdrew to the US zone
of occupation under the Static Plan. Under the authority of SHAEF’s
successor, US Forces European Theater, the Third and Seventh Armies
became the Eastern and Western Military Districts, and their G-5
staff sections transformed into the Office of Military Government for
Bavaria and for Baden-Württemberg, respectively.28 In accordance with
occupation policy, US Forces European Theater reduced the number of
military government detachments (to a total of 269 detachments) and
enlarged the size of detachments commensurate to their new mission.29
It is noteworthy no civilian agency ever relieved the US military
government of the occupation mission during or after the war.
Accordingly, the Office of Military Government for Germany, United
States “civilianized” the mission by separating military government
from the US military command and replacing military personnel with
civilians—many of them demobilized civil affairs personnel.30

Implementation of Stability Tasks

Civil affairs/MG detachments served as the primary instrument for
the establishment of local order and security while tactical units focused
on combat operations. These detachments accompanied combat troops
in the initial waves of the invasion, establishing immediate stability in
ports, towns, and cities. This section explores the manifold security
tasks CA/MG detachments undertook to stabilize their assigned areas.

26. USFET, Civil Affairs and Military Government, 96, 98, 111, 116–17; Ziemke, Occupation of
Germany, 164, 193–94, 310; and Zink, American Military Government, 58–60.
27. Ziemke, Occupation of Germany, 186–87.
28. USFET, Civil Affairs and Military Government, 38–39, 94, 98–100, 124–27; Ziemke, Occupation
of Germany, 321; Zink, American Military Government, 52; and Lucian K. Truscott, Command Missions:
A Personal Story (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1954), Kindle.
29. USFET, Civil Affairs and Military Government, 117, 122; and Ziemke, Occupation of Germany,
310.
30. Robert Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company,
1964), 228–29; Parrott, “Education for Occupation,” 85; Truscott, Command Missions, 546; Ziemke,
Occupation of Germany, 423; and Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, NY: Doubleday &
Company, 1950), 65–66.
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Aerial bombing, indirect fire, and ground combat inflicted
significant damage and casualties in towns and cities and caused
psychological paralysis among the inhabitants. As a result, the initial
task of CA/MG detachments was to spur local authorities into action
and to prioritize emergency efforts.31 Just as important, the implicit aim
of detachments was to provide a psychological boost to the citizens,
restoring confidence, optimism, morale, and hope for the future.
Accordingly detachments sought to avoid the appearance of charity;
instead they strove to create economic self-reliance and preserve
self-dignity.32 In this manner, military government minimized the
diversion of supplies, funding, and other resources from the primary
military effort.
An incoming CA/MG detachment established its military
government headquarters in the town hall or a suitable nearby facility
and raised the American flag to designate its presence. The detachment
commander met with or appointed a new mayor, directing him to
disseminate the theater commander’s proclamations, directives, and
ordinances, as well as prompting the resumption of local government.
At the same time, the public safety officer met with or appointed a new
chief of police to reestablish police authority. As a principle, military
government governed indirectly whenever possible, limiting its activities
to supervising empowered officials.33
Upon entering a town, the CA/MG detachment would conduct
surveys on the state of local government, shelter problems, medical
issues, food conditions, and available potable water as part of its initial
report to the parent G-5 staff. In response, the G-5 would dispatch
medical personnel, rations, material, and civil affairs technical specialists
to the communities most in need.34 This approach sought to minimize
waste and optimize the use of limited resources.
Identifying the availability of human capital was essential for
local recovery as well as supporting military operations. The CA/
MG detachment conducted a census to determine population size,
available labor, and important professionals such as doctors, nurses,
lawyers, judges, and bankers. The issuance of ration cards for food
distribution provided detachments with an accurate way to gather census
information. Establishing a labor pool by age, gender, and skills, all
under the control of the mayor, provided a readily available resource for
myriad tasks in support of the war effort. Greater knowledge of the local

31. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 198.
32. Parrott, “Education for Occupation,” 48n134, 49; Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 67;
and Ziemke, Occupation of Germany, 435.
33. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 193–95, 213, 735; Maginnis, Military Government Journal,
10, 13–14, 20–28, 33; Zink, American Military Government, 225–26; Komer, Civil Affairs and Military
Government, II-13–II-14, II-17, II-35–II-36; and Oehrig, Civil Affairs, 5–6.
34. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 338; and Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 9–10, 20–28.
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professionals permitted the CA/MG detachment to draw upon their
capabilities as well.35
The CA/MG detachment identified, organized, and supervised
the labor details, such as longshoremen, burial parties, infrastructure
repairs, and rubble clearance, in support of military activities. While the
detachment provided funds from local banks or G-5 currency reserves,
it was important in terms of legitimacy for the local government to pay
the salaries of officials and labor details.36
Disease and potential epidemics presented a major risk to Allied
soldiers, the populace, displaced persons, and refugees. Civil affairs/
MG detachments conducted health inspections to determine medical
needs and identify diseases. Infectious diseases such as typhus, malaria,
venereal disease, and cholera were prevalent during the war, so quick
responses to outbreaks staunched epidemics. From the experiences in
the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, medical specialists undertook
preventive measures such as inoculations and DDT dusting stations
to kill lice. Civil affairs/MG detachments sought out local doctors to
assist in preventive measures and prompted the G-5 staffs to search for
doctors in prisoner of war camps to obtain their immediate release.37
Reestablishing law enforcement in local communities was critical
in order to relieve tactical units and military police of security tasks.
Under the supervision of the CA/MG detachment, the chief of
police reestablished an active police presence in the community. The
detachment vetted all police to eliminate Fascist, Nazi, corrupt, and
incompetent police officers. Often, the detachment authorized the
recruitment of police auxiliaries to secure banks, government facilities,
post offices, cultural facilities, enemy supplies and equipment, and
anything of value or importance from looting or wanton destruction.
Police provided traffic control and posted road signs for military
traffic transiting the urban area in order to forestall congestion and
wrong turns. Only in dire circumstances would the detachment request
tactical units or military police for security tasks. A recurring problem
was Allied soldiers disarming local police, so detachments requested
tactical commands inform their soldiers the police were under Allied

35. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 193–95, 338, 723–24, 730–31, 733, 737, 758, 792, 794;
Komer, Civil Affairs and Military Government, II-35–II-36; Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 13–15,
17, 19–20, 38; and Damon M. Gunn, “The Civil Affairs Detachment,” Military Review 25, no. 6
(September 1945): 77.
36. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 777; Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 19–20, 38; and
Gunn, “Civil Affairs Detachment,” 77.
37. Malcolm Gladwell, “The Mosquito Killer,” The New Yorker 77, no. 17 (July 2, 2001): 1–2,
4–5, 42; Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 307, 322–27, 325n10, 336, 338, 742, 758, 758n3, 792,
794, 813–14, 859; Keith Lowe, Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 2012), 7–8; Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 103, 134, 300, 344–45; Ziemke,
Occupation of Germany, 53, 195–96, 279, 293, 347; Norman Lewis, Naples ’44: A World War II Diary of
Occupied Italy (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 1978), 47–48; Rick Atkinson, The Day of Battle:
The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943–1944 (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007), 247; and Komer,
Civil Affairs and Military Government, II-41.
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control.38 Also, CA/MG detachments established curfews and placed
movement limitations on civilians.
Further, the detachments established police checkpoints on
surrounding roads to enforce security ordinances. They issued
instructions for civilians to turn in weapons, cameras, binoculars,
carrier pigeons, and radio transmitters, which the local police collected
and secured. Detachments issued receipts for such items with the
assurance that civilians could recover them once hostilities ended.
These ordinances were necessary to limit civilian congestion on
roads and to deter espionage. Once the security situation permitted,
detachments instituted a pass system for civilians needing to conduct
authorized business such as commuting to work and labor details.
Detachments also ordered civilians to provide information on enemy
weapons caches or armories, supply depots, abandoned equipment, and
unexploded ordnance.39
Generally prison conditions were atrocious, so CA/MG detachments
inspected prisons and jails to ensure they conformed to international
law and norms. As such, detachment leaders retained the prerogative
to replace corrupt or incompetent wardens and guards. Additionally
detachments issued instructions to tactical commands, forbidding units
from arbitrarily liberating prisoners held in jails and prisons out of a
misperception they were all political prisoners.40
The CA/MG detachments and the G-5 staff sections also revived the
judicial system, opening criminal and civil courts as quickly as possible.
They sought out lawyers, judges, and legal clerks in local communities
and scoured prisoner of war camps for such individuals. United States
military tribunals focused on cases that affected the military effort, such
as the black market, curfew violations, theft of military supplies, and
attacks on the military. The civil courts handled the majority of criminal
and civil cases.41
As a matter of policy, CA/MG detachments closed banks, post
offices, and other financial institutions to prevent withdrawals by the
enemy government, criminal organizations, and anxious civilians.
Once detachments accounted for the financial assets, they reopened
these facilities at the earliest opportunity for the resumption of local
government and economic activities. Accordingly, local governments
renewed revenue collection as the local economy recovered. Often,
detachments advanced money to pay the salaries for civil servants,
police, firemen, and labor, so as to keep government running and to

38. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 193–96, 198–99, 377, 383, 459–60, 725, 730; Ziemke,
Occupation of Germany, 146, 146n24; Komer, Civil Affairs and Military Government, II-35–II-36, II-43–
II-44; and Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 9–11, 19–20, 99.
39. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 193–94, 735–36, 814–15, 817.
40. Komer, Civil Affairs and Military Government, II-39–II-40.
41. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 206–7, 701–2, 772–73; Komer, Civil Affairs and Military
Government, II-38–II-39; and Zink, American Military Government, 109.
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restart the local economy. Nonetheless, this “seed money” was only a
temporary expedient until banking and revenue collection resumed.42
The black market proved to be a significant and continual problem
throughout the war. Theft of army supplies deprived the military of
scarce resources for the war effort. For example in Italy, an estimated
30 percent of incoming supplies were pilfered and sold on the black
market.43 Detachments discovered Axis governments had disrupted
local economies by diverting food, livestock, and equipment for their
war effort. Farmers in particular hoarded food and sold it on the
black market.
Thus the main goal for detachments was to create economic selfsufficiency in order to ameliorate humanitarian assistance. Detachments
undertook measures to regenerate local economies, such as ensuring
farmers and fishermen could get their products to markets, fixing prices
temporarily to combat black market prices, and discouraging hoarding.
Further, local police and military police executed raids on suspected
black market rings to curb that practice.44
As a matter of restoring self-sufficiency and local economies,
CA/MG detachments inspected public utilities, such as water, electricity,
gas, and sewage, for damage and repair. At times, repairs were easily
done once parts became available. In other instances, damage was more
extensive and required expertise from the specialist pool. Nonetheless,
these detachments sought to exhaust local resources and solutions
before requesting assistance from the G-5 staff to limit dependency on
the Allies and minimize a drain on Allied resources.45
Detachments inventoried captured supplies to determine the
value of these supplies for supporting military operations, provided
the G-5 staff section with the inventory lists, and notified the Counter
Intelligence Corps of captured documents and mail. Generally, tactical
commands placed the highest value on fuel and cargo trucks for
immediate use. Detachments provided all other captured supplies and
material not needed for the military effort, such as rations and medical
supplies, to the local communities. It is noteworthy that detachments
sold abandoned and captured equipment and tools to local farmers and
business owners to prevent their use in the black market and also to give
such items intrinsic value to the users. Detachments sent the proceeds
for such sales to the US government to defray war costs.46
Detachments organized motor pools from abandoned vehicles to
assist civilians with transportation or cargo lift needs. These motor
42. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 196–97.
43. Atkinson, Day of Battle, 246–47; and Lewis, Naples ’44, 70, 82–84, 109–10, 116–17, 122–23,
125–30, 153, 164–66, 181.
44. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 463, 725; and Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 54–56.
45. Ziemke, Occupation of Germany, 149–54, 253–54; Komer, Civil Affairs and Military Government,
II-41; Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 321–22, 338, 792; and Maginnis, Military Government Journal,
13, 99–105.
46. Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 18, 60, 95, 103, 110, 150; Gunn, “Civil Affairs
Detachment,” 77–78; and Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 147, 775, 810.
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pools featured fuel points, garages, and mechanics at minimum
cost. Additionally, detachments arranged for the repair of public
transportation—buses, streetcars, and trains—as quickly as possible for
commuters, and CA organized motor pools in Italy as well.47
Local police intelligence on enemy officials, collaborators,
criminals, and friendly resistance groups proved invaluable for CA/MG
detachments and the Counter Intelligence Corps. Detachments met with
resistance groups to gain their cooperation and assistance with the war
effort. Paradoxically, while they provided invaluable assistance to the
Allies, resistance groups proved the most disruptive to stability because
they appropriated civilian property and undermined law and order in
liberated areas. Hence, detachments and provisional government liaison
officers persuaded these groups to disarm and demobilize. As a matter
of patriotism, quite a few of them enlisted in the French and Belgian
armies during the war.48
Detachments interfaced with the fire chief, inspected fire equipment,
and supervised the extinguishing of fires and rescue of people trapped
in damaged buildings. Frequently detachment personnel prioritized
firefighting to save lives, critical infrastructure, and issues of military
necessity. As a matter of course, detachments arranged for the repair or
replacement of fire equipment through the G-5 staff.49
Detachments also assisted military units transiting through urban
areas on the way to the combat front with temporary accommodations.
Accordingly, they coordinated with the local authorities to identify
facilities such as abandoned military posts, warehouses, and dormitories
and established billeting offices to accommodate units. This service
limited the displacement of civilians, potential looting, and incidental
damage to civilian property.50
Naturally the war resulted in the inevitable loss of and damage
to civilian property, so CA/MG detachments duly investigated and
provided restitution for valid claims. Often, Allied troops “requisitioned”
civilian property, which prompted detachments and G-5 staffs to
admonish tactical commands that such actions undermined relations
between civilians and Allied forces. After all, civilian cooperation rested
on the premise Allied liberators acted better than the Axis occupiers.
Going further, G-5 staff sections marked some towns in rear areas
as off-limits, established joint police and military police patrols, and
publicized the prosecution of miscreant soldiers to curb misconduct.
As the agent of Army provost marshal authority, detachments also
marked certain urban areas off-limits such as bordellos and bars, banned
the consumption of alcohol in towns, and prohibited soldiers on rest
47. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 204, 207–8, 463, 810.
48. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 737, 770–71, 797, 802–6, 811; and Maginnis, Military
Government Journal, 129, 131, 134–38, 166–69, 176–77, 180–81, 193.
49. Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 9–10, 14, 158; Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 338,
813; and Ziemke, Occupation of Germany, 253.
50. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 792; Zink, American Military Government, 79–87; and
Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 14–15, 30, 36, 49.
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and recreation from carrying weapons. Prompt attention to civilian
sensibilities not only promoted good relations between civilians and the
military but also supported economic recovery.51
Another problem threatening military operations was the sudden
multitude of refugees and displaced persons on roads. Many civilians
simply sought to escape the fighting, but German troops also contributed
to the congestion by deliberately forcing refugees and displaced persons
toward Allied lines for the purpose of disrupting Allied offensive
operations. In response, G-5 staffs diverted dozens of CA/MG
detachments for refugee control, care, and swift repatriation. These
detachments guided refugees and displaced persons to roads away from
military lines of communication and accommodated them in abandoned
military garrisons or temporary camps with shelters. There, refugees
received rations, medical care, clothing, and transportation back to their
home communities.
Whenever the security situation and transportation allowed,
detachments collaborated with civilian agencies such as the United
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to assist in refugee
care. But generally detachments performed the lion’s share of processing
for these people. Literally millions of refugees and displaced persons
returned to their homes quickly as a result of the organizational
abilities of these detailed detachments.52 Achievements of the CA/MG
detachments were unassuming and largely unremarked upon by
historians who devoted more attention to military operations and
strategy. But the myriad problems they proved capable of resolving kept
tactical units on task, maintained the demands of military necessity, and
facilitated spectacular tactical and operational accomplishments by the
US military.

Conclusions

While future conflicts are unlikely to match the magnitude of
the Second World War, certain practices of military government
are worthy of consideration. Foremost, task organized CA/MG
detachments, CA specialty pools, and multifaceted G-5 staff sections
were notable achievements.
The War Department initiated US training programs early in the war
for civil affairs personnel earmarked for northwest Europe, highlighting
not only military government and technical skills, but also language and
cultural proficiency. In England, the European Civil Affairs Division
continued their training, ran practical exercises, and task organized the
CA/MG detachments for the anticipated missions.

51. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 377; Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 25–28, 33, 49;
and Gunn, “Civil Affairs Detachment,” 77.
52. Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, 307–8, 317, 327–33, 553, 729–30, 813–14, 816–17, 849–
50, 854, 856, 858; Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 94, 114–16, 120, 122–23, 127, 144; Ziemke,
Occupation of Germany, 168–69, 200–202, 239; USFET, Civil Affairs and Military Government, 66–67,
70–71, 114–15; and Oehrig, Civil Affairs, 3, 6.
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By deliberately deploying CA/MG detachments with the invasion
forces (both airborne and amphibious), US units were able to establish
stability on the beachhead immediately. While control of the population
was the immediate concern of CA/MG detachments, they also restored
local governance, public order, essential services, and the economy. This
approach prompted self-sufficiency, thereby minimizing the drain on
Allied personnel, supplies, and equipment. Moreover, the detachments
provided local labor, captured supplies and equipment, and intelligence
to military operations. They served as Allied representatives to the local
populace so as to bolster legitimacy and civil relations.
As the first responders for most nontactical incidents, CA/MG
detachments addressed labor disputes, the care of refugees
and displaced persons, and potential pandemics. International
organizations (the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration and the International Red Cross Joint Relief
Committee) and local government organizations could not operate
on the continent due to the nonpermissive environment and logistical
priorities. Thus CA/MG detachments repatriated the vast majority
of refugees and displaced persons on their own. Today, the United
States should anticipate circumstances, similar to those experienced by
CA/MG detachments in World War II, will prevent the participation
of international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and US
Government departments and agencies.
Lastly, military government set the conditions for the postwar
occupation of Germany and the recovery of Europe in general.
While the postwar conditions in Germany presented a host of
new challenges, the experiences and activities of existing military
government entities provided a practical foundation for the
next phase of postwar reconstruction. As such, military government
conducted reconstruction, economic recovery, law and order activities,
and political reforms. These long-term activities set the conditions for
the European Recovery Program—the Marshall Plan—and Germany’s
rehabilitation as a constructive European partner.
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ABSTRACT: Contribution warfare removed the influence of
Sweden’s politics from the Afghanistan War (2001–14) and created
learning conditions favoring case-specific, tactical lessons over the
strategic ones. This article applies the concept of “contribution
warfare” to analyze the lessons from Sweden’s involvement in
the war. The inconsistent application of this knowledge resulted
largely from the political and operational realities of a small nation
contributing to an alliance dominated by a single actor.

W

hile Sweden was participating in the Afghanistan War
(2001–14), the country’s elite strategists who advise the
government on whether to commit troops and resources
to combat and who direct the execution of military tasks identified
and learned many lessons. Unfortunately the parliament, which decides
whether to use force internationally, and the government, which proposes
the use of force and controls the armed forces, has not applied the
information consistently.
During the mission in Afghanistan, Sweden’s armed forces quickly
institutionalized a new section in their headquarters to identify and
disseminate lessons learned. This effort identified the lack of a clear
political aim for participation in the war in Afghanistan as a shortcoming.
But Sweden’s participation in the United Nations (UN) intervention
in Mali, which similarly lacked a clear political aim that could provide
strategic guidance for the use of force, provides a telling example
of a lesson Sweden identified but did not quite learn. Tactical-level
involvement, however, continuously yields reasons to improve and
case-specific lessons Sweden’s strategists can share throughout the
armed forces.
Contemporary research often intertwines innovation and learning
and roundly criticizes military organizations for failures in both areas.1
Explanations of innovation failure in the military vary from bureaucratic
inertia, a mismatch of conceptions of military virtue, and the particular
nature of innovations. Explanations of learning failure include a lack of

1. Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, eds., The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001); Richard Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation:
From Vietnam to Iraq (London: Routledge, 2006); Adam Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation
Studies,” Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 5 (2006): 905–34; and Williamson Murray, Military Adaptation
in War: With Fear of Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
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processes within the structure of the armed forces that support learning.2
Explanations of the relationship between organizational culture and
outcomes in learning processes are also likely true.3
Although culture explains inertia well, in the short term, it is
a constant that does not explain inconsistency, especially in learning
processes. Moreover, attributing the inconsistency between tactical and
strategic lessons from the Afghanistan War to the culture of the Swedish
armed forces does not explain the government’s decisions. Hence, this
article considers the actions of Sweden’s strategic elites.
These strategists experienced inconsistencies in the organizational
learning of the Swedish armed forces that can be explained by the
inherent difficulties smaller partners encounter when making their
voices heard in coalitions dominated by a single actor. In this structure,
smaller partners cede the establishment of the coalition’s political aims
to the dominant partner. When that occurs, smaller partners make
participation their main task in the coalition’s war, thus conflating the
ends, means, and ways of strategy. In such instances of “contribution
warfare,” smaller coalition members do not allow political direction to
influence their roles in war.4
In this context, the proposition that wars are directed from the
strategic perspective becomes flawed and strategic lessons can be
neglected. If participation is the only aim, then no strategic lessons that
can be applied to conventional wars of self defense can be learned.
Thus, the contribution of this article to the literature is twofold. First,
it provides an empirical analysis of the lessons-learned processes of the
Swedish armed forces beyond the typical examination of international
interventions prior to the Afghanistan War. The most common situation,
arguably, is the Congo crisis in the early 1960s.5 Second, rather than
focusing on organizational culture—and, as many studies do, on tactical
lessons learned—this article focuses on strategic lessons.

Organizational Learning and Coalition Warfare

The traditional, rationalist model of organizational learning
presumes military organizations, through experiential feedback loops,
can identify shortcomings, acquire support for proposed solutions, and
provide solutions in documents such as doctrine or standard operating

2. Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1991); Andrew Hill, “Military Innovation and Military Culture,” Parameters
45, no. 1 (2015): 85–98; John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to
Eat Soup with a Knife (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002); Robert T. Foley, “Dumb Donkeys or Cunning
Foxes? Learning in the British and German Armies during the Great War,” International Affairs 90, no.
2 (March 2014): 279–98; and Benjamin M. Jensen, Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the US Army
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016).
3. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons.
4. J. H. Vance, “Tactics without Strategy or Why the Canadian Forces Do Not Campaign,”
in The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives, Context and Concepts, ed. Allan English et al. (Kingston:
Canadian Defense Academy Press, 2005), 280–81.
5. Lars Ericson Wolke, Lessons Learned? Svenska operativa och taktiska erfarenheter från Kongokrisen,
1960–1964, Krigsvetenskapliga forskningsrapporter nr. 15 (Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan, 2007).
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procedures.6 This idealized version of organizational learning indicates
Sweden’s learning process was compromised by inexperience with
coalition warfare, including misunderstanding how Sweden would fit
into modern coalition warfare.
The reality of contribution warfare effectively removed the influence
of Sweden’s politics from the war, short-circuited its strategy, and created
learning conditions that favored case-specific, tactical lessons over the
strategic ones. This reality is important to understanding Sweden’s
application of lessons learned from the campaigns in Afghanistan.
Following the traditional model of learning, it is possible to
differentiate between two critical phases in organizational learning.
First, the actor needs to recognize there is something to be learned, that
is, there must be a process to identify lessons. Admittedly, strategists
occasionally have incentives to be secretive regarding what they learn,
therefore, this article may eschew some lessons. But there are also
incentives to demonstrate that strategists lead a learning organization,
which is, after all, an ideal in much of the current discourse.7
Second, the actor needs to act upon such identification to assess
appropriately the lesson as learned. Hence, learning involves the use of
“new knowledge or understanding gained from experience or study to
adjust institutional norms, doctrine and procedures in ways designed to
minimize previous gaps in performance.”8 Evidence of such learning
can be identified by changes to military doctrine, force composition or
force behavior, strategic goals, or decision-making processes.
In the processes of identification and learning, there are numerous
pitfalls. When identifying something as a lesson, an actor may make
flawed inferences about what should be learned from a militarized crisis
or a war. As Elizabeth Kier demonstrated, Germany, France, and Britain
drew completely different conclusions from the First World War, and
arguably, the Germans got it right on the tactical level.9
There is also a risk that the actor will fail to identify any lessons at
all. The British, for example, failed to identify the dangers of infantry
line tactics and cavalry attacks from the American Civil War (1861–65),
which resulted in tremendous loss of life during the early phases of
the First World War. Moreover, bureaucratic inertia or misperceptions
may result in lessons learned too slowly, even if they are rapidly
identified—for example, British intelligence did not update its estimate
of the Japanese preference for surprise attacks after Pearl Harbor, and
thus failed to prepare the defenses of Singapore, which surrendered to
Japanese assault a few months after Pearl Harbor.

6. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons, 6.
7. Hans Hasselbladh and Karl Ydén, “Why Military Organizations Are Cautious about
Learning?,” Armed Forces & Society (March 17, 2019).
8. Richard Downie, quoted in Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons, 6 (emphasis added).
9. Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

TOC

64

Parameters 50(4) Winter 2020–21

An Asymmetrical Learning Environment

Peculiar circumstances created when small actors participate within
asymmetrical coalitions dominated by a considerably more powerful
military actor might also create inconsistencies between learning and
applying lessons learned from warfare. A common assumption in most
research on coalition warfare involves bargaining within the coalition.
Although this bargaining does not occur on equal terms, all actors are
at least equally interested in discussing the same things.10
This bargaining process, in turn, should lead to a situation in which
resources are used more efficiently and according to the participating
states’ caveats.11 But this ideal image of coalition warfare seemingly
ignores the reality that actors within coalitions have different resources
and different interests at stake. Consequently, small actors within
asymmetrical coalitions realize the huge imbalance between their
resources and the political aims of the war. Thus, they effectively cede
space for political aims to more powerful actors in the coalition. Rather
than employing force for political purposes, as the concept of strategy
implies, they become force providers.12
As the process of ceding political aims to the powerful members
of the coalition occurs, small coalition partners neglect the politics of
war. The task becomes one of providing, not directing, force. In the
absence of political aims, participation becomes both means and ends,
thus short-circuiting the ends, means, and ways of strategy. For small
partner nations, coalition wars effectively become contributory, rather
than wars fought with unity of effort and with clear, jointly agreed
upon, political goals. Notably, this scenario held true for member and
nonmember states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
alike during the Afghanistan War.13
This dynamic does not mean instrumentality is completely lost
for the small coalition partners. It is, however, severely restricted and
compromised. In fact, contribution warfare entails, and is reinforced by,
the idea small coalition partners seek to acquire a reputation as a good
ally to gain advantages from the dominating coalition partner in other
areas.14 This concept suggests small partners contribute for political
10. Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York:
Free Press, 2002); and Kelly Grieco, “Fighting and Learning in the Great War: Four Lessons in
Coalition Warfare,” Parameters 48, no. 3 (2018): 27–36.
11. Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); and Stephen
M. Saideman and David P. Auerswald, “Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of National
Restrictions upon NATO’s Mission in Afghanistan,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 1 (2012):
67–84.
12. Vance, “Tactics without Strategy,” 271–92.
13. Benjamin Schreer, “The Evolution of NATO’s Strategy in Afghanistan,” in Pursuing Strategy:
NATO Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddafi, ed. Håkan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 139–56.
14. Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Jens Ringsmose, and Håkon Lunde Saxi, “Prestige-Seeking Small
States: Danish and Norwegian Military Contributions to US-led Operations,” European Journal
of International Security 3, no. 2 (June 2018): 256–77; and Ida Maria Oma and Magnus Petersson,
“Exploring the Role of Dependence in Influencing Small States’ Alliance Contributions: A
Reputation Mechanism Argument and Assessment,” European Security 28, no. 1 (2019): 105–26.
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purposes, and thus use force strategically. But most notably, the political
purpose of appearing to be a good ally does not in any way direct the
means or the ways of strategy. Hence, you can be a good ally regardless
of what you contribute and regardless of how you operate: force is not
directed by a political aim.
In the case of the conflict in Afghanistan, politics did not guide and
direct the use of force. As a result, strategic elites of smaller coalition
actors failed to learn strategic lessons from that conflict. Even if smaller
coalition partners still have strategic choices to make, relinquishing the
political aim of the war means operations lack strategic direction. The
great variation of military behavior in Afghanistan or Denmark, the
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden proves this point.15 War, and the
continuous learning and adaptation in war, becomes a military rather
than political matter. Following the logic of smaller powers in asymmetric
coalitions, we can now formulate some empirical expectations.
Above all else, if politics does not guide the use of force, we must
expect only comfortable, fitting lessons drawn in ways that conform
to a clear distinction between the learned tactical lessons and the
unlearned strategic lessons. We can also expect the lessons learned will
be case-specific, compartmentalized lessons, because only in cases of
asymmetric coalitions and the resulting contribution warfare, do smaller
coalition partners lack the political aims that influence the use of force.
Although other tasks for the armed forces of smaller coalition
partners may very well be directed with clear political aims, the stakes
associated with the lowly ambition of participating in a coalition make
recognizing strategic lessons from that participation less important;
doing so would suggest the war in question was important. Furthermore,
we can expect meta-learning, that is institutionalized improvements in
learning processes, only in such cases where the mandate or discretion
of the new command or headquarters were limited to case-specific,
tactical lessons.

Lessons Identified and Learned

The Swedish intervention in the Afghanistan War started in January
2002 with a small special forces unit in Kabul. The early entry into the
war can be understood as a lesson learned from the Kosovo conflict
when Sweden was late deciding to join the Kosovo Force. The delay
in joining the NATO peace enforcement mission was a source of
embarrassment for the government. Thus, Sweden was determined to
avoid a similar delay after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on
the United States.16

15. Jan Ångström and Jan Willem Honig, “Regaining Strategy: Small Powers, Strategic Culture,
and Escalation in Afghanistan,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 5 (2012): 663–87.
16. Lars Wikman, “Don’t Mention the War: Forging a Foreign Policy Consensus: The Case of
Swedish Military Contributions to Afghanistan” (PhD diss., Department of Government, Uppsala
University, forthcoming); and Wilhelm Agrell, Ett krig här och nu (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2013).
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In 2006 when Sweden took control of the provincial reconstruction
team in Mazār-e Sharīf in northern Afghanistan, the force consisted of
lightly equipped infantry. But there were sizeable reinforcements, and
just over 500 soldiers were present at any given time. But among the
teams in northern Afghanistan, the Swedish armed forces unit eventually
stood out due to its high percentage of combat-ready troops. The
increased mechanization occurred as a tactical adaptation to a gradually
deteriorating security situation and increasing insurgent activity in the
Swedish area of responsibility around 2008–9. This approach resulted
from a lesson learned in Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 1994 when a
company of Danish main battle tanks joined a Swedish battalion. “Walk
softly but carry a big stick” was one of the lessons the Swedish armed
forces learned from the wars in the former Yugoslavia.17
On the tactical level, the Swedish armed forces quickly identified
risks to units and were equally proficient at finding institutional solutions
to the challenges. Consistent with theoretical expectations, these learned
lessons have not been applied in the context of conventional wars of
self-defense. The lessons have been applied, however, in the context
of international missions. Moreover, some tactical lessons learned have
been identified as applicable only to operations in Afghanistan.
First, when improvised explosive devices (IEDs) became a serious
threat for units in northern Afghanistan, the Swedish armed forces
were quick to recognize the dangers and began developing counterIED practices. In 2009 the armed forces issued a new manual on
countering IEDs and increased the protection level of the battalion
vehicles. Notably, the manual explicitly refers to Afghanistan or other
potential international missions, recognizing the tactics are not valid in
the context of defending Sweden against foreign threats.
One report from the Swedish Defense Research Agency observes
the time between detecting a particular threat and implementing new
tactics and delivering new threat-mitigation equipment was as short
as 12 months during the most intense and violent phase of the war.18
Considering the rotation schedule required selecting and training soldiers
more than a year prior to deployment, the 12-month development of a
new capability is impressive.
Second, the armed forces introduced military observation team
(MOT) Juliette, an all-female group of soldiers and officers created for
intelligence purposes. This initiative arose from intelligence gathering
being recognized as a critical activity in the Afghanistan War. When
Colonel Bengt Sandstrom returned to Sweden from the conflict, he
began to experiment with different solutions. After being selected to
become the commander of the entire Swedish contingent, he built a
consensus within the armed forces to improve intelligence by targeting
Afghan women. Access to this population was easier for female than
17. Ulf Henricsson, När Balkan brann! (Stockholm: Svenskt Militärhistoriskt Bibliotek, 2013).
18. Henric Roosberg and Anna Weibull, Försvarsmakten efter ISAF: Lärdomar och påverkan på
militärstrategisk nivå, FOI-R--3914--SE (Stockholm: Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, 2014), 60.
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male soldiers and MOT Juliette was launched in 2008, four years after
its inception.19
A crucial aspect for the argument advanced here is the lessons
regarding quick applications of forces and innovation were not applied
to defending Sweden. Consistent with contribution warfare, what
happened in Afghanistan stayed in Afghanistan. At home, the major
reorganization of the armed forces in 2009–10 followed different logic
that was further accentuated by the Russian interventions in Georgia
and Ukraine.20
Rather than incorporating the effective counterinsurgency lessons
from Afghanistan, the dominating tactical doctrine for Sweden’s defense
was based upon maneuver warfare with mechanized units. Case-specific
lessons were stovepiped, ensuring neither all-female squads, nor counterIED lessons were included in exercises or planning for national defense.
Since the introduction of gender in the armed forces was couched
in terms of intelligence purposes and efficiency in peace support
operations, applicability to the defense of Sweden appeared irrelevant,
despite a recent surge in inequality arguments within the armed forces.21
Third, at a more general, procedural level, when the security
situation deteriorated in Afghanistan, the armed forces were relatively
quick to institutionalize an organizational body to deal with lessons
learned. During the wars in the former Yugoslavia, the army command
provisionally organized a lessons-learned function to provide incoming
commanders and units with updated information. But this organization
had no standard operating procedures and no formal role in the training
processes or planning procedures before the missions. This involvement
changed after a 2007 review that identified the provisional nature of
lessons learned as a problem.
In 2010 the armed forces institutionalized the lessons-learned
function as a section at the headquarters that became a node in the
planning process.22 In addition to requesting other reports from
Afghanistan, the lessons-learned section ordered highly structured,
reports from the units in Mazār-e Sharīf. These reports were then
reworked and disseminated widely within the armed forces (rather than
only to the incoming commander). Consequently, the lessons-learned
section initiated and maintained a continuous tactical discussion

19. Magnus Johnsson, “MOTs, Juliette and Omelettes: Temporary, Tactical Adaptations as
the Postmodern, Inoperable Force Awaits the Anticipated Operation?,” in The Swedish Presence in
Afghanistan: Security and Defence Transformation, ed. Arita Holmberg and Jan Hallenberg (London:
Routledge, 2017), 90–91.
20. Olof Kronvall and Magnus Petersson, Svensk säkerhetspolitik i supermakternas skugga 1945–1991
(Stockholm: Santérus, 2005); and Håkan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre, Svensk försvarsdoktrin efter
kalla kriget: Förlorade decennier eller vunna insikter? (Stockholm: Santérus, 2014).
21. Robert Egnell, Petter Hojem, and Hannes Berts, Gender, Military Effectiveness, and Organizational
Change: The Swedish Model (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014).
22. Jan Frelin and Ann Ödlund, Ett lärande försvar? Förutsättningar för Försvarsmaktens
erfarenhetshantering, FOI-R--3420--SE (Stockholm: Försvarsanalys, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut,
2012); and Försvarsmakten, Erfarenheter Afghanistan (Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, 2016).
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throughout the armed forces. The section was also given an uncommonly
open mandate to improve its own procedures.
Noteworthy, however, the mandate of the lessons-learned section
was restricted to tactical improvements for international missions.
Consequently, this stovepiping ensured tactical, technical, and conceptual
lessons learned from Afghanistan would not enter the national domain
and be treated as general lessons learned at the land warfare school in
Skövde in southern Sweden, which develops the army’s defensive tactics.
Then Swedish Army Chief of Staff Major General Anders Brännström
stated it would be a problem if lessons from Afghanistan were allowed
to dominate army tactics in the years to come: “Battle experience
from Afghanistan is not valid elsewhere.”23 He concluded, “It is not
the same kind of combat needed to solve the main task: the defense of
the nation.”24
While the chief of staff may have had a point regarding specific
tactics—in a war for national survival, Sweden would most likely not
possess air superiority—this was not the first time Swedish tactics in
international conflicts were ignored on the home front. Since veterans
of the Congo crisis in the early 1960s were confronted with the same
arguments upon returning to their regiments, something other than
pure military rationalism seems to be at work here.
Fourth, the armed forces learned relatively quickly that they needed
to become internationalized in a way the Cold War neutrality policy
never had allowed. Over the course of the Afghanistan War, the number
of Swedish officers embedded in international staffs and headquarters
increased substantially. In 2001 there were only five Swedish officers in
NATO staffs and headquarters. This presence quickly increased and
peaked in 2011, reaching nearly 90 Swedish officers in NATO.25 As the
Afghanistan War unwound, this number quickly decreased to less than
30 officers in 2015.
Under the logic of contribution warfare, embedding officers can
be expected. Sweden did not have input into the political aims of the
intervention, which were determined by the United States. Therefore, it
is to be expected Sweden would embed as many officers as possible at
lower levels of war in order to be efficient and influential as a coalition
partner. But the decreasing number of embedded officers as the war
ended suggests Sweden understood the need for internationalization as
strictly connected to the conflict.
Oddly, these lessons seem to be understood as case-specific, despite
Sweden officially declaring it cannot defend itself alone. Since 2009, the
government has maintained solidarity: “Sweden will not remain passive
if another EU Member State or Nordic country suffers a disaster or an
23. Quoted in Roosberg and Weibull, Försvarsmakten efter ISAF, 76.
24. Quoted in Roosberg and Weibull, Försvarsmakten efter ISAF, 75.
25. Jan Ångström and Erik Noreen, “Swedish Strategy and the Afghan Experience: From
Neutrality to Ambiguity,” in The Swedish Presence in Afghanistan: Security and Defence Transformation, ed.
Arita Holmberg and Jan Hallenberg (London: Routledge, 2017), 44.
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attack. We expect these countries to act in the same way if Sweden is
affected. We must therefore be able both to give and receive support,
civilian as well as military.”26
Fifth, the government, after much deliberation, instituted a
Veterans Day in 2010 and a veterans policy in 2015.27 This lesson was
slow in coming considering Sweden has been providing forces to UN
missions, occasionally violent ones, since 1956. Arguably, the veterans
issue was delayed due to entanglement with vested bureaucratic interests.
Specifically, the armed forces and the government struggled with
whether or not officers were the only veterans or if soldiers ought to be
included too.
Despite the definitional problems, perhaps the greatest challenge
to the idea of veterans was its inherent logic. Being a veteran implies an
individual has experienced war, at great personal cost. This concept was
incompatible with the idea of Sweden being at peace for 200 years. This
state of mind also fed the logic of contribution warfare. Since the war
in Afghanistan was not motivated by Swedish political interests and the
military effort was not directed by Sweden’s political aims, it became
difficult to embrace the idea that those who served in Afghanistan
were veterans.
Finally, as Magnus Johnsson has demonstrated, three Swedish
colonels took individual initiatives to institutionalize tactical lessons
very informally between the component commanders. The Troika, as
it became known, was in charge of the previous, present, and future
Swedish force in Afghanistan. The group conceived the transition from
mentoring and stability operations to counterinsurgency operations as
a direct response to the increasingly hostile environment in northern
Afghanistan in early 2009.28 Hence, through the informal structure
of the Troika, the commanders continuously updated one another,
utilizing the individuals’ experiences, which were also case-specific
and tactical.

Lessons Identified and Not Learned

As we have seen, under the logic of contribution warfare, lessons
learned from the Afghanistan War are necessarily case-specific, not
relevant for the defense of Sweden, and consequently stovepiped.
Tactical lessons identified but not learned also confirm institutionalized
processes to apply lessons learned have a clear, but limited capability to
influence army tactics in general. By examining the nature of the lessons

26. Margot Wallström, “Statement of Government Policy,” Government of Sweden, February
13, 2019, 5.
27. Ralph Sundberg, “A Veteran at Last: The Afghan Experience and Swedish Veterans Policy,”
in The Swedish Presence in Afghanistan: Security and Defence Transformation, ed. Arita Holmberg and Jan
Hallenberg (London: Routledge, 2017), 160–81.
28. Magnus Johnsson, “Strategic Colonels: The Discretion of Swedish Force Commanders
in Afghanistan 2006–2013” (PhD diss., Department of Government, Uppsala University, 2017),
211–19.
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identified but not learned, we can see whether these can be accounted for
by the particularities of contribution warfare.
At the strategic level, the ambivalence to learning from the
Afghanistan War becomes quite clear. In particular, two biases
derived from contribution warfare led Swedish strategic elites to learn
effectively only the comfortable lessons, while merely identifying
others: understanding of the problem scopes the learning as well as
the legitimacy and appeal of solutions. First, learning occurs within the
boundaries set by what is understood as the problem. This condition
clearly aligns with contribution warfare acting as a screen through which
world events are filtered.
In the Swedish case, tactical issues are understood as problems
that can be solved. Strategic issues, however, are not understood to be
major problems since strategy, the pursuit of political ends with military
means, was never allowed to dictate the military effort. Moreover, the
vague political aim of appearing to be a good ally does not provide clear
political direction for the employment of military force.
A series of studies convey Sweden understands itself as an apolitical
actor in international interventions.29 When there is no political end
other than participation—or too many, and sometimes even conflicting,
political ends—devising a strategy becomes highly problematic.30 In
practice, strategy exists. But in the case of Afghanistan, the government
and generals at the armed forces headquarters effectively withdrew from
the process and left the conduct of the war to the colonels.31 It was, in
short, a decision made by a colonel whether or not “support the Afghan
National Army (ANA)” ought to be translated into sitting at the camp
waiting for the ANA to call for help or going out to do ANA’s work
for them.32
Hence, force was not directed toward a political aim, but toward
participation. Despite the fact that the government’s own major review
of Afghanistan identified the lack of political aim as a problem—hence,
the lesson is identified—Swedish forces in the later Mali operation had
no concrete political goals to relate to other than simply repeating the
UN mandate.33 Again, consistent with contribution warfare, to deploy
forces is more important than to employ force.

29. Ångström and Honig, “Regaining Strategy.”
30. Wikman, “Don’t Mention”; and Ångström and Noreen, “Swedish Strategy,” 31–54.
31. Jan Willem Honig and Ilmari Käihkö, “Challenges of Command: The Rise of the ‘Strategic
Colonel’,” in Leadership in Challenging Situations, ed. Harald Haas, Franz Kernic, and Andrea Plaschke
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2012), 89–108; Jan Willem Honig and Ilmari Käihkö, “The
Likely Lads: The Joint Swedish-Finnish PRT in Mazar-e Sharif,” in From Venus to Mars? Provincial
Reconstruction Teams and the European Military Experience in Afghanistan, 2001–2014, ed. Bernhard Chiari
et al. (Freiburg: Rombach Verlag KG, 2014), 209–20; and Johnsson, “Strategic Colonels.”
32. Johnsson, “Strategic Colonels.”
33. Tone Tingsgård, Sverige i Afghanistan 2002–2014: Betänkande av Afghanistanutredningen,
Statens Offentliga Utredningar (SOU) 2017:16 (Stockholm: Wolters Kluwers, 2017); and Svenskt
deltagande i Förenta nationernas stabiliseringsinsats i Mali, Regeringens proposition
2018/19:69, 14–16.
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Since clear political aims were not involved and political guidance
from the capital was absent, save the direction to participate, there were
no strategic lessons to be learned: the Afghanistan War was never a
political problem for small coalition partners. Ignoring strategy, however,
has several negative consequences. Avoiding to think of the intervention
as inherently strategic, that is, denying the action ought to result in a
desired end state, creates a situation in which the effects on Afghan
society are irrelevant. Thus, the important ends are to participate and to
bring Swedish forces home, preferably unscathed.
Also, leaving strategy to be shaped by midlevel military officers
implies a potential democratic deficit.34 It slowly dissolves the coherence
of the strategic narrative of the military intervention. In these cases,
if the government cannot clearly communicate why soldiers are put
in harm’s way far from Sweden, it gradually undermines support for
the intervention. In Sweden, for example, the support for international
military interventions among the general population dropped from
nearly 80 percent in the mid-1990s to just over 50 percent by the end of
the war in Afghanistan.35
The absence of politics directing the use of force also means there
is hardly any reason for strong rivalries among the political parties in
parliament.36 Consensus implies there is no danger of losing future
political debates. Hence, rather than becoming politically active on the
subject of Swedish participation in coalition wars, Swedish strategic
elites learned to be inactive. Donald Rumsfeld learned from the initial
stages of the Afghanistan War that toppling a government only required
high-altitude, precision-guided bombing in combination with Special
Forces. This rationale was then used as an argument for troop-size
reductions in Iraq War planning. Meanwhile, in Sweden, elites learned
to avoid political ends.
Second, contribution warfare narrows what actors understand as
legitimate solutions to problems and, by implication, suggests which
solutions ought to be pursued. In the case of Sweden in Afghanistan,
this situation meant there was no reason for self-criticism to improve
strategic decision making. The government review did suggest a special
decision-making body be installed within the government to coordinate
strategy and avoid suboptimal outcomes such as stovepiping development
aid and the military effort in Afghanistan.37
Such a national strategic council would be a completely new thing
in Sweden. Yet since the proposal in 2017, there have been no attempts
to create one. Again, the absence of political aims directing the use of
force in contribution warfare can explain the lack of industry in trying
34. Johnsson, “Strategic Colonels,” 245–46.
35. Erik Noreen and Jan Ångström, “A Catch-All Strategic Narrative: Target Audiences and
Swedish Troop Contributions to ISAF in Afghanistan,” in Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion, and
War: Winning Domestic Support for the Afghan War, ed. Beatrice de Graaf, George Dimitriu, and Jens
Ringsmose (London: Routledge, 2015), 295.
36. Wikman, “Don’t Mention.”
37. Tingsgård, Sverige i Afghanistan, 201–4.
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to improve strategic decision making. Since strategic elites did not direct
warfare in Afghanistan, they did not have any incentives to create rival
decision-making bodies either.

Conclusion

Most case-specific, tactical lessons from Sweden’s intervention
in Afghanistan were quickly identified and learned, but general and
strategic lessons were equally quickly ignored. Within the context of
contribution warfare, this inconsistency can be best explained by Swedish
strategic elites being uneasy and inexperienced with the demands of
coalition warfare.
Sweden’s armed forces have been quite successful in learning tactical
lessons. But these lessons have been curtailed and limited to operations
in Afghanistan. Congruent with the logic of contribution warfare,
tactical lessons have not been transmitted to the national domain to
influence doctrine and tactics for the defense of Sweden. Meanwhile,
strategic lessons were identified, but never learned—for example, even
though the official governmental reviews after Afghanistan concluded
Swedish international interventions should have political ends that
effectively direct the use of force, the ongoing mission in Mali still lacks
one. But the aims set out in the UN Security Council Resolution have
been repeated.
It is important to recognize the logic of contribution warfare is not
limited to lessons-learned processes. It also influences the planning
for and conduct of wars. It is not limited to non-NATO members
partaking in NATO-led operations, although problems for small, nonNATO members such as Sweden may be accentuated in comparison
with Norway or Denmark. It should also be pointed out the structural
condition of asymmetric coalitions is probably not the only reason for
the emergence of contribution warfare.
The idea feeds into, and appears rational for, increasingly bureaucratic
military organizations as well as political leaders who are more worried
about appearances than results. Since only the United States has the
capability to launch major military interventions in the foreseeable
future, contribution warfare is likely here to stay.
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ABSTRACT: Defense officials and politicians claimed to learn
lessons from Germany’s involvement in Afghanistan. Practitioners
asserted a successful mission would have required more time and
resources. Politicians developed a preference for training missions
instead of combat missions. While both concluded interventions
intended to transform foreign societies still made sense in principle,
the most logical lesson is quite the opposite: Germany must avoid
such engagements.

G

ermany’s participation in the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan (2002–14) did not have a unified
goal. Instead, German military, diplomats, and politicians
worked toward diverse and often implicit goals that did not relate to
Afghanistan. This situation makes it impossible to identify general
lessons learned. Military and diplomatic practitioners concluded more
resources and time would be required in future interventions, and
politicians implicitly concluded the country should avoid intensive
combat missions—referring to what occurred in the later stage of
ISAF—and instead support smaller enhancing and enabling missions.
Yet practitioners and politicians both believe interventions intended to
transform foreign societies make sense in principle. This article refutes
this shared conclusion, arguing instead that the most logical lesson is to
avoid such engagements in the future.

Background

Germany’s participation in ISAF in Afghanistan from 2002 until 2014
was the most costly—over €9 billion—and intensive military mission in
its history.1 In 2010 when participation in ISAF peaked, well over 5,000
soldiers were serving in Afghanistan. By June 30, 2014, approximately
132,500 soldiers had been deployed at some point, including 30,140 who
had been deployed several times.2 From 2006—the year the security
situation started to deteriorate significantly in the German main area

1. [Parliamentary document: government response to opposition inquiry] Deutscher Bundestag,
Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten, Andrej Hunko, Alexander S. Neu,
Michel Brandt, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion DIE LINKE, Drucksache 19/6011 (Berlin:
Deutscher Bundestag, November 26, 2018), 6.
2. Deutscher Bundestag, Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage der Abgeordneten Wolfgang
Gehrcke, Jan Korte, Jan van Aken, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion DIE LINKE, Drucksache
18/4168 (Berlin: Deutcher Bundestag, February 27, 2015), 6, 76.
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of responsibility—to 2014, German soldiers were attacked at least 380
times and participated in at least 150 firefights.3
Since 2010 over 5,700 soldiers have received the combat medal.4
Though casualties are lower than those of some other major ISAF
nations, 54 soldiers lost their lives in Afghanistan—35 through direct
enemy action. More than 260 soldiers were physically wounded and an
unaccounted number suffered psychological wounds.5 Drastically falling
approval rates among voters and intensifying parliamentary debate attest
that participation in ISAF became one of the most controversial foreign
policy enterprises.
In light of these considerable costs and political developments,
what strategic lessons did Germany learn from its participation in
ISAF? First the necessary questions: did the government achieve its
intended goals? If so, how completely? These questions highlight a
significant shortcoming in obtaining an adequate assessment of lessons
learned—the government’s goals in Afghanistan were only broadly
defined and therefore cannot be clearly measured. Further, lessons
learned always depend on the perspectives and interests of those who
draw them. Accordingly, this article considers lessons learned by civilian
and military practitioners and politicians and contrasts them with an
academic perspective.
To assess informal lessons learned, this article reviews contributions
by former or active senior practitioners published as private opinions.
The article also looks at the major steps decision makers took in recent
years with regard to interventions and assumes these decisions were
(unconsciously) informed by lessons learned from ISAF. In particular,
the article scrutinizes the two most crucial strategic aspects of the
German contribution to ISAF—strategy making and transformation
of Afghan society; it examines the goals of decision makers related to
these two aspects and evaluates the level of success toward achieving
these goals.
The article also highlights lessons politicians and more junior
practitioners drew from the mission. The article concludes by contrasting
the author’s lessons learned from the ISAF contribution with those
drawn by politicians and practitioners, arguing the lessons learned by
the latter were shaped by their positions in the state apparatus.

Theory

According to bureaucratic politics theory, states are not unified
actors with an overarching rationality. Instead, states are constituted by
representatives who try to maximize their autonomy by accumulating

3. [Parliamentary report, no author, publisher or date given] Bericht der Kommission zur Untersuchung
des Einsatzes des G36-Sturmgewehres in Gefechtssituationen, 24–25.
4. Deutscher Bundestag, Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage des Abgeordneten, René
Springer, Gerold Otten, Martin Hess, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion der AfD, Drucksache
19/5825 (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag, November 19, 2018), 4.
5. Bericht der Kommission, 25.
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resources and competencies and influencing state policy. As a result,
state policy becomes a compromise of diverging interests. Interests are
position driven; in the case of German politicians and national security
practitioners, their respective positions in the state apparatus shape their
perspectives on policy issues like lessons learned from an intervention.6
According to the bureaucratic politics model, politicians seek to
create a distinctive political heritage and ensure re-election. Practitioners
tasked with conducting interventions, such as diplomats who serve as
special representatives for an intervention or military commanders in
charge, strive for more resources for such a mission and do not doubt its
usefulness.7 Members of the armed services at home, however, tend to
resist interventions that could endanger force readiness.8
In the case of the German participation in ISAF, lessons learned by
practitioners should be differentiated into mostly explicit—published
or classified—official reports and informal, mostly implicit lessons
practitioners have internalized subsequently manifested as experience
or communication. Despite public and parliamentary pressure, to
date neither the federal government nor the parliament (Bundestag)
has commissioned a comprehensive independent assessment of the
ISAF contribution—based on access to classified sources—that draws
lessons learned.9 Therefore the major formal document is the November
2014 final report on progress in Afghanistan, written by the federal
government’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan,
Ambassador Michael Koch. This report also served as an ISAF
final report.
In typical diplomatic fashion, the report often avoids clear statements
or cushions judgments in mild diplomatic language.10 Though written
for the entire government, the report tends to emphasize the position
of the Federal Foreign Office. At the same time, the federal ministers
responsible for Afghanistan published brief public statements in which
they referred to lessons learned, which align closely with Koch’s report.11
Also during this time, the armed forces (Bundeswehr) produced a
comprehensive collection of mostly operational and tactical lessonslearned reports on its ISAF mission. The reports are classified, but the
strategic report was leaked to the press, which published some of the
6. See Marc R. DeVore, When Failure Thrives: Institutions and the Evolution of Postwar Airborne Forces
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Press, June 2015).
7. Morton H. Halperin, Priscilla A. Clapp, and Arnold Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign
Policy, Second Edition (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006).
8. Kevin P. Marsh, “The Intersection of War and Politics: The Iraq War Troop Surge and
Bureaucratic Politics,” Armed Forces & Society 38, no. 3 (2012): 425–26.
9. Deutscher Bundestag, Antwort auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten, Marcus Faber, Alexander
Müller, Christian Sauter, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion der FDP, Drucksache 19/1630
(Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag, April, 13 2018), 2–3.
10. Bundesregierung, 2014 Progress Report on Afghanistan Including an Assessment of the Engagement
in Afghanistan (Berlin: Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, November 2014),
19, 45–47.
11. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “Meine Lehren aus Afghanistan,” Frankfurter Allgemeine
Sonntagszeitung, October 12, 2014; Ursula von der Leyen, “Die Fortschritte sind greifbar,” Frankfurter
Rundschau, November 18, 2014, https://www.fr.de/meinung/fortschritte-sind-greifbar-11188124.html.
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report’s conclusions.12 For this contribution, an excerpt of the army’s
lessons-learned report was declassified.13 Since ISAF was primarily a
land operation, this is the most comprehensive and significant of the
Bundeswehr’s reports. To assess informal lessons learned, this article
reviews contributions by former or active senior practitioners published
as private opinions.14
The practitioners’ and politicians’ lessons learned will be contrasted
with the most comprehensive academic assessment of the German ISAF
and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) contributions. This study is
based on numerous interviews, field research in Afghanistan, and the
largest number of open or leaked documents. Its core argument is
the engagement was largely self-referential and did not primarily aim
at achieving anything in Afghanistan but tried to reach diverse goals,
depending on the position of the actors involved.15

Creating National Strategy

In accordance with their position in the state apparatus, the
most senior foreign policy makers tried to achieve two goals with the
contribution to ISAF. First, they sought to establish a political legacy—
improving the country’s position in international relations through
participation in the US-led engagement in Afghanistan following 9/11
and later through ISAF. Second, to ensure reelection, however, they tried
to avoid undue public attention focused on the nation’s involvement in
a major war effort.
Four years after leaving office, former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder
outlined the political backdrop of his decision to go to Afghanistan:
The Bundestag’s decision [on a military intervention in Afghanistan] put an
end to the chapter of Germany’s limited sovereignty after World War II. It
made us an equal partner in the international community of nations, one
that had obligations to meet, such as those that have arisen from the NATO
alliance in the case of Afghanistan. . . . In other words, the deployment of
the Bundeswehr in the Hindu Kush is an expression of Germany’s complete
sovereignty over its foreign and security policy.16

Indeed, nothing points to any geopolitical or other strategic aims
foreign policy makers tried to realize in Afghanistan. As Michael
Steiner, a foreign policy adviser to Schröder observed, the decision to
join the intervention “had zero percent to do with Afghanistan and
12. Konstantin von Hammerstein, “‘Strategisches Vakuum’ Bundeswehr kritisiert mangelhafte
Zielsetzung bei Militärmission,” Der Spiegel, September 3, 2016.
13. Kommando Heer I 1 (4) EinsAuswH, Dokumentation 13 Jahre ISAF, hier: Exzerpt /
Zusammenfassung (Strausberg. Deutschland: Kommando Heer I 1 (4) EinsAuswH, March 3, 2015).
14. Roderich Kiesewetter and Stefan Scheller, “Mission erfüllt? ISAF–Verstanden und
Dazugelernt,” Politische Studien 67, no. 467 (2016): 72–73; Rainer Glatz, “ISAF Lessons Learned:
A German Perspective,” PRISM 2, no. 2 (2011), 171–72; and Hans-Peter Bartels, Klaus Wittmann,
and André Wüstner, “Was wir aus Afghanistan lernen müssen,” RP Online, September 21, 2016.
15. Philipp Münch, Die Bundeswehr in Afghanistan. Militärische Handlungslogik in internationalen
Interventionen (Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 2015).
16. Gerhard Schröder, “The Way Forward in Afghanistan,” Spiegel Online International,
February 12, 2009.
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hundred percent with the U.S.”17 It is therefore not surprising Germany
failed to develop clearly defined national goals for its engagement
in Afghanistan.
The concept papers from 2003 to 2010 only included a wide range
of operational tasks that helped the involved ministries highlight their
expertise, thereby serving their institutional interests. Vague umbrella
terms like stability or development held these tasks together. Foreign
policy makers emphasized the importance of a civil-military intragovernmental approach they termed “networked security” and confused
this operational concept with strategy.18 Politicians wanted Afghan
society to improve in general, envisioning a reduction in or elimination
of widespread human rights violations, mass violence, and apparent
corruption, but decision makers were unable to articulate clear goals for
post-conflict Afghanistan.
In contrast, the commitments and structural/operational
achievements that helped give Germany a significant and visible
share of ISAF were much more concrete. Throughout its existence,
policy makers successfully maintained the country’s position as the
third biggest troop contributor for the mission. Military members
also secured major posts at the ISAF headquarters, from commander
to spokesman—the public faces of the mission. Policy makers
also established a leading presence in northern Afghanistan when
Germany became the permanent lead nation for Regional Command
North, led by a brigadier general. As large US reinforcements
arrived in early 2010, Regional Command North became a German
major general–led headquarters.19
The fact that the nation’s contribution to ISAF occurred in a
multinational context, however, did not help the strategy become more
focused. First, like Germany, most non-US contributors to ISAF hoped
to improve their global reputation rather than achieve anything specific.20
Furthermore contributors often could not agree on ISAF mission goals.
In this debate, policy makers sided with policy makers from other
continental European nations who endorsed a peacekeeping mission
instead of one more counterterrorism-oriented, resisting attempts to
merge the more heavy-handed, US-led Operation Enduring Freedom
with ISAF.21 Eventually as a compromise, ISAF contributors agreed
on a rather vague desired end state of the mission, “a self-sustaining,
moderate and democratic Afghan government . . . able to exercise its
authority” without ISAF security assistance.22

17. Nico Fried, Christoph Hickmann, and Tobias Matern, “Krieg im toten Winkel,” Süddeutsche
Zeitung, June 17, 2017.
18. Münch, Bundeswehr in Afghanistan, 169–70.
19. Münch, Bundeswehr in Afghanistan, 207, 214.
20. See the contributions on the subject in this and the two previous issues of Parameters.
21. Münch, Bundeswehr in Afghanistan, 166.
22. United Nations Security Council, S/2003/970, October 8, 2003, 3, https://undocs
.org/S/2003/970.
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To ensure reelection, senior foreign policy makers tried to avoid
tasks in ISAF that could pull soldiers into combat. In 2003 Germany only
reluctantly took the temporary command together with The Netherlands
and supported by NATO. The same year policy makers also authorized a
presence in the north because they assumed the forces would be spared
combat.23 To protect their forces from combat, German policy makers—
like those of other troop contributors—imposed (informal) caveats on
the strategic NATO operational plan for ISAF. These caveats restricted
forces from regularly leaving Regional Command North and Kabul,
precluded them from participating in counternarcotics operations,
and ruled out some provisions of the rules of engagement that allowed
German troops to take offensive action.24

Lessons Learned
To find lessons learned, one should ask whether policy makers
achieved the largely implicit strategic goals identified above. At least since
the late 2000s, policy makers failed to create or maintain the perception
in large parts of the domestic public that Afghanistan was improving
and that the country’s ISAF engagement was a peaceful enterprise.
The abstract question, whether the nation improved its international
standing, is much harder to answer. One indicator is the acquisition of
key positions in NATO and the UN: Germany did not gain any new key
posts in the Alliance, and it did not come closer to the goal of gaining
a permanent UN Security Council seat. One may argue Germany was
only able to maintain its position in these organizations because of its
participation in ISAF, but France—a NATO member state of roughly
comparable size—did not seem to have suffered from its much more
reluctant ISAF involvement.
These negative and neutral outcomes suggest involvement in ISAF
did not pay off in the ways senior policy makers had hoped. Instead,
policy makers lost control over this foreign engagement. Germany’s
experience with ISAF demonstrates foreign policy with unclear or
implicit goals is unlikely to benefit a state’s position in international
relations and should be avoided at all costs.
Incidentally, the authors of the formal and published lessons-learned
contributions drew very different conclusions. First, none saw a problem
in terms of unclear goals or strategy. The reports only conceded the
government and the international community unintentionally raised
unrealistically high expectations among the Afghan population and
the domestic German audience although their goals actually were quite
limited from the beginning.25
23. Lutz Holländer, Die politischen Entscheidungsprozesse bei Auslandseinsätzen der Bundeswehr 1999–
2003 (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2007), 106–7.
24. Münch, Bundeswehr in Afghanistan, 274–75.
25. Frank-Walter Steinmeier et al., “Open letter” on the completion of the ISAF mission, Joint
press release of the Federal Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry of the Interior, the Federal Ministry
of Defence and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, https://www
.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/141229-offener-brief-isaf/267898; and Bundesregierung,
2014 Report on Afghanistan, 57.
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Praising the high level of contributions, the reports also hinted this
participation played a significant role. The minister of defense even
stated the lead-nation role in the north demonstrated Germany would
be “determined to take more responsibility in the alliance.”26 Secondly,
the authors concluded rather generally that only the goal of destroying
terrorist safe havens (not an ISAF goal) was completely achieved and
determined development and democratic state building in Afghanistan
made great progress, but not to a satisfactory degree. In terms of strategy
formation, they drew no lessons learned.27
In contrast to the formal and published lessons-learned contributions,
some of the classified military and private publications heavily
criticized ISAF strategy making. According to Der Spiegel magazine,
the Bundeswehr strategic lessons-learned report concluded the
strategic vacuum which persisted for most of the country’s participation
in ISAF had to be avoided in future conflicts.28 Unofficial publications
by the then commander of the Bundeswehr Joint Forces Operations
Command, Lieutenant General Rainer Glatz and Member of Parliament
Roderich Kiesewetter and the joint report organized by Parliamentary
Commissioner Hans-Peter Bartels also concluded ISAF strategy was not
clear or measurable and would have to change in order to secure success
in future engagements. Yet all the critiques depicted the strategic deficit
as a technical deficit and did not ask why policy makers failed to define
an explicit strategy.29

Transforming Afghan Society

NATO’s desired end state for Afghanistan effectively demanded
ISAF should influence the behavior of two groups of Afghans at odds
with one another: representatives of the Afghan state who ISAF could
enable to exert control over Afghanistan and all nonstate actors who
defied attempts by these representatives to control the country. Though
difficult to distinguish in Afghan reality, ISAF mostly divided this
latter group of nonstate actors into local power brokers who maintained
autonomy through nonstate sources of political power and insurgents
who fought the government militarily. The desired end state promulgated
by NATO coincided with German goals vaguely aimed at creating a
peaceful country with a capable liberal state.
In accordance with the implicit goal of senior policy makers to
avoid creating warlike conditions, in working with local Afghans,
soldiers generally followed a cautious, legalistic approach. Information
collection on and analysis of local political conditions was persistently
deficient, seriously hampering all related efforts. German soldiers
preferred to work with Afghan officials—except those who overtly

26. Von der Leyen, “Die Fortschritte sind greifbar.”
27. Bundesregierung, 2014 Report on Afghanistan, 39–50; and Von der Leyen, “Die Fortschritte
sind greifbar.”
28. Von Hammerstein, “‘Strategisches Vakuum,’” 20.
29. Glatz, “ISAF Lessons Learned,” 173; Kiesewetter and Scheller, “Mission erfüllt?,” 72–73;
and Bartels, Wittmann, and Wüstner, “Afghanistan lernen müssen.”
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did not comply with formal structures—and abstained from trying too
strongly to change the local power structure by removing officials such as
provincial governors, as the United States and the United Kingdom did.
Despite attempts to support officials who complied with formal rules,
the local power structure in the areas of the two German provincial
reconstruction teams in Kunduz (2003–13) and Badakhshan (2004–12)
provinces remained much the same as it was in late 2001.30
Faulty analysis of the conflict situation in Kunduz proved the most
disastrous.31 Ignoring the very recent history of this embattled Afghan
province, in 2003 policy makers selected it as the first location of a
German-led provincial reconstruction team mostly on the basis of the
then low number of security incidents.32 Yet like in most other parts
of Afghanistan, the main driver of the insurgency was the distribution
of local political power, not ideological conviction.33 As recent research
demonstrates, even allegedly hard-core Taliban leaders like Jalaluddin
Haqqani tried to negotiate a power-sharing agreement with the new
Western-backed regime in late 2001 and in 2002.34
After the 2001 intervention as reconciliation was ignored and
the Afghan winners took it all, political positions were dramatically
reshuffled, pushing the disgruntled into the insurgency.35 The upsurge
of the insurgency in Kunduz since the mid-2000s, which caught German
ISAF forces by surprise, resulted from the same logic—local power
distribution outweighed considerations of ideology.36
Beginning in 2007 German ISAF forces tried to oppose the
insurgency with increasingly offensive tactics. Trained to counter a
massive Soviet/Russian conventional attack during and after the Cold
War, the Bundeswehr tried to maintain this capability in Afghanistan. The
military interpretation of the broad counterinsurgency concept therefore
focused on fighting a combined arms battle involving mechanized
vehicles like the Marder, Dachs, Biber, and PzH 2000 armored SP
howitzer to take or hold decisive terrain. Since this approach ignored
the human terrain—the insurgent networks that operated without being
overly bound to actual terrain—it failed to reduce insurgent violence.37
In order to enable the Afghan government to exert control over
its territory, German ISAF forces focused their training and advising
30. Philipp Münch, Local Afghan Power Structures and the International Military Intervention: A Review
of Developments in Badakhshan and Kunduz Provinces (Afghanistan Analysts Network, November 2013).
31. Nils Wörmer, The Networks of Kunduz. A History of Conflict and Their Actors, from 1992 to 2001
(Afghanistan Analysts Network, August 2012), 3.
32. Holländer, Entscheidungsprozesse bei Auslandseinsätzen, 112–13.
33. Münch, Afghan Power Structures.
34. Anand Gopal, The Battle for Afghanistan. Militancy and Conflict in Kandahar (Washington, DC:
New America Foundation, 2010), 8.
35. Mike Martin, An Intimate War. An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict, 1978–2012 (London:
C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., 2014), 112, 251; Carter Malkasian, War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of Conflict
on the Afghan Frontier (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 80–86, 105; Münch, Afghan Power
Structures, 14–15; and International Crisis Group, The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland (Kabul/
Brussels: International Crisis Group, June 2011), 6–7.
36. Münch, Afghan Power Structures, 34–35.
37. Münch, Afghan Power Structures, 51–62.
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efforts on the 209th Afghan National Army (ANA) Corps, based in the
north. Due to unrenewed contracts, casualties, and desertions, the exact
effects of training and advice through ISAF is hard to measure. Yet as
the temporary fall of Kunduz City in October 2015—the first loss of a
provincial capital to the Taliban—and again in October 2016, as well as
the devastating attack on the 209th ANA Corps headquarters on April
21, 2017, that killed at least 140 persons demonstrated, ISAF training
and advising apparently did not sustainably improve the quality of
the ANA.
In the spectrum of counterinsurgency approaches, forces cautiously
engaged local leaders, trying to focus on rewards instead of punishments,
and fought insurgents very conventionally. The German approach
differed from the approach of the United States, the United Kingdom,
and even The Netherlands, all of which forced Afghan governors of
important provinces out of office. The unconventional US “carrot and
stick” approach practiced in the same area of operations in northeastern
Afghanistan from about late 2009 until 2011 also proved to be more
successful in reducing insurgent violence. US Special Forces captured
and killed numerous insurgent commanders and coopted even more by
making them US-paid local security forces.38

Lessons Learned
Still, the more forceful policy adopted by some allies toward local
leaders apparently did not lead to markedly different outcomes since
ousted governors continued to exert power informally.39 As funding
for local security forces in northeastern Afghanistan was reduced and
finally eliminated in 2012, the violence increased again and continued
in the long term. Given the dire results of different national approaches
to move Afghan society in a desired direction, the lesson learned is
any kind of long-term social engineering will fail and should not be
attempted. These experiences demonstrate as long as people are paid,
it is possible to influence their behavior to some degree. But when the
overall goal is to create a self-sustainable political order, this approach is
ineffective. In light of its totally aid-dependent economy, Afghanistan is
far from achieving this outcome.
The official lessons-learned report and statements account for the
many deficits mentioned above, including the lack of economic selfsustainability, but they identify more positive impacts from efforts to
transform Afghan society as well. Yet Ambassador Koch also noted
the problems of gathering detailed information on local conditions and
advised against being too intervention eager. Finally, he drew the lesson
that assisting a foreign society in transformation requires the support
of that society in such efforts. Oddly, he countered the argument that
intervention in such a case would be unnecessary by stating that even then
security forces would need to be provided “to ensure domestic order.”40
38. Münch, Afghan Power Structures, 39–40.
39. Martin, Intimate War.
40. Bundesregierung, 2014 Report on Afghanistan, 43–44, 47–50.
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This position contradicts his lesson drawn that for success, society in
question has to support the international transformation effort—in that
case, suppressing significant resistance would be unnecessary.
Official and private lessons-learned reports from senior military
officers also accounted for—sometimes implicitly by formulating the
lessons as implications—the extreme difficulties generating useful
intelligence on Afghanistan.41 The army report characterized “acting
upon key leaders” as a “new challenge.”42 In contrast to the official report,
the Glatz report and the army report concluded a future engagement
should involve more capable military forces from the beginning and
demonstrate strength vis-à-vis the local population.43
Despite the meager results of conventional style or mechanized
counterinsurgency operations, the authors of the army report were eager
to point out the (traditional) German concept of maneuver warfare “was
confirmed as a core capability/leadership culture for the army.” They
also concluded ISAF “is not a blueprint for other missions!”44 This
perspective suggests a main concern for the army was to preserve its
traditional expertise in conventional warfighting.

Reflecting on ISAF

Given the evidence presented here, the generally applicable lesson
learned from the German ISAF contribution is a similar engagement
should be avoided at all costs. If the most senior policy makers cannot
clearly articulate a common goal for a mission and why it matters, they
should abstain from such a foreign policy endeavor. Implicit goals
do not substitute for explicit ones. Ensuring strategic coherence and
consistency is difficult when policy makers cannot or do not want to
articulate goals.
Implicit goals for costly long-term projects are also undemocratic
since they cannot be debated among the electorate. Reflecting upon
implicit goals is difficult, which contributes to prolonging them even
if they do not make sense anymore. Finally, implicit goals help nurture
conspiracy theories about hidden agendas like a secret geopolitical
NATO plan to maintain a strategic position in Afghanistan vis-à-vis
Russia or China.
Other lessons learned more specific to the ISAF contribution emerge.
First, Germany’s engagement in Afghanistan demonstrated in the long
run it was impossible for practitioners to conduct combat operations
and sell the activity to the domestic public as a quasi-peacekeeping
mission. A major lesson, therefore, is controlling the course of a military
intervention is an illusion. In addition, applying the principles of the

41. Glatz, “ISAF Lessons Learned,” 172–74; and Kommando Heer I 1 (4), EinsAuswH,
Dokumentation, 4.
42. Kommando Heer I 1 (4), EinsAuswH, Dokumentation, 5.
43. Glatz, “ISAF Lessons Learned,” 174; and Kommando Heer I 1 (4), EinsAuswH,
Dokumentation, 4.
44. Kommando Heer I 1 (4), EinsAuswH, Dokumentation, 6.
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German approach to maneuver warfare, as cultivated in the army, to
operations in Afghanistan clearly failed. Though to date there is no
absolutely convincing Western concept of counterinsurgency, it appears
much more promising to employ more unconventional approaches with
a stronger role for intelligence.
The official and, even more so, the private lessons learned by
practitioners concluded relatively unanimously that the goals of the
ISAF mission had not (yet) been achieved and were too ambitious or
even too vague. Yet practitioners never questioned the assumption
foreign societies might be transformed according to Western standards.
They only concluded it would be much harder than previously thought.
Despite the dire results, practitioners did not draw the lesson such
missions should be abandoned. To the contrary, they advocated increased
funding for these missions. Former military or defense representatives
especially demanded that initially, dramatically more forces should be
employed in interventions. Others like Koch asked for more “strategic
patience” and stated such missions needed a “generational time scale.”45
The key difference between the major lessons learned by practitioners
and those advocated for in this article is the former suggest interventions
intended to transform foreign societies require a more substantial
military commitment, while the latter question their utility. The main
argument throughout this article has been this difference in assessment
can be most comprehensively understood by referring to the strong
institutional interests associated with interventions like ISAF. These
interests prevent practitioners from changing their premises—like the
general utility of interventions for transforming foreign societies—but
instead compel them to ask for more resources.
Practitioners apparently convinced senior foreign policy makers
that interventions aiming to transform foreign societies might work
in principle. Yet policy makers’ dominant lesson learned was to avoid
participating in another large-scale combat mission like ISAF. They
did not support the implication that even more robust forces would be
necessary, and therefore did not include any combat ground forces with
maneuver tasks in following interventions.
Except for observer missions, after the troop-level zenith of ISAF,
Germany (almost) only participated in smaller enhancement missions:
EU Training Mission Somalia (2010 until 2018, up to 20 soldiers), EU
Training Mission Mali (since 2013, up to 350 soldiers), training support
for Iraq/Kurdistan (2015 until 2018, up to 150 soldiers), and train,
advise, assist mission Resolute Support in Afghanistan (since 2015, up
to 1,300 soldiers). The only exception is the contribution to the UN
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (2016, up
to 1,100 soldiers), which also includes reconnaissance forces and some
security forces for base protection.

45. Bundesregierung, 2014 Report on Afghanistan, 47–48.
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Also it appears that as part of its framework-nation concept, the
country tries to outsource more dangerous military tasks to other
nations under its command. Already in ISAF Regional Command
North, the Bundeswehr trained and equipped Albanian, Georgian, and
Mongolian forces to perform infantry tasks. For the follow-up mission
to ISAF, Resolute Support, the country delegated the quick-reaction
force for the north to Georgia and trained and equipped those soldiers
in Germany.46
Finally, as form followed function, the major policy documents that
guide interventions reflect the policy shift to less dangerous and smaller
training missions. The 2016 White Paper on German Security Policy and the
Future of the Bundeswehr positions “enhancing and enabling” missions
more prominently than traditional stabilization operations.47 Also,
the Federal Government of Germany Guidelines on Preventing Crises, Resolving
Conflicts, Building Peace of the following year emphasize “local ownership”
and a more careful and indirect approach to the transformation of fragile
states. They do not mention the term “stabilization operations” at all.48

46. Silvia Stöber, “Georgische Streitkräfte in Afghanistan. Hohes Risiko für ein bisschen
NATO,” tagesschau.de, June 10, 2016, https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/afghanistan-nato
-georgien-101.html.
47. Federal Government of Germany, White Paper 2016: On German Security Policy and the Future
of the Bundeswehr (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defence, 2016).
48. Federal Government of Germany, Federal Government of Germany Guidelines on Preventing
Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace (Berlin: Federal Foreign Office, 2017), 52.
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ABSTRACT: India and Pakistan, both nuclear powers, have
averted crises through geopolitical weaponry rather than through
the frameworks of conventional deterrence theory and mutually
assured destruction. An analysis of three distinct conflicts between
these two nations reveals the inadequacy of a bipolar systemspreserving model of deterrence theory to explain their responses.
Future confidence-building measures must come from an emphasis
on shared history and culture.

C

ontrolling tensions and de-escalation take on distinct processes
and meanings in the Indo-Pakistani context. Conventional
deterrence, epitomized by a Cold War strategy of mutually
assured destruction, does not fully explain the picture. The threat of
mutual annihilation has never been genuine given the physical and
cultural closeness of India and Pakistan; consequently, the existential bias
in deterrence theory does not shape how India and Pakistan use nuclear
weapons. Conventional deterrence theory flexes its analytical muscle
more often in cases of immediate deterrence—during times of a pressing
specific threat—than during times of general deterrence where the focus
is on preventing military conflict between rival nuclear giants. As such,
India and Pakistan manage (de)escalation as an exercise in geopolitical
weaponry, engaging their nuclear capabilities as political tools to obtain
economic and political goals within the wider international community.
As demonstrated by the early 2019 India-Pakistan military standoff,
responsibility for crisis management falls on the shoulders of Indian
and Pakistani leadership. They cannot count on external countries
like the United States to intervene significantly and/or spearhead deescalation.1 In the future, India and Pakistan will have to learn, adapt,
and script new bilateral forms of confidence-building measures, drawing
more from their shared history and culture than some abstract sense of
game theory. Moreover, trilateral negotiations including permutations
of the big five nuclear states—the United States, Russia, China, India,
and Pakistan—are still pertinent.2 Nevertheless, such a reality will also

1. Dan De Luce and Robert Windrem, “With Trump Silent, No ‘Sheriff ’ in Town on PakistanIndia Crisis, Ex-Diplomats Say,” NBC News, March 5, 2019, https://www.nbcnews.com/news
/world/trump-silent-no-sheriff-town-pakistan-india-crisis-ex-diplomats-n979406.
2. William Walker, “International Nuclear Relations after the Indian and Pakistani Test
Explosions,” International Affairs 74, no. 3 (July 1998): 505–28.
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have to take into account nonstate actors and various terrorist/militant
groups that continue to take advantage of emergent situations.3
This article briefly discusses India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
programs and stresses the strategic interrelationships in the region
extend beyond a simple dyad. This operating framework will speak to
the limitations of the bipolar systems-preserving model of deterrence
theory when analyzing the South Asian security situation. The article
then considers three distinct military conflicts between India and
Pakistan that have occurred since 1998: the 1999 Kargil War, the
2001–2 India-Pakistan standoff, and the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The
article uses these conflicts to investigate the nature of escalation and
de-escalation—especially the role of external diplomacy in defusing
various tensions.
Finally, the article considers the conflicts in early 2019 involving
India and Pakistan, focusing on the immediate events following the 2019
Pulwama attack. This history will explain how tensions arose between
India and Pakistan and how both countries not only ratcheted up their
aggressive discourse toward one another, but more importantly how
they eventually engaged in effective crisis management. Both countries
did so in a new way that de-escalated the situation and altered their
appreciation for the role of crafting stability themselves. The United
States played a less interventionist role in early 2019; consequently, both
India and Pakistan had to contend with a situation that did not rely
on the diplomacy of external nation-states.4 The 2019 standoff shows
crisis management is a process, a set of dialogues, and an ongoing
experiment necessitating limited military confrontations as operationalcum-heuristic opportunities.

Conflict from the Beginning

Partition was the original sin. With the dissolution of the British Raj
in 1947, millions of people were displaced during the formation of India
and Pakistan as two sovereign nations. The resulting situation was not a
political vacuum in the strict sense; instead, the violent partition ensured
a complex set of relations and territorial disputes that would remain just
as contentious as on the eve of India’s independence.5 Despite diverse
ethnicities in their populations, India and Pakistan—secular nationstates—share kinship with respect to history and culture.
Indo-Pakistani relations have witnessed several violent conflicts over
the past decades including the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 and countless
other border skirmishes and limited military confrontations—some

3. Robert S. Litwak, “Recalibrating Deterrence to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism,” Washington
Quarterly 40, no. 1 (2017): 55–70, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2017.1302739.
4. Lexington, “The Trump Administration and the Indo-Pakistan Crisis: How America First
Works in Kashmir,” Economist, March 7, 2019, https://www.economist.com/united-states
/2019/03/07/the-trump-administration-and-the-indo-pakistan-crisis.
5. See Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia:
Refugees, Boundaries, Histories (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).
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having to do with Kashmir.6 Because of this history and the fact both
countries possess nuclear weapons, their mutual hostilities have reached
a level of concern. At first glance, such concern is somewhat moderated
by the operating frameworks of conventional deterrence theory, or so
it seems.
Yet India and Pakistan cannot be thought of as small-scale versions
of larger nuclear states; their South Asian-styled path to the nuclear
age was heavily influenced by external actors—the United States and
China—who were inextricably part of the nuclear deterrence posture
and strategy of both countries.7 As a result, becoming a nuclear power
did not mean India and Pakistan inherited a classical deterrence theory
manual that would automatically apply to conflict between them.

Nuclear Capabilities and Intentions

In the early 2000s pundits were debating whether India could
maintain escalation dominance. India began to consider developing
tactical nuclear weapons as a strategic way to pressure Pakistan to
disband or dissuade anti-India terrorist groups. According to the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) 2018
Yearbook, India and Pakistan have around 140 nuclear warheads in their
respective arsenals.8 India has been able to produce plutonium for use
in nuclear weapons, while Pakistan is working on transitioning from the
production of highly enriched uranium to plutonium.
The SIPRI report also states India and Pakistan are expanding their
arsenals and testing capabilities. India has air-, land-, and sea-based
missiles, securing a robust second-strike capability. Meanwhile, Pakistan
is working toward narrowing the gap to match India’s triad by developing
a sea-based nuclear missile delivery system. Although India continues to
claim a no-first-strike policy, it reserves the right to use nuclear weapons
in a preemptive counterforce strike if it believes Pakistan is gearing up
for a first-strike attack. Also under its current doctrine, India reserves
the right to use nuclear forces first when they are attacked with biological
or chemical weapons.9
Recent changes in Indian military doctrine, however, raise concerns
for Pakistani leadership. The Indian Army developed the Cold Start
Doctrine as a fix to what it saw as a slow mobilization of forces to
halt attacks coming from Pakistan. During the 2001 attacks on the
Indian Parliament, Indian forces were slow to mobilize along the Line
6. G. W. Choudhury, “Bangladesh: Why It Happened,” International Affairs 48, no. 2 (April 1972):
242–49, https://doi.org/10.2307/2613440.
7. Robert Einhorn and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, The Strategic Chain: Linking
Pakistan, India, China, and the United States, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Series
(Washington, DC: Brookings, March 2, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the
-strategic-chain-linking-pakistan-india-china-and-the-united-states/.
8. SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 2018), https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRIYB18c06.pdf.
9. Kumar Sundaram, and M. V. Raman, “India and the Policy of No First Use of Nuclear
Weapons,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 1, no. 1 (2018): 152–68, https://doi.org/10.1080
/25751654.2018.1438737.
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of Control, the de facto border between India and Pakistan. According
to one source, the Cold Start Doctrine was developed to:
Facilitate smaller scale, rapid, and decisive conventional offensive operations
into Pakistani territory in the event of a Pakistani-sponsored asymmetrical
attack on Indian soil before the international community can actively
intervene, and before Pakistan would feel compelled to launch nuclear
retaliatory strikes to repel an Indian invasion. It is still unclear what CSD
specifically entails, and senior Indian officers have on purpose remained
ambiguous about it.10

On the Pakistan side, the first-strike policy is part of Pakistan’s
nuclear doctrine but is better understood in the context of its overall
defense principles. The Pakistani military views its first-strike posture
as purely deterrent. Pakistan reserves the right to use nuclear weapons
first, but only after certain thresholds have been crossed—if an invasion
is imminent. These thresholds could take the form of particular military
strikes targeting more than just military assets or attacks that put the
national security and sovereignty of Pakistan at severe existential risk.
A risk to strategic stability may also occur as a result of unevenness
in the development of regional nuclear forces and capabilities among
China, India, and Pakistan. This disparate regional nuclear development
means “redundancy is weak, flexibility is limited, and the security of the
deterrent’s primary arm is menaced.”11 “Their [China, India, Pakistan]
land-based ballistic missile systems (along with aircraft in the Indian and
Pakistani cases) serve this core function, and, when limited in size and
in fixed locations, they are vulnerable to first-strike destruction by an
adversary with superior nuclear forces.”12
Another facet to be taken into account pertains to how external
countries intervened early in the establishment of India’s and Pakistan’s
growing nuclear weapons arsenals. According to a now-declassified
1981 US State Department report, “if the two South Asian states
moved to develop nuclear weapons, both China and the USSR would
have strong temptations to shape relations among the four countries.”13
Another section from the same document reveals US officials trying to
ascertain the Indian perspective: “From New Delhi’s vantage point, the
possible nuclear threat from China has been the underlying incentive
for supporting the nuclear weapons option. India believes China’s longrange goal is the domination of all of Asia.”14
10. Franz-Stefan Gady, “Is the Indian Military Capable of Executing the Cold Start
Doctrine?,” Diplomat, January 29, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/is-the-indian-military
-capable-of-executing-the-cold-start-doctrine/.
11. Robert Legvold, “The Challenges of a Multipolar Nuclear World in a Shifting International
Context,” in Meeting the Challenges of the New Nuclear Age: Nuclear Weapons in a Changing Global Order,
ed. Steven E. Miller, Robert Legvold, and Lawrence Freedman (Cambridge, MA: American Academy
of Arts & Sciences, 2019), 47.
12. Legvold, “Multipolar Nuclear World,” 47–48.
13. US Department of State (DoS), Bureau of Intelligence and Research, India-Pakistan Views
on a Nuclear Weapons Option and Potential Repercussions, FOIA release July 28, 2005, (Washington, DC:
DoS, June 25, 1981), https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114242.
14. US DoS, India-Pakistan Views.
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Another recently declassified document confirms the United States,
while not sanguine about supporting Pakistan’s development of nuclear
weapons, in fact turned a blind eye, much to India’s chagrin.15 The
former Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq and Chinese Vice Premier Deng
Xiaoping convinced the United States to continue providing Pakistan
economic and military aid. During this period, US Secretary of Defense
Harold Brown said: “There are limits on our ability to aid Pakistan
because of their nuclear explosive program. Although we still object to
their doing so, we will now set that aside for the time being, to facilitate
strengthening Pakistan against potential Soviet action.”16
A 1983 State Department briefing document reveals the United
States recognized a Pakistani had stolen European technology in aid
of Pakistan’s active uranium enrichment program.17 Despite the theft
and the fact the United States also knew China was assisting Pakistan
in developing nuclear weapons, the then US President Ronald Reagan
continued to allow aid to flow to Pakistan, citing national interest
concerns.18 Today China matters even more. An article published during
the height of the February 2019 skirmish reinforces both US and Chinese
interests in South Asia. “Washington has been wooing New Delhi for
the past several years, going so far as to rename its Pacific Command to
‘Indo-Pacific’ [emphasis in original] and signing weapons deals with Prime
Minister Narendra Modi’s government, hoping to use India as a regional
counterweight to China.”19

Three Crises

Three recent conflicts between India and Pakistan reveal common
themes and provide examples showing how escalation toward major
military confrontation was avoided. The 1999 Kargil crisis was the first
major conflict following the ascension of both countries to the status of
nuclear powered nation-states. Pakistan provoked the crisis by sending
troops across the Kargil border. According to one expert, the move by
Pakistan was intended to signal to the international community Kashmir
was a geopolitical issue that could merit nuclear escalation. “This aim
would align with the broader perspective of India viewing Kashmir as a
bilateral issue and Pakistan viewing it as one requiring the international
community’s participation. . . . The Pakistani offensive in the Kargil

15. US DoS, The Pakistani Nuclear Program, declassified, (Washington, DC: US DoS, June 23,
1983), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB6/docs/doc22.pdf.
16. US DoS, Office of the Historian, “Memorandum of Conversation: Meeting between
Secretary of Defense Brown and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping” in Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan, Document 150, ed. David Zierler and Adam M.
Howard (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), https://history.state.gov
/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v12/d150.
17. DoS, Pakistani Nuclear Program.
18. “Escalating India-Pakistan Conflict a Major Headache for China & US,” RT, February 28,
2019, https://www.rt.com/news/452627-india-pakistan-conflict-spillover/.
19. “Escalating India-Pakistan Conflict.”
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district of Kashmir reflected a strategy of ‘preemptive defense,’ with
Pakistan responding in anticipation of presumed Indian offensives.”20
If nuclear weapons enabled and emboldened such political moves,
options were dwindling in the face of fear, enlarging the scope of the
Kargil incident and restraint. Consequently, the United States stepped
in and the then US President Bill Clinton and United States Central
Command leadership spoke to Indian and Pakistani leadership, providing
political cover and an exit to withdraw from the tensions along the Line
of Control. The end of the Kargil War represented a watershed moment
in Indo-American dialogue. American foreign policy in India shifted
focus from nonproliferation in South Asia to conflict prevention. More
importantly, the United States started publicly siding with India against
Pakistan’s sheltering of al-Qaida, even before the attacks of 9/11.21
The 2001–2 “Twin Peaks” crisis brought India and Pakistan
closer to the brink of major war. The first peak occurred when Islamic
militants attacked the Indian Parliament in December 2001. India opted
for compellence to convince Islamabad to stop militant/terrorist groups
from infiltrating and attacking. In order to carry this out, India launched
Operation Parakam, mobilizing military forces along the international
Pakistan-India border. In response, Pakistan mobilized its forces along
the Line of Control and the international border.
The second peak arose five months later when terrorists attacked
an Indian army base located at the international border. The tension
and possible threat of military conflict in the aftermath of the first peak
led the international community to put pressure on the then President
Pervez Musharraf to announce formally he would not let his country
be the launching pad for terrorist attacks. The war in Afghanistan
post-9/11 committed the United States to the region, so much so
that de-escalating what might have initially been a bilateral situation
became multidimensional. “The U.S. war in Afghanistan played an
important role restraining India from striking Pakistan, a key U.S.
ally in Afghanistan and the broader war on terrorism. This motivation
was especially important because the United States did not want
Pakistani troops redirected from counterterrorism operations to the
Indian border.”22
On November 26, 2008, 10 gunmen—thought to be associated
with Pakistani-based terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Taiba—killed 170
people in Mumbai. India blamed Pakistan for allowing the gunmen to
operate from its territory. Unlike the two previous crises, India did not
rush to mobilize forces along the border, and as a result Pakistan resisted
20. Zafar Khan, “Crisis Management in Nuclear South Asia: A Pakistani Perspective,” in
Investigating Crises: South Asia’s Lessons, Evolving Dynamics, and Trajectories, ed. Sameer Lalwani and
Hannah Haegeland (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2018), 146, http://crises.stimson.org
/nuclear/.
21. Bruce Riedel, “How the 1999 Kargil Conflict Redefined US-India Ties,” Order From Chaos
(blog) Brookings, July 24, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/07/24
/how-the-1999-kargil-conflict-redefined-us-india-ties/.
22. Khan, “Crisis Management.”
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the urge to match India’s provocation. The United States stepped in
again, but this time swiftly ahead of any major mobilization. The exact
reasons for India’s restraint in the face of the mass killing are still
unknown, but the countries ultimately avoided a military standoff.
The United States was committed to defuse the situation. “Pakistan
remained a critical frontline state for cooperation. Washington needed
Islamabad to not only play an effective role in the Afghanistan peace
process but also to support the withdrawal of its forces and war equipment
from the region through Pakistan.”23 According to one observer, there
were other reasons why the United States was an effective if not de facto
broker and why the then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice engaged
directly with both Indian and Pakistani leadership. “The United States’
intervention was considered benign by both New Delhi and Islamabad,
and thereby welcomed by both despite having different expectations
from the mediator and diverse outcomes of the settlement.”24

Consequences of 1999–2008

A few observations can be made regarding India’s and Pakistan’s
experience with the aforementioned military conflicts and their mutual
avoidance of nuclear escalation. To begin with, both countries were
relatively new to the nuclear club while testing the limits of brinkmanship.
They were also learning how to balance various strategic actions. For
example, even though both countries could and did extend the scopes of
particular crises, they did so with opportunistic pathways for improving
communication and generating mutually accepted restraint mechanisms.
India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were not born from an
existential Cold War framework—they were not seeking to annihilate
one another from the start due to an ideological clash. For India and
Pakistan, nuclear weapons’ advancement coevolved with their changing
security and political interests. The notion of proxy wars and extended
deterrence in the case of India and Pakistan also do not accurately
capture the nature of their conflict.
For instance, given the United States is not fighting a proxy war
against China on the border of India and Pakistan, nonstate actors such
as terrorist organizations are able to conduct limited attacks under the
nuclear cover. In other words, terrorist groups not officially sponsored
by the state and that operate transnationally can carry out some attacks
without being subject to the consequences of symmetric deterrence
between nation-states. Such terrorist groups do not often follow the
political unity and governance structures of the nation-state or even
rational chains of command. As a result, retaliating against a nationstate in response to the actions of rogue terrorist groups would be hard
to justify internationally.

23. Khan, “Crisis Management,” 152.
24. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “Paradox of Deterrence: India-Pakistan Strategic Relations,” Strategic
Studies 29, no. 4 (2009).
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Nonetheless, although terrorist attacks do not warrant nuclear
escalation at least in the three historical cases discussed, the threat of
nuclear escalation, even if deployed politically and purposively, only
realizes itself in Indo-Pakistani relations when conventional forces
take positions along borders such as the Line of Control. In this sense,
it is conventional war and major military conflict that act as critical
thresholds, opening the door to escalation.

2019 Crisis

On February 14, 2019, a suicide bomber with links to the Pakistani
terrorist organization Jaish-e-Mohammed attacked a military convoy
in Pulwama—a district in India’s northern region of Jammu and
Kashmir—killing over 40 Indian soldiers. In response, India conducted
air strikes supposedly targeting a terrorist base camp in Balakot in the
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. While India claimed it
had killed scores of Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorists, Pakistan and later
third-party satellite imagery revealed no damage was done to any of the
targeted buildings.25
Whether Pakistan was able to intercept the Indian Mirage 2000 jets
is still uncertain. Nonetheless India launched air strikes in a calculated
strategy of compellence. Conscious of not escalating tensions too close
to the brink of nuclear war, and definitely with the April 11–May 23 Lok
Sabha general elections in mind, Indian leadership ordered air strikes
on Pakistan land, but instead of hitting real targets, India bombed
wooded areas as a warning measure. A day later, Pakistan retaliated
by sending in air strikes, and according to one report, Pakistani F-16s
targeted Indian army positions near the Line of Control. The report
noted: “A Pakistani major general said that the jets locked on to Indian
targets to demonstrate capability, but then purposefully avoided causing
damage. . . . The response appears to be a sort of minimum required
reaction to demonstrate its resolve against the Indian military entering
its territory without doing anything that would warrant a
serious response.”26
Both countries claimed their fighters shot down the other’s
aircraft, but the only concrete evidence was an uploaded video
confirming Pakistan shot down and captured an Indian pilot who was
subsequently released.27 Meanwhile, Pakistan arrested several dozen
terrorist organization members as a sign to India and the international

25. Martin Howell, Gerry Doyle, and Simon Scarr, “Satellite Images Show Buildings
Still Standing at Indian Bombing Site, Reuters, March 5, 2019, https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-india-kashmir-pakistan-airstrike-insi/satellite-images-show-buildings-still-standing-at
-indian-bombing-site-idUSKCN1QN00V.
26. Phillip Orchard and Xander Snyder, “Why India and Pakistan Avoided Nuclear War,” Real
Clear World, March 7, 2019, https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2019/03/07/why_india
_and_pakistan_avoided_nuclear_war_112984.html.
27. “IAF Pilot Abhinandan: Wing Commander Returns Home, Received by BSF Officials,”
Business Today India, March 1, 2019, https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics
/india-pakistan-tension-live-updates-iaf-pilot-wing-commander-abhinandan-iaf-to-release/story
/323483.html.
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community that it was doing its part to curb terrorist activities within
Pakistan’s borders.28 The Indian air strikes are notable for being the first
time since 1971 that India struck a target within Pakistan, even if it was
just an empty field. This attack was also the first time any nuclear power
conducted air strikes in the territory of another nuclear power.
Notwithstanding the usual finger-pointing as to who was the
aggressor, certain realities, old and new, emerged in the wake of the air
strikes. Indian and Pakistani intelligence agencies were communicating
constantly throughout the crisis and afterwards, even if the messages
were mutual threats of nonnuclear conventional missile exchanges.
(Ironically, hostilities between India and Pakistan were heating up at the
same time US President Donald Trump was in Hanoi hoping to strike
a deal with North Korea on its nuclear weapons program.) According
to the Pakistani Foreign Minister, China and the UAE intervened and
expressed their concerns regarding escalating tensions.
But if the United States was not actively involved and committed
to crisis management to the same extent as it had been before, how
was this tense moment defused? Are we to agree with Joshua White,
a former White House official, who asserted, “Indian and Pakistani
leaders have long evinced confidence that they can understand each
other’s deterrence signals and can de-escalate at will”?29 Evidently so,
as the Indian government rejected the Trump administration’s offer
to mediate, citing the tension with Pakistan over Kashmir would be
strictly bilateral.30
During this time, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan stated:
“History tells us that wars are full of miscalculation. My question is
that given the weapons we have can we afford miscalculation. . . .We
should sit down and talk.”31 Several weeks after the return of India’s
captured pilot, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi at an election rally
responded regarding the purpose of nuclear weapons. “What do we have
then? Have we kept our nuclear bomb for Diwali?”32 Since Diwali is the
Hindu festival of lights, equating nuclear weapons with fireworks is a
Hindutva-arousing and politically effective, yet crass evocation.

28. Barnini Chakraborty, “Several Dozen Arrested in Pakistan over Attack in Indian
Kashmir,” Fox News, March 5, 2019, https://www.foxnews.com/world/several-dozen-arrested
-in-pakistan-over-attack-in-indian-kashmir.
29. Sanjeev Miglani and Drazen Jorgic, “INSIGHT-India, Pakistan Threatened to Unleash
Missiles at Each Other-Sources,” Reuters, March 17, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article
/india-kashmir-crisis/insight-india-pakistan-threatened-to-unleash-missiles-at-each-other-sources
-idINL3N2150XD.
30. Matthew Lee, “India Again Rejects Trump’s Kashmir Mediation Offer,” ABC News,
August 2, 2019, https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/india-rejects-trumps-kashmir
-mediation-offer-64726009.
31. Drazen Jorgic, “Pakistan PM Urges Talks with India to End Crisis, Avoid Miscalculation,”
Reuters, February 27, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-pakistan-primeminister
/pakistan-pm-urges-talks-with-india-to-end-crisis-avoid-miscalculation-idUSKCN1QG1C2.
32. “Have We Kept Our Nuclear Bomb for Diwali, Asks Narendra Modi,” Hindu, April 21,
2019, https://www.thehindu.com/elections/lok-sabha-2019/have-we-kept-our-nuclear-bomb-for
-diwali-asks-narendra-modi/article26905408.ece.

TOC

94

Parameters 50(4) Winter 2020–21

On February 14, 2019, the then US National Security Adviser John
Bolton remarked that the United States “support[s] India’s right to self
defense.”33 The timing and delivery of such diplomatic pronouncements
did more damage than good; the statement not only condoned India’s
reaction but emboldened India to continue pressing for a moreaggressive strategy. The Hill newspaper noted: “We should all remember
this statement as the moment Bolton reset India-Pakistan relations as
we’ve known them since 1947. Once a deliberate and cautious back
channel intermediary on security flare-ups between the nuclear-armed
rivals, the United States has taken yet another step back from Pakistan
and one closer to India.”34 By failing to mediate either willingly or not,
the United States paved the way for India’s encroachment into Kashmir
and Jammu just a few months later.

Strategic Findings

The 1999 Kargil crisis proved Pakistan could still provoke and engage
in limited conflict below the threat of nuclear war. This is often known
as the stability-instability paradox; “Strategic stability creates instability
by making lower levels of violence relatively safe and undermining
‘extended deterrence’.”35 The handling of the early 2019 crisis, however,
demonstrated to India and Pakistan they could no longer depend on the
United States to step in as a mediator and distributor of political favors
to both sides.
Moreover, given the United States is trying to diminish its
footprint in the Middle East, it will have less leverage and ability to
provide politically expedient off-ramps and face-saving channels. In
future crises, both countries will exercise brinkmanship in an effort to
dominate escalation, but the real question is how confident India and
Pakistan are regarding their ability to carry out de-escalation. “Neither
India nor Pakistan would want uncontrolled escalation, but . . . on whose
terms will the conflict end? For India, an extra shot would have to be
fired, so to speak, for it to walk away satisfied. Pakistan, on the other
hand, would want to exit immediately after it has responded to India’s
initial aggression.”36
Conventional realist deterrence theory provides limited analytical
purchase in understanding how India and Pakistan conceive of and
leverage the threat of using nuclear weapons. Because one cannot
discount the presence and role of the United States, Russia, and China in

33. “U.S. Adviser Bolton Promises India Support after Kashmir Attack,” Reuters,
February 15, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-usa/u-s-adviser-bolton-promises
-india-support-after-kashmir-attack-idUSKCN1Q504T.
34. Shamila N. Chaudhary, “Better Late Than Never: US Comes to Its Senses on IndiaPakistan Conflict,” Hill, February 28, 2019, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/432031
-better-late-than-never-us-comes-to-its-senses-on-india-pakistan.
35. Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 19–20.
36. Moeed Yusuf, “Banking on an Outsider: Implications for Escalation Control in South
Asia,” Arms Control Today 41 (June 2011): 20–27.
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the region, India and Pakistan are not just aiming their nuclear strategies
at one another—multiple potential adversaries are in the offing.
One expert argues even though the political actors in the region are
the same, shifting trends on the ground induce new realities. Pakistan
will become increasingly anxious about its immediate security because
(1) India’s economy is grower stronger, (2) the United States is enhancing
its partnership with India as a counterweight to China, and (3) China’s
security concerns will outstrip any sense of unwavering receptiveness
to relieving Pakistan’s distresses. In this new environment, regional
nuclearization will not be checked by the United States alone. Such
sentiment seems to be calling for a pivot in thinking away from a post–
Cold War unipolar world, one which makes room for a postcolonial
theory of nuclear deterrence.37
An important corrective to any working theory must contain
empirical data and/or observations. For some, such a corrective
entails treating the critical unit of analysis not in terms of nuclear
weapons capability but rather nuclear posture. “Nuclear posture is the
incorporation of some number and type of nuclear warheads and
delivery vehicles into a state’s overall military structure, the rules and
procedures governing how those weapons are deployed, when and under
what conditions they might be used, against what targets, and who has the
authority to make those decisions.”38
Posture and not simply the category of abstract capabilities dictate
just how one country might deter another. “This focus on postures as
a variable . . . is preferable because it maintains the focus on observable
[emphasis in original] capabilities, organizational procedures and
interests, and patterns of behavior that are measurable both to adversaries
and analysts.”39

Recommendations

Just months after the February 2019 attack, India revoked Articles
370 and 35-A of its constitution.40 On August 5, 2019, the ruling political
party in India, the Bharatiya Janata Party, changed legislation ensuring
the Indian-controlled portion of Kashmir would no longer hold its
semiautonomous status. Needless to say, placing Jammu and Kashmir
under greater Indian control will certainly cause a humanitarian and
security crisis for Muslim residents living in that state, which may very
well engulf India and Pakistan in yet another round of military conflict.
The United States should be prepared to mediate diplomatically and
proactively from the start of any such conflict.

37. See also Bharat Karnad, “South Asia: The Irrelevance of Classical Nuclear Deterrence
Theory,” India Review 4, no. 2 (2005): 173–213, https://doi.org/10.1080/14736480500225640.
38. Vipin Narang, “Deterring Unequally: Regional Power Nuclear Postures and International
Conflict,” International Security Colloquium (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 2011), 10.
39. Narang, “Deterring Unequally.”
40. Spriha Srivastava, “India Revokes Special Status for Kashmir. Here’s What It Means,”
CNBC, August 5, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/05/article-370-what-is-happening-in
-kashmir-india-revokes-special-status.html.
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Some experts believe India and Pakistan should create constant
lines of communication and bilateral crisis management institutions
in order to manage future crises better. “Adopting proposals such as
regular communication and meetings between local commanders,
coordinated patrolling . . . would improve the LoC situation, serving as
a major confidence-building measure to transform the political nature
of the relationship.”41 Communication when deterrence fails also needs
to be addressed and applied to cooperative military exercises and/or war
gaming. Here the United States could supply command, control, and
communication assets and training. The failure of deterrence may be
quite different in both form and function for India than for Pakistan.
Avoiding miscalculation by communicating intent and doctrinal shifts
will help manage escalation should a nuclear weapon ever be launched.
Several principles will help the United States understand and
contend with security in the region. For the US military, it is important
to realize terrorist groups operating within Pakistan, whether or not
officially endorsed by Pakistani civilian leadership, will retaliate for the
recent accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India. Pakistan interprets
this emboldened move by India as more than just a territorial grab; it is a
provocation exacerbating the clash of identities that underlies how India
and Pakistan regard the relationship between (fundamentalist) religion
and nationhood. Consequently India and Pakistan will have claims to
both offensive and defensive deterrence for the foreseeable future.
To make matters worse, India will see more jihadist-inspired attacks
and will continue to cross into Pakistani territory to deter and punish
such unconventional attacks. The US military must be cognizant of the
cultural and politically contingent logics driving the escalation and deescalation of tensions in the region. The possession of nuclear weapons
has not been the sole cause or even instigator of Indo-Pakistani conflict
over the past few decades. Rather, nuclear weapons have opened and
closed particular options.
Next, efforts should be taken to emphasize conflict resolution rather
than short-term actions geared toward de-escalation. In this regard, the
United States should avoid conveying the impression it is choosing sides.
Instead, it should help both India and Pakistan develop better crisis
management mechanisms while “continu[ing] to de-hyphenate Pakistan
and India by addressing both countries on issues beyond their mutual
antagonism.”42 Both nations engage in bilateral relations with the United
States; they are not part of any formal defense alliance.
Another possible course of action, and one the United States should
champion, is potential nonproliferation treaties India and Pakistan could
construct and enter bilaterally. Some experts have made the interesting
case that: “India has sought to resignify the Western discourse of
41. Fahad Nabeel, “3 Scenarios for India-Pakistan Relations under Modi 2.0: Can India
and Pakistan Shift the Balance from Confrontation to Cooperation?,” Diplomat, June 25, 2019,
https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/three-scenarios-for-india-pakistan-relations-under-modi-2-0/.
42. Richard Weitz, Promoting US-Indian Defense Cooperation: Opportunities and Obstacles (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2017).
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nuclear responsibility such that it is linked to nuclear disarmament and
equality rather than nuclear nonproliferation and hierarchy. . . . India’s
status as a responsible nuclear power is based, not on its compliance
with international regimes or norms, but on its ‘civilizational
exceptionalism’.”43 If India and Pakistan could decolonize the discourse
and hegemony of Western nuclear arms control by taking the higher
moral ground, both sides would learn from each other directly without
having to risk the breakdown in communications and trust resulting
from the involvement of middlemen.
The US Indo-Pacific Command should invest in strategies for
integrating Pakistani military officers into its operations. Foreign
exchange officer programs are fruitful. Additionally, holding important
regional exercises featuring both Pakistani and Indian military leadership
at the helm would clearly show the United States is not picking sides.
The United States could also let China play a more prominent leadership
role by endorsing particular conferences and security forums inviting
Pakistan and India to the table, even if they take place in Beijing. The
United States could also partner with China in establishing better
security and economic outcomes for South Asia more broadly.
Lastly, by providing command, control, and communication
technology and training support, the United States would help India
and Pakistan underscore and strengthen their crisis management
systems. Empowering India and Pakistan to strengthen their respective
intelligence systems will allow the two nation-states to navigate
disruptions emerging from a future that will inevitably involve hybrid
conflicts. These gray-zone conflicts include campaigns such as (dis)
information operations, troop movements, cyberattacks, and more.
Providing technology and training would require the United States to
engage in constant communication with India and Pakistan and transmit
clear and consistent foreign policy goals.
Finally, the United States should increase strategic planning in the
region with both India and Pakistan, without playing one side against
the other. Developing common and relevant training relationships
during peacetime with India and Pakistan together is critical. Ultimately
the United States has an opportunity to fulfill its commitment to the
region, not as an adversary but as a geopolitical power with well-defined
priorities for peace.

43. Priya Chacko and Alexander E. Davis, “Resignifying ‘Responsibility’: India, Exceptionalism
and Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” Asian Journal of Political Science 26, no. 3 (2018): 352–70,
https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2018.1486218.
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Diverging Interests: US Strategy
in the Middle East
Christopher J. Bolan, Jerad I. Harper,
and Joel R. Hillison
ABSTRACT: The novel coronavirus is only the latest in a series of
global crises with implications for the regional order in the Middle
East. These changes and the diverging interests of actors in the
region have implications for US strategy and provide an opportunity
to rethink key US relationships there.

M

ajor global crises, such as the Great Depression of the 1930s
and the terror attacks on September 11, 2001, can result in a
significant reordering of the global and regional orders. The
ongoing coronavirus pandemic has the potential to accelerate a trend
already well underway in the Middle East: the emergence of a new and
dynamic regional order making the attainment of US interests more
challenging. This latest crisis provides an opportunity for policy makers
to reassess US strategy in the Middle East. For decades the region has
been a focal point for American foreign policy and the object of multiple
US and allied military campaigns.
Securing American national security interests in this troubled
environment will require US policy makers to be flexible, creative, agile,
and adaptive in managing rapidly evolving and transient relationships
among actors in the region. This article briefly examines how the actions
of key regional powers—Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel—diverge
from US interests in the region and offers recommendations for how US
policy should adapt to these shifting realities.

Key US Interests

The 2017 National Security Strateg y describes the US vision of “a
Middle East that is not a safe haven or breeding ground for jihadist
terrorists, not dominated by any power hostile to the United States, and
that contributes to a stable global energy market.”1 Realizing this goal
requires promoting enduring US regional interests such as preventing the
emergence of a regional hegemon, promoting regional stability, ensuring
global access to the region’s energy resources, guaranteeing the survival
An earlier and abridged version of this article was originally published as Christopher J. Bolan,
Joel R. Hillison, and Jerad I. Harper, “Shifting Poles in the Middle East: Implications for U.S. Regional
Strategy,” Foreign Policy Research Institute (website), November 11, 2019, https://www.fpri.org
/article/2019/11/shifting-poles-in-the-middle-east-implications-for-u-s-regional-strategy/.
Revised and reprinted by permission of the authors and the publisher.
1. Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC:
White House, December 2017), 48.
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of Israel, limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and
containing terrorism. The actions of emerging major regional powers,
namely Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel, will strongly influence the
ability of the United States to promote these interests.

Iran
Tehran’s post-revolutionary foreign policy has been aimed at
countering and reducing the influence of the United States and its close
regional allies. US policy since the revolution has been to isolate and
contain Iranian influence. Accordingly, the United States has subjected
Tehran to a network of American and international sanctions designed to
prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons’ technology, limit its ballistic
missile program, and constrain its support of terrorist organizations.
Since the United States ended its compliance with the 2015 Iran
nuclear deal—formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action—it has imposed a steadily intensifying campaign of economic
sanctions dedicated to compelling changes in Iran’s behavior. While this
policy of intensified sanctions has clearly imposed significant damage on
Iran’s economy, Iran’s malign influence continues in the region.
In response, Iran has taken steps to reduce its compliance with the
nuclear accord, expand its civilian nuclear activities, and shorten the
so-called breakout time required to produce a nuclear weapon.2 More
recently, Iran temporarily denied the International Atomic Energy
Agency access to some sites with suspected ties to a nuclear weapons
program.3 These steps, while reversible, are especially worrisome as
some hard-line Iranian leaders are signaling a willingness to withdraw
from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Similarly, Iran’s missile programs also continue to advance despite
intensified and expanded American sanctions. In April 2020 Iran’s
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps successfully launched its first satellite
into orbit—a step the United States strongly criticized as a cover for
Iran’s further development of a ballistic missile program designed to be
capable of delivering nuclear weapons in the future.4
Iran is also actively seeking to undermine regional stability through
a network of Shia militia groups trained, equipped, and sponsored under
the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This network
includes a close relationship with Lebanese Hezbollah—a group the US
government formally designated a foreign terrorist organization in 1997.
In addition to arming Hezbollah with rockets and missiles capable of
2. Greg Priddy, “Concerns about Iran’s Nuclear Breakout Time Are Set to Grow,” Stratfor,
February 21, 2020, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/concerns-about-irans-falling-nuclear
-breakout-time-are-set-grow-jcpoa-iaea-united-states-centrifuges.
3. Lara Jakes, “Iran to Allow U.N. Inspections of Previously Blocked Nuclear Sites,” New York
Times, August 26, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/26/world/middleeast/trump-iran
-nuclear-iaea.html.
4. Sandra Erwin, “Pompeo Blasts Iran’s Space Program in Wake of Satellite Launch,”
Space News, April 26, 2020, https://spacenews.com/pompeo-blasts-irans-space-program-in-wake
-of-military-satellite-launch/.
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threatening Israeli population centers, Iran provides critical financial
and military support to the Houthis militants in Yemen, enabling
the group to launch missile and drone attacks on Saudi civilian and
military facilities.5
In Iraq, Iran has deep and enduring ties with numerous Shia militia
groups. While playing a supporting role in liberating Iraqi territories from
ISIS control, these groups have also continued to launch direct attacks
on US and Iraqi facilities alike.6 Meanwhile in Syria, Iran continues to
recruit local fighters and Shia militia groups to bolster its only regional
ally in Damascus.7 There is little sign Iran will abandon its historical
support for these groups despite economic strains.8
Additionally leaders in Tehran have demonstrated the ability to attack
directly US and allied energy interests in the region. In September 2019
Iran conducted missile and drone strikes on refining facilities in Saudi
Arabia that temporarily cut Saudi oil production in half and reduced
global supplies by 5 percent.9 While Saudi Arabia quickly restored this
capability, these incidences highlighted the vulnerability of the Arab
Gulf state to Iranian attacks and clearly demonstrated the limits of any
US security guarantee.
As a direct consequence, Arab leaders have begun to hedge their
support for an American strategy of maximum pressure on Iran by directly
reaching out to Tehran to ease tensions. In early August 2019 the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) sent a military delegation to Tehran to discuss
coordinating security efforts to protect shipping in the Gulf and more
recently sent an airplane full of medical supplies to Iran in a gesture
of solidarity to help combat the coronavirus.10 Similarly, leaders in

5. Corey Dickstein, “CENTCOM: Weapons Shipment from Iran Seized in Arabian Sea Was
on the Way to Houthi Rebels in Yemen,” Stars and Stripes, February 19, 2020, https://www.stripes
.com/news/middle-east/centcom-weapons-shipment-from-iran-seized-in-arabian-sea-was-on-the
-way-to-houthi-rebels-in-yemen-1.619374.
6. Louisa Loveluck and Missy Ryan, “Militia Attacks on Americans in Iraq Are Becoming More
Audacious,” Washington Post, March 28, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle
_east/militia-attacks-on-americans-in-iraq-becoming-more-audacious-us-wrestling-with-how-to
-respond/2020/03/27/7b31d76c-6d38-11ea-a156-0048b62cdb51_story.html.
7. Golnaz Esfandiari, “Analysts See Little Change in Iran’s Strategy in Syria despite Reports
of Withdrawal,” Radio Free Europe, May 15, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/tactical-change-or
-withdrawal-iran-s-syria-strategy-analyzed-amid-reports-of-force-reductions/30614695.html.
8. Raz Zimmt, “Iran’s Regional Ambitions Are Not Going Anywhere,” Atlantic Council
(blog), April 10, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/irans-regional-ambitions
-are-not-going-anywhere/.
9. Humeyra Pamuk, “Exclusive: U.S. Probe of Saudi Oil Attack Shows It Came from
North – Report,” Reuters, December 19, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-aramco
-attacks-iran-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-probe-of-saudi-oil-attack-shows-it-came-from-north-report
-idUSKBN1YN299.
10. “Rivals Iran and UAE to Hold Maritime Security Talks,” Reuters, July 30, 2019, https://
www.reuters.com/article/mideast-iran-emirates/rivals-iran-and-uae-to-hold-maritime-security
-talks-idUSL8N24V3BO; and “UAE Sends Medical Aid to Iran as Coronavirus Outbreak
Intensifies,” Al-Monitor, March 17, 2020, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/03
/uae-iran-medical-aid-coronavirus-outbreak.html.
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Riyadh have launched a quiet campaign of diplomatic outreach to Tehran
in order to avoid direct conflict.11
Moreover, US allies in Europe and in some Arab capitals have
sought some level of accommodation with Iran. Leaders in Germany,
Britain, and France are actively seeking to preserve the Iran nuclear deal
by creating alternative means of facilitating both international business
investments and the provision of humanitarian goods to Iran.12

Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia has often directly contributed to US interests by
using its position as a major swing producer of oil to stabilize global
oil markets at critical junctures.13 But the so-called Shale Revolution
has transformed the global energy market, propelling the United States
into position as the world’s largest oil producer and effectively making
the United States and Saudi Arabia competitors for the global market
share.14 In fact, some analysts directly attribute recent Saudi efforts to
flood the oil market to a campaign designed to drive US shale companies
out of business.15
In addition to these newly emerging tensions, the Kingdom has a
mixed record in terms of battling Islamic extremism. Terrorism expert
William McCants has characterized the Saudis as “both the arsonists
and firefighters” in this battle.16 Saudi Arabia has undoubtedly used
its wealth to promote a puritan and reactionary Wahhabi version of
Islamic theology, which now fuels many of the violent Sunni jihadi
terrorist groups threatening Western interests around the globe.17 While
acknowledging this troubled past, terrorism expert Daniel Byman also
notes Riyadh has simultaneously proven itself to be “a vital partner in
the struggle to defeat the Islamic State, al-Qaida, and other groups.”18
Moreover, Saudi Arabia is now effectively being led by Mohammed
bin Salman, the King’s son, heir apparent, and at 35 years old stands
to rule the country for several decades. At home he is pushing a
11. Declan Walsh and Ben Hubbard, “With U.S. Help No Longer Assured, Saudis Try a New
Strategy: Talks,” New York Times, December 26, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/26
/world/middleeast/saudi-iran-qatar-talks.html.
12. Leila Gharagozlou, “EU Implements New Iran Trade Mechanism,” CNBC, January 31,
2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/31/eu-implements-new-iran-trade-mechanism.html.
13. John Kemp, “Saudi Arabia Cannot Escape Destiny as Swing Producer,” Reuters,
February 1, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-oil-kemp/saudi-arabia-cannot-escape
-destiny-as-swing-producer-kemp-idUSKBN15G4OO.
14. Candace Dunn and Tim Hess, “The United States Is Now the Largest Global Crude Oil
Producer,” Today in Energy, US Energy Information Agency, September 12, 2018, https://www
.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37053.
15. Enea Gjoza, “Saudi Arabia Is Starting a Reckless Oil War with Russia–but the
US Is Also a Target,” Business Insider, March 14, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com
/saudi-arabia-starting-oil-war-with-russia-us-also-targeted-2020-3.
16. Scott Shane, “Saudis and Extremism: ‘Both the Arsonists and the Firefighters’,” New York
Times, August 25, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/26/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia
-islam.html.
17. Farah Pandith, “Extremism Is Riyadh’s Top Export,” Foreign Policy, March 24, 2019, https://
foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/24/farah-pandith-saudi-how-we-win-book/.
18. Daniel L. Byman, “Saudi Arabia and Terrorism Today,” Markaz (blog), Brookings Institution,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/09/29/saudi-arabia-and-terrorism-today/.
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forward-looking economic agenda aimed at diversifying the Kingdom’s
oil-based economy, boosting the private sector, and creating a more
favorable environment for foreign investment.19 The crown prince
has also said he wants to foster a more tolerant version of Islam that
is not susceptible to being hijacked by violent terrorist groups for their
own purposes.20
At the same time, however, bin Salman has shown no signs of
undertaking any serious domestic political reforms that would be more
inclusive or serve as a basis to weaken the strong ruling hand of the
Saud family. Moreover, his behavior overseas has been reckless and
costly. As defense minister he plunged Saudi Arabia into an ill-advised
quagmire in Yemen that has highlighted Riyadh’s military incompetence,
drained its fiscal coffers, and raised doubts about the wisdom of his
personal leadership.21
In addition, he led a regional campaign to isolate Qatar that has
fractured the unity of the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council and created
opportunities for Iran to expand its political, commercial, and military
presence in the region—all of which work at cross-purposes with
existing American strategies to isolate Iran. A continuation of these
troubling behaviors could trigger potentially significant changes ahead
in this long-standing partnership.

Turkey
When Recep Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party came to
power in 2003, the United States had hoped the republic would become
an example of how Islam and democracy could coexist in a secular state.
Over time, Erdogan’s Islamic leanings and domestic repression have
increasingly tarnished the image of Turkey as a secular democracy. After
the failed 2016 coup attempt, Erdogan blamed his former ally, Fethullah
Gülen, and the United States for failing to extradite Gülen from his
compound in the Poconos. The Gülen issue, along with terrorism and
Turkish cooperation with Russia, have increased tensions between the
United States and Turkey.
The Syrian civil war has exacerbated the instability in Turkey, the
Middle East, and Europe. In 2017 Turkey established observation posts
in Idlib to monitor agreements with Moscow to de-escalate tensions.
Since then, Turkey has sent around 20,000 troops into the Idlib province
in addition to clearing Kurdish fighters from the border with Turkey.22
This action has not only resulted in clashes between the Turkish and
19. “Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 Is Too Big to Fail—or Succeed,” Stratfor, July 27, 2018, https://
worldview.stratfor.com/article/saudi-arabias-vision-2030-plan-too-big-fail-or-succeed.
20. Martin Chulov, “I Will Return Saudi Arabia to Moderate Islam, Says Crown Prince,”
Guardian, October 24, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/24/i-will-return
-saudi-arabia-moderate-islam-crown-prince.
21. Yoel Guzansky and Ari Heistein, “Saudi Arabia’s War in Yemen Has Been a
Disaster,” National Interest, March 25, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/saudi-arabias
-war-yemen-has-been-disaster-25064.
22. Isabelle Khurshudyan and Sarah Dadouch, “Russia and Turkey Agree to Cease-Fire in
Syria’s Idlib Province,” Washington Post, March 5, 2020.
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Syrian armies, it has also increased the risk of conflict with Russian and
US forces in the region.
Further, the Syrian war has created a massive influx of some 3.6
million refugees and migrants that Turkey hosts today.23 The offensive
in the Idlib province has displaced another 1 million Syrians.24 While
the EU has at least partially compensated Turkey for this burden—over
€6 billion—Turkish citizens and Erdogan are losing their patience with
the refugees. To deal with the recent movement of Syrians, Erdogan has
threatened to move them through Turkey to Europe.25 The COVID-19
virus may exacerbate tensions caused by the refugees and displaced
persons, placing additional strains on Turkey.
Erdogan’s obsession with the (real but exaggerated) security threat
posed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK—an organization
designated as a terrorist group by Turkey, the United States, and many
European countries) has led him to intervene militarily on multiple
occasions into neighboring Syria and Iraq. These operations have strained
Turkey’s military, which is still reeling from the massive leadership purges
of senior and mid-level officers ordered by Erdogan in wake of the failed
2016 coup. These Turkish interventions into the sovereign affairs of
neighbors have at various times exacerbated tensions with leaders in
Baghdad, Damascus, Washington, Brussels, and Moscow alike.
Considering its concerns over the PKK, Turkey has increasingly
cooperated with Russia to pursue its interests in the region. In addition,
both the United States and NATO have pushed back strongly against
Turkey’s deal to purchase S400 missiles from Russia, resulting in Turkey’s
suspension from the F-35 fighter program.26
In addition, Erdogan’s open support for the Muslim Brotherhood
has placed him into open conflict with regional leaders in Riyadh, Tel
Aviv, and Cairo. Meanwhile, his decision to intervene in Libya has also
put Turkey at odds with Egypt, Russia, and the UAE.27 The recently
escalated Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could also increase tensions
between Russia and Turkey, although both sides are working to constrain
the fighting.28 Further, Turkish drilling and exploration operations off
the coast of Cyprus are causing tensions between Turkey and members
of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum which includes Cyprus, Egypt,

23. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Turkey Fact Sheet,” February 2020,
https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2020/03/UNHCR-Turkey-short-Fact
-Sheet-February2020f.pdf.
24. Khurshudyan and Dadouch, “Cease-Fire in Idlib.”
25. Paul Hockenos, “Europe’s Morality Is Dying at the Greek Border,” Foreign Policy, March 5,
2020.
26. Jarod Taylor, “U.S. Sanctions and Turkey’s Purchase of Russia’s S-400 Air Defense System,”
E-Notes, Foreign Policy, July 12, 2019.
27. Keith Johnson, “Newly Aggressive Turkey Forges Alliance with Libya,” Foreign Policy,
December 23, 2019.
28. Maria Tsvetkova and Olzhas Auyezov, “Analysis: Russia and Turkey Keep Powder Dry in
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” Reuters, November 9, 2020.
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Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority.29 Moreover,
Turkey has developed a working relationship with Iran through the
Astana peace process and by providing humanitarian and medical
assistance for Iran to combat the coronavirus pandemic. Turkish entities
such as Halkbank have also sought to evade US sanctions on Iran.30
Clearly, the relationship between Turkey and the United States is in
trouble. Polling in 2019 indicates over 80 percent of the Turkish public
now views the United States as a threat rather than an ally.31 Congress
has taken a harsher approach to Turkey by supporting sanctions on
Turkish arms manufacturers and, symbolically, by formally recognizing
the Armenian genocide in 1915.32

Israel
The preservation of Israel has been a vital interest for the
United States from the Cold War onward. While US support has been
instrumental in aiding Israel, today a strong and confident Israel with a
muscular foreign and internal security policy presents its own challenges
to the US interest in regional stability. Israel’s long-running effort to
guard against the external threat once posed by its Arab neighbors has
been replaced by a forward defense strategy against the threat of Iran
and its nonstate actor Shia Arab proxies. Meanwhile Israel’s struggle to
maintain and expand control over the occupied territory of Palestine
continues to complicate its relationships with Arab states who otherwise
might be inclined to pursue a more formal and visible partnership.
Despite the negative stigma of its continued occupation of
Palestine, Israel shares many values and a democratic political system
with the United States. The country also benefits from strong and
active constituencies within America’s Jewish and Evangelical Christian
populations that make support for Israel a domestic and foreign policy
concern for American leaders.
Regional threats to Israel’s security have eased due to extensive
continued US military assistance. Both Egypt and Jordan, which
traditionally posed a sustained and significant conventional military
threat to Israel’s southern and eastern borders, today share Israeli
concerns about the threat posed by Islamist terrorist groups and have
developed effective working security relationships with Israel. More
recently, US diplomacy and weapons sales have helped induce the UAE
and Bahrain to normalize relations with Israel—making official what
had long been quietly expanding economic and security cooperation.
29. Nimrod Goren, “Gas Forum a Diplomatic Opportunity for Israel,” Jerusalem Post, February
8, 2020; and “Turkey, Cyprus and Gas Deposits: What You Need to Know,” Deutsche Welle, July
16, 2019.
30. Brendan Pierson, “U.S. Prosecutors Accuse Turkey’s Halkbank of Scheme to Evade Iran
Sanctions,” Reuters, October 16, 2019.
31. Ragip Soylu, “Anti-US Sentiment in Turkey Reaches a New High, Poll Shows,” Middle East
Eye, February 1, 2019.
32. Philip H. Gordon and Amanda Sloat, “The Dangerous Unraveling of the U.S.-Turkish
Alliance: Washington and Ankara Still Need Each Other,” Foreign Affairs, January 10, 2020.
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Oman may soon follow and even Saudi Arabia’s crown prince reportedly
favors eventual recognition.33
To Israel’s north, Syria and Lebanon are now confronting serious
political, economic, and social divisions. Such divisions are consuming
the attention of leaders in Damascus and Beirut and will prevent these
states from presenting a serious conventional military threat for years
to come. America’s 2003 removal of Saddam Hussein and Baghdad’s
current domestic political turmoil and more immediate ISIS threat
effectively eliminate Iraq as a meaningful threat to Israel’s security.
These developments leave Iran and its proxies in Syria and Lebanon as
the most serious regional threat to Israel’s security.
In a dramatic change from the previous seven decades of its
existence, Israel today benefits from the parallel security concerns
of other Arab states, similarly focused on the threat posed by Iran’s
growing influence. Although public opinion in the Arab Street remains
anti-Israel, many regional Arab governments have quietly formed
increasingly strong security ties with Israel based on their own pragmatic
needs.34 These quiet partnerships complement US national security
interests. Nonetheless, while this behind-the-scenes coordination
and the expanding official recognition of Israel are important steps,
continued Israeli occupation and the absence of a formal peace
agreement with the Palestinians will act as constraints on Israeli hopes
of becoming a fully integrated and accepted member of any emerging,
region-wide political, economic, or security architecture. Additionally,
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s plans to annex formally much of
the West Bank, although temporarily suspended, continue to produce
friction with Jordan and other US Gulf allies.
Israel’s concerns about the growing threat from Iran have led it to
take increasingly aggressive active unilateral military and diplomatic
measures. Militarily, Israel continues periodic, but extensive air strikes
throughout Syria against Iranian or Iranian-backed targets and has
demonstrated its willingness to risk inflammatory and potentially
escalatory aftereffects.35 One strike in 2018 even led to Syrian air defenses
shooting down a Russian jet in the ensuing confusion.36 More recently,
Israel has expanded its reach into Iraq, including a series of summer
2019 drone strikes against Iranian proxies in Iraq that raised a potential
threat to the fragile US-Iraqi relationship and could have placed US

33. Mark Landler, “Another Gulf State Recognizes Israel. Here’s Why It Matters,” New York
Times, September 12, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/12/world/middleeast/bahrain
-israel.html.
34. Omar H. Rahman, “Order from Chaos: What’s Behind the Relationship between Israel and
Arab Gulf States?” Brookings Institution, January 28, 2019.
35. Judah Ari Gross, “‘Operation House of Cards,’ the IAF Mission to Cripple
Iran’s Presence in Syria,” Times of Israel, May 10, 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com
/operation-house-of-cards-the-iaf-mission-to-destroy-irans-presence-in-syria/.
36. “Report: Syria Mistakenly Downs Russian Plane While Repelling Israeli Strike,”
Times of Israel, September 18, 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/report-syria-mistakenly
-downs-russian-plane-as-it-repels-alleged-israeli-strike/.
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military forces in Iraq at risk from Iranian retaliation.37 While these
preemptive actions are understandable from the standpoint of an Israeli
state assessing itself vulnerable and increasingly surrounded by threats,
they complicate America’s efforts to counter Iranian and extremist
influence throughout the region.

Implications for US Policy

In a region increasingly under stress, the United States will need
to adopt policies that advance US interests in an increasingly complex
and constantly evolving security environment. Given the tremendous
uncertainties surrounding the region’s future, US policy makers should
adopt a hedging approach: pursue adaptive and flexible strategies toward
these states, based on the specific interests concerned; build diverse
coalitions-of-the-willing to confront challenges as they emerge; and
avoid large, one-sided investments in any single static group of countries
or partners.
As a part of this hedging approach, bilateral relationships with these
four countries will need to change. First, the United States should take
a more nuanced and expansive approach to Iran. Iranian influence in
the region should be resisted to the extent it harms US interests, but
US policy makers should also seek constructive engagement where interests
overlap. With a population of over 80 million people and significant
reserves of oil and natural gas, Iran and its regional influence cannot
simply be eliminated but instead must be actively opposed when
necessary and channeled in positive directions where possible.
The steps Iran has taken to reconstitute components of its civilian
nuclear program in the wake of US withdrawal from the nuclear deal
must be at the top of US security concerns. Thus far these steps are
reversible; Iran’s foreign minister has repeatedly stated Iran will return
to full compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action once
sanctions are lifted in accordance with the terms of the original deal.38
Should policy makers decide to return to negotiations with Iran,
the window for a potential agreement will be short due to upcoming
Iranian presidential elections scheduled for early 2021. Hardliner and
conservative candidates swept Iran’s parliamentary elections held
in February 2020 suggesting diplomatic proposals to make open
concessions to the United States will meet strong resistance.39 Taking
advantage of this fleeting opportunity will require urgent and creative
US diplomacy that incentivizes Iran’s return to the negotiating table and
lays out a credible plan for the phased easing of sanctions tied to specific

37. Katie Bo Williams, “Alleged Israeli Strikes Bring US to Crossroads in Iraq,” Defense
One, August 29, 2019, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2019/08/alleged-israeli-strikes
-bring-us-crossroads-iraq/159541/.
38. “Iran’s Fifth Step Away From the Nuclear Deal,” The Iran Primer (blog), United States
Institute of Peace (USIP), January 6, 2020, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2020/jan/06
/iran%E2%80%99s-fifth-step-away-nuclear-deal.
39. Garrett Nada, “2020 Parliamentary Election Results,” The Iran Primer (blog), USIP, February
24, 2020, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2020/feb/24/2020-parliamentary-election-results.
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changes to Iranian activities in the region. Such diplomacy must generate
sufficient international support, reassure nervous US regional allies, and
refrain from generating opposition from Russia and China in the UN
Security Council.40
Additionally, Iran has the potential to play constructive or
destructive roles in addressing many of the region’s major security
challenges whether in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, or Afghanistan. US
policy makers will need to craft the right combination of pressures and
incentives to channel Iranian influence.
The current COVID-19 pandemic may present an opportunity for
US policy makers to reassert American leadership, build international
goodwill, and open a window for renewed negotiations with Iran.
Although the extent of the damage is unclear, Iran has been hit extremely
hard by the coronavirus at a time when its leaders were already under
intense domestic pressure. Extending an olive branch in the form of
humanitarian aid and temporary conditional lessening of sanctions
could offer a unique opportunity to demonstrate American support
for the Iranian people. Such a move could also de-escalate mounting
US-Iranian tensions.41
Similarly, future policy makers could initiate international, regional,
and bilateral discussions aimed at establishing the parameters for a more
enduring and effective Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action targeting the
full range of Iran’s problematic behavior. Such a diplomatic and economic
bridge-building exercise could start with small confidence-building
measures, including a targeted relaxation of sanctions and expansion
of foreign investments in Iran’s economy in exchange for parallel
restrictions on Iranian nuclear, missile, and other regional activities.
At the same time, the United States should seek to capitalize
on the convergence of Israel and Gulf Arab interests in contesting
Iran’s growing influence in the region by deepening and expanding
the recently concluded normalization agreements with the UAE and
Bahrain. Continuing the tradition of extensive US conventional military
assistance to and cooperation with Israel and Saudi Arabia provides a
strong foundation for deterring overt Iranian aggression. The United
States, nonetheless, should also be careful of relying too much on Israel
and Saudi Arabia as proxies to confront Iran. Ongoing Israeli air strikes
into both Syria and Iraq as well as the costly Saudi intervention into
Yemen demonstrate either of these partners are capable of instigating
larger regional conflicts into which the United States could easily
be drawn.

40. Daniel Benaim and Jake Sullivan, “America’s Opportunity in the Middle East: Diplomacy
Could Succeed Where Military Force Has Failed,” Foreign Affairs, May 22, 2020, https://www
.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2020-05-22/americas-opportunity-middle-east.
41. Robert Malley and Ali Vaez, “The Coronavirus Crisis is a Diplomatic Opportunity for
the United States and Iran,” Foreign Policy, March 17, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/17
/coronavirus-crisis-maximum-pressure-iran-usa-diplomacy-opportunity/.
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US regional military strategy should rely heavily on a strong—if
necessarily transient—naval and air force presence to serve as a deterrent
to Iranian military adventurism that directly targets the United States
and its regional allies or endangers international shipping through the
Hormuz Strait. Meanwhile, the US Army presence in the region should
more narrowly focus on defeating ISIS and building partner capacity.
This reduced US physical military presence in places like Kuwait will
place primary responsibility for regional security in the hands of Arab
leaders while still providing a residual on-the-ground presence to
reassure allies.
Beyond military cooperation, US policy makers should also
explore potential measures to forge regional and international arms
control agreements that improve transparency and reduce the risks for
miscalculations that could spark regional military conflict. US policy
should expand both the substantive scope and roster of participants
in maritime patrol operations, which would ensure freedom of
navigation through critical choke points in both the Hormuz and
Bab el-Mandeb Straits.
A tailored US military presence should be simultaneously bolstered
by an increasingly active diplomatic and economic campaign aimed at
reducing prospects for a military confrontation with Iran; repairing the
internal Gulf Cooperation Council rift with Qatar; forging regional
solutions to the civil wars in Yemen, Syria, and Libya; and addressing
the humanitarian needs of increasingly desperate refugee populations
fleeing these conflicts. The roles of Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran
will be a key consideration in any of these efforts.
In some ways, Turkey may be the most difficult bilateral relationship
to navigate. The United States must make a concerted effort to address
Turkish fears emanating from an unstable southern border and the
continued threat from the PKK. The United States should also work
with its European allies to continue economic support for Turkey,
which has borne much of the brunt of caring for migrants and refugees
since 2015. The United States should continue bilateral and multilateral
exercises—under NATO—with Turkey, commit to retaining a nuclear
deterrent in Turkey, and roll back Congressional efforts to sanction
Turkey’s defense industry further.42
Turkey remains a force multiplier for US efforts to contain Russian
adventurism, to project power in the region, and to balance Iran’s
influence in the region. The United States should use its diplomatic,
economic, and military instruments of power to keep Turkey in the
NATO alliance, while working behind the scenes to curb Turkey’s
increasingly autocratic and expansionist tendencies.
At the same time, the United States needs to push back against
Erdogan courting Russia and Iran. In addition to suspending Turkey
from the F-35 program, US policy makers should consider limiting
42. Gordon and Sloat, “U.S.–Turkish Alliance.”
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other military sales to Turkey if Erdogan does not reverse course. The
United States must also continue to work closely with Erdogan regarding
Turkey’s presence in Syria and Iraq. The United States should explore
alternative basing arrangements so as not to be caught flat-footed in the
event Erdogan demands US forces depart Incirlik Air Base. The United
States should also seek to mediate competing resource claims between
Turkey, Egypt, Greece, Israel, and Cyprus in the Aegean.43 Finally, the
United States should exert influence on Ankara to reinitiate peace talks
with the PKK that were suspended in 2015 and reduce military ties
with the YPG (the People’s Protection Units, a primarily Kurdish militia
in Syria and the major component of the Syrian Democratic Forces)
in Syria.44

Conclusion

The future of the Middle East is more in flux than it has been for
decades. The traditional poles of power emanating from Cairo, Baghdad,
and Damascus have been eclipsed by the rise of non-Arab powers
in Israel, Iran, and Turkey; competition from China and Russia; and
increasingly divergent interests between these regional powers, Saudi
Arabia, and the United States.
The COVID-19 pandemic has introduced even more uncertainty
into the region.45 Saudi Arabia, for instance, may well have sufficient
economic resources to emerge from this pandemic relatively unscathed;
however, other countries including Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon,
and Yemen may suffer damage only large-scale international assistance
can hope to mitigate. In this situation, existing US policies and strategies
need to adapt quickly to these challenges as they emerge in the region.
Even competently led and well-resourced governments will have trouble
surmounting these challenges, and such governments are in rare supply
in the Middle East.

43. Yiannis Baboulias, “Greece Accidentally Steered into a Foreign-Policy Crisis,” Foreign Policy,
February 3, 2020.
44. Joe Parkinson, “Turkish President Says Can’t Continue Peace Talks with Kurds,” Wall
Street Journal, July 28, 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/turkish-president-halts-talks-with
-kurds-1438084113.
45. Thomas Wright, “Stretching the International Order to Its Breaking Point,” Atlantic,
April 4, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/pandemic-lasts-18-months-will
-change-geopolitics-good/609445/.
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On “Projecting Stability: A Deployable
NATO Police Command”
Raymond E. Bell Jr.
This commentary responds to Massimo Pani’s and Karen J. Finkenbinder’s article
“Projecting Stability: A Deployable NATO Police Command” published in the
Spring/Summer 2019 issue of Parameters (vol. 49, no. 1–2).

I

t will be interesting to see if a NATO Police Command will
mature from a theoretical force structure to one of reality as so
cogently argued by Massimo Pani and Karen J. Finkenbinder in
“Projecting Stability: A Deployable NATO Police Command.” As a
former brigade commander of the US Army Reserve 220th Military
Police Brigade, my interest is piqued, especially when thinking about
the manning of such a command.
I commend the authors for their forward thinking in developing
the rationale for such a command but feel they might have taken
their concept an additional step further and commented on
the “who” situation in more detail. They could have addressed
some of the personnel resources presently available, especially as
pertains to US contributions to a US stability policing brigade but
also to the other proposed necessary adjunct organizations and
staff sections.
If the command were to be organized just from within today’s
active duty US Army military police unit structure establishment,
a difficulty would arise. The authors noted, “the most notable
aspect that authorities and military commanders must understand
about building a stability police force is that large numbers of
novice police officers, swiftly equipped and hastily instructed, are
detrimental to the success of security and stabilization operations.”
This is a point well taken.
My experience was that the US Army Military Police Corps
commissions officers and enlists soldiers who are what I consider
the “cream of the crop.” Members must be capable of multitasking,
specifically, accomplishing various police-related functions with
professionalism. But by and large, the active duty corps does not
have a broad-based complement of professionally mature and
experienced personnel in its ranks.
The majority of the active duty, lower-ranking corps members
must be considered novice police officers, although considering
their high caliber, my evaluation is not to be construed as negative
or degrading. Today’s enlisted individual or officer with an active
duty commissioned or enlisted commitment simply does not have,
nor can be expected to have, the experience gained by extended
service in the corps.

Dr. Raymond E. Bell Jr.,
brigadier general, US
Army retired, former
commander of the 220th
Military Police Brigade,
US Army Reserves,
holds a PhD in Central
European history from
New York University
and is a military affairs
and history writer.
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Dr. Finkenbinder clearly has military police experience and
is qualified to address the subject of effective manning. Her
curriculum vitae states she served as “a municipal police officer,
state police training and education specialist, and military police
officer.” I suspect that hidden within those words is that she was
not only on active duty service as a military police officer but also
in the Army Reserve or National Guard in some military police
capacity. If I am correct, then she fully appreciates from where
the law enforcement professional assets can come to man a NATO
police command outside the active duty Army force structure.
The law enforcement background of such Reserve component
police personnel can be phenomenal. But individuals with
other backgrounds related to combat, anti-criminal operations,
community service, legal work, business enterprise, civilian
government administration, and religious practice (to name a few)
have, as noted in the essay, a place in the manning mix. That mix
can be multicomponent.
In my brigade headquarters, for example, there were personnel
whose performance over a four-year period showed that the
integrated active duty Army, traditional Army Reserve, activated
Army Guard and Army Reserve, and military technician
combination of personnel worked harmoniously and effectively.
The traditional Army reservists in the brigade headquarters
consisted of those with active duty Army combat arms and military
police service in Vietnam, as well as those who were local and
regional full-time correctional and police officers, US Department
of Agriculture and US Department of State employees, college
professors, civilian military intelligence and Central Intelligence
Agency professionals, writers, Naval Criminal Investigative
Service investigators, lawyers, hospital administrators, and clergy.
Some had advanced degrees including doctorates. All these
personnel were experienced in their civilian capacities, which would
have contributed effectively to mission accomplishment had the
brigade ever been mobilized. Indeed, in training deployments to
Egypt, Jordan, and Somalia, the personnel had many opportunities
to demonstrate proficiency in projecting stability.
Accordingly, a further step in manning a US contribution to a
deployable NATO police command could be organizing an Army
Reserve or Army National Guard brigade composed of experienced,
component-integrated personnel available on the short notice the
authors have stipulated.
In sum, it is encouraging to read of organizing a deployable
NATO police command, but as the authors noted, it must be
appropriately manned to accomplish its different anticipated
functions and missions. I would like, therefore, to see the authors
consider in more detail who should be in the force’s complement,
with an eye toward integrating members of all US Army components
and even investigating the participation of the other branches of
service in the command.
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Massimo Pani and Karen J. Finkenbinder

W

e agree with Brigadier General Raymond Bell’s
assessment regarding “civilian” policing expertise in the
Army. Much of it is resident in the Reserve components
as there are many civilian police officers serving within the
Reserves and National Guard, however, there are broader issues at
play here.
The United States is not ideal to conduct stability policing
or lead any international police development program. Our
decentralized, US state-centric system does not translate easily
into international operations, notwithstanding one common
denominator among American municipal and state police—their
experience using discretion among civilians in their daily work
practice, something likely not found among many military police
in the active component. A civilian on a military post is quite
different from one in a civilian community as the military has
options to prevent entry and to remove troublesome civilians from
its installations.
In contrast, stability police from gendarmerie-type forces
(GTF), like the Carabinieri, have much longer training and
education programs and they spend their careers in civilian
communities, not on military installations. Further because of
the nature of deployments, especially in recent years, GTF often
have extensive experience in international operations. And they
are police with civilian status and accepted by the United Nations
as police.
In contrast, military police are not recognized by the
United Nations as police for a police component, an important
consideration as NATO missions often transition to UN or similar
police or political-led missions. Similarly, the African Union and
other regional organizations have similar philosophies—the
military are not police. There’s a reason for that. In many countries
in which there are peace operations, security forces have been
(and sometimes are) bad actors, related to a predatory, corrupt
political class that came into power as the result of a coup
supported by the military. The civilian police (clearly delineated
from the military) under civilian control are necessary to build
police institutions that respect the rule of law.
Can military police do stability policing? Absolutely! And we
agree their professionalism goes a long way toward setting the
standard for future policing. But this doesn’t get to the longerterm institution building, built upon a civilian-control model,
accepted by the population as legitimate. At best, military police
can conduct stability policing for basic tasks as we get enough GTF
into the operation to do it. And as the environment stabilizes, the
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long-term development plan should transition supporting police
to the type of police being developed.
The area of detention operations is one in which we believe
military police are best suited to support, if their force structure
allows. The military police, aside from one unfortunate incident
in recent years, are by far the best at detention. The American
Corrections Association’s accrediting of military police-led
detention facilities recognizes this. The rule-bound nature of
detention and the technical competence and professionalism of
military police officers make them a preferred provider of detention
until the capacity to detain prisoners humanely can be built. There
is less risk of disenfranchising the public when providing humane
and transparent detention operations.
History shows that sustainable, civilian-led police institutions
are not built by militaries in a top-down approach. “Militarized”
police development tends to train and equip (it risks making
corrupt police more efficiently corrupt) and misses the necessary
bottom-up institution building necessary for legitimacy.
Additionally, many of our international partners have GTF or
other deployable police assets that can do such policing. This
should also make us pause before the US military provides
any support to civilian police under the auspices of security
cooperation. Do we inadvertently risk delegitimizing the police
when they begin to use military tactics, dress, or act like the
military? We have seen this occur domestically when police adopt
military practices.
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R

oland Philipps has produced an interesting and valuable biography
of former British diplomat Donald Maclean, who conducted
significant Soviet-sponsored espionage activities for decades as part
of the “Cambridge Five” spy ring. This group was composed of five
committed upper-class British communists, who after their studies and
radicalization at Cambridge University, falsely claimed to have renounced
their radical pasts. They then established themselves in important careers,
where they acted as Soviet agents and did substantial damage to Western
security interests before and during the Cold War. All of these men had
developed a rigidly Marxist outlook in the 1930s during a period of
political turmoil and economic depression throughout the world.

New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, 2019
440 pages
$28.95

Philipps suggests certain elements of Maclean’s upbringing under
the supervision of a strict and morally uncompromising father played
out in unexpected ways. At Cambridge Maclean began searching for
a cause and an opportunity to serve humanity. In an era of moral and
political uncertainty, he felt he was beginning to find that opportunity
by studying Marxism. He did so at a time when communism had become
more acceptable at British universities due to the Great Depression,
mass unemployment, reduced wages, and rapidly expanding and visible
poverty throughout the United Kingdom and other Western societies.
The widely accepted and very rosy predictions of continued growth in
the Western economies following World War I dissolved in the aftermath
of the Wall Street Crash of 1929. These economic problems were further
complicated by the frightening rise of fascism in Europe.
In this atmosphere, young Maclean joined the popular Cambridge
University Socialist Society, where about a quarter of the participants
were also members of the Communist Party. Maclean was a vocal
supporter of many radical causes and even identified himself as a
Communist in an interview with the student newspaper. He graduated
from Cambridge in June 1934 as the same morally rigid person he had
always been, but this rigidity was now in the service of his belief in the
need for world revolution. Moreover, Maclean’s communism was not
that of a leftist academic drawing diagrams of class struggle; he was a
hard-core Communist who saw the Soviet Union as the epitome of what
he believed the world should be.
After graduating from Cambridge Maclean applied to the Foreign
Office and sought a career in diplomacy. It was at least possible, and
probably likely, that he was planning to work on behalf of the Soviet
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Union even at this early stage in his life. He did well in his Foreign
Office examinations and during the interview phase dismissed his radical
past as a brief flirtation with an ideology, which he by then viewed as
nonsense. Such an explanation appealed to his examiners who shared
a widespread British upper-class view that interest in socialism or even
communism was simply a “passing fancy of youth” (50). Undoubtedly, it
was such a “fancy” with some candidates, but not in this case. Maclean’s
examiners, correspondingly, made their country vulnerable by refusing
to entertain the possibility that someone of his family, background, and
upbringing could be committed to anything but establishment values.
No serious investigation occurred into Maclean’s life experiences, and
he was inducted into the Foreign Office as a junior official.
Perhaps even more egregious, and indicative of the same approach,
Maclean’s friend, Kim Philby, was eventually inducted into the British
Intelligence Service despite his own youthful record of radical activism
and his secret marriage to an Austrian communist, who recruited him
into Soviet service. Philby used his communist connections in Europe
and put Maclean in touch with a Soviet handler, who quickly recruited
Maclean to engage in espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union and its
satellite organization, the Communist International (Comintern).
Philipps shows that Maclean was a brilliant and extremely productive
Soviet agent throughout most of his diplomatic career. In some ways the
British government made it easy for him. The Foreign Office showed
almost no serious interest in document control for classified material,
and Maclean freely took important secret documents home with him.
This practice was well-known among his coworkers, but they wrote it off
as a by-product of Maclean’s exceptionally strong work ethic. While he
did work on these documents at home, Maclean usually had his Soviet
handler photograph them first.
Philipps maintains Maclean conserved his self-esteem throughout
most of his diplomatic career by his service to the communist cause.
Maclean would become unhappy and depressed during periods when
he was unable to obtain especially important documents for Moscow.
He also married an American radical, and against the principles of
intelligence tradecraft, he told her he was working as a spy for the Soviet
Union. During his time as a Soviet agent Maclean seemed impervious
to doubt about the Soviet system under Stalin. While some supporters
of the Soviet Union were shaken by the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the Soviet
invasion of Finland, and the Great Purges, Maclean remained sanguine,
trusting in Stalin’s judgment, and a total ideologue.
As the world situation became more alarming, Maclean’s career with
the Foreign Office continued to flourish, and he achieved important
promotions due to his intellect, hard work, and apparent commitment
to the job. He did, nevertheless, feel considerable pressure from living
a double life and began drinking heavily, eventually becoming an
alcoholic who was often loud, unpleasant, and sometimes violent when
drunk. These clear warning signs eventually earned him a lengthy
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period of leave to rest, but never caused a review of his fitness to hold a
security clearance.
Yet, if British counterintelligence efforts were naive regarding
Maclean, Soviet intelligence activities as Philipps shows were often
stumbling and unprofessional. The Soviets initially gave Maclean the
code name Orphan, which reflected his fatherless state at the time and
his solitary nature. This misguided approach represented the weak Soviet
tradecraft in the 1930s and 1940s. Code names sometimes reflected
personal attributes of the individual in question and were therefore less
effective than a random name in protecting their agent’s identity if the
code name was compromised. In an even more unforgivable example of
this failing, Maclean’s fellow Cambridge spy Anthony Blunt was given
the code name Tony.
These mistakes were marginal compared to those brought on by
the paranoia infecting the Stalinist system. Soviet handlers were often
recalled to Moscow on the assumption they might have become too
westernized during their time abroad regardless of their outward loyalty.
They usually willingly returned as ordered, facing almost certain death
after extensive torture. Ironically, the Soviets often suspected Maclean
of being a double agent due to the same prejudices as the British, a
general disbelief that an upper-class British civil servant would actually
be willing to engage in espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. Yet, the
material he provided to the Soviets was so useful they found it difficult
to write him off.
As with many Soviet agents, Maclean worried about his identity being
properly protected by Moscow. General Walter Krivitsky defected from
Soviet intelligence in 1937 and represented a potential threat to all Soviet
spies in the British government, depending upon what information he
knew to pass along to British counterintelligence officers. Unfortunately,
this information was fairly limited. Krivitsky told his debriefers there
were two Foreign Office spies, but he did not provide details to suggest
who the traitors were. Moreover, Krivitsky’s usefulness to Western
intelligence came to an end when he was murdered by Soviet agents in
Washington, DC, in 1941.
Maclean avoided detection in this instance but was much more
seriously implicated by US intelligence personnel who decrypted
important portions of various intercepted messages. Many of these
messages were decoded because of Soviet shortcuts for encryption taken
during and after World War II. Tipped off by Philby in Washington, DC,
about the American decryptions, Maclean fled to Moscow with fellow
Cambridge Five spy Guy Burgess. Together the men lost the surveillance
placed on them and managed to reach France and then Switzerland
before disappearing into the Soviet Union in 1951.
Moscow initially refused to acknowledge Maclean’s presence, but
then allowed him to assume a more public role. He learned Russian,
acquired a doctorate, and became a senior analyst for the Institute of
World Economy and International Relations. Maclean’s wife and three
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children joined him in Moscow, although the marriage remained under
great strain due in part to his severe alcoholism.
Perhaps the most important lesson of A Spy Named Orphan is that
loyalty cannot be taken for granted because of a person’s background,
education, or apparent conformism to social and organizational values.
Another lesson is the tremendous damage a single well-placed agent can
do if left in place without any investigation of scandalous statements or
behavior. None of these lessons will come as a surprise to intelligence
officials, but a comprehensive analysis of old lessons provided by a
case study such as this work can be useful. It may also convey valuable
knowledge for military leaders who are not intelligence professionals but
who sometimes work in classified environments.

How Ike Led: The Principles Behind
Eisenhower’s Biggest Decisions
By Susan Eisenhower
Reviewed by Dr. Jonathan D. Arnett, research director at the Modern War
Institute at the United States Military Academy

New York: Thomas Dunne
Books, 2020
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H

ow Ike Led is a readable whirlwind tour of the life and leadership
of Dwight D. Eisenhower, written by his granddaughter, Susan
Eisenhower—a longtime policy strategist and author of the 1996 book
Mrs. Ike: Memories and Reflections on the Life of Mamie Eisenhower. I highly
recommend the book to readers with limited time who want to know
more quickly about the general and the 34th president. Ms. Eisenhower
indicates the book is a primer on Ike, a reintroduction of Dwight
Eisenhower to the public, for those who did not grow up during his
lifetime or who know little of him. Ms. Eisenhower relies on information
garnered from scholarly works and her grandfather’s contemporaries and
subordinates and intersperses childhood memories of her grandfather
throughout the book—which I found interesting and very touching.
The book does not offer anything particularly new historically.
Instead, Ms. Eisenhower condenses Ike’s history and highlights his
critical decisions and character traits in a very personal, intimate way as
only a granddaughter can do. As Ike’s granddaughter, Ms. Eisenhower
illustrates more clearly and personally, the character and leadership
principles that governed Ike’s success as a commander and president.
She admits the book’s genesis, partially, was a reaction to 30 years of
sharp criticism of the Eisenhower administration. She also claims as
she grew older and dealt with more policy issues herself, she became
more impressed with her grandfather’s legacy and appreciated how well
he handled the challenging problems of the early Cold War. She claims
criticism of Ike’s presidency has waned, and Americans increasingly are
gaining an appreciation for her grandfather’s wisdom and bipartisanship.
She hopes this book maintains that momentum.
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I will not detail all of Ike’s big decisions and specific character traits
highlighted in the book but will focus on a few. First, having worked
closely for a service secretary and chief of staff, as well as three fourstar combatant commanders, and supported high-stakes war planning,
I have a special appreciation for Eisenhower’s strengths as a staffer,
commander, and president. He had excellent judgment and seemed
intuitively able to balance desired ends with available means against
risks and prevail. In today’s lexicon of buzzwords and catchphrases, Ike
was an exemplary “critical thinker.” While Ike may have made errors
along the way—and what leaders do not—he consistently made the right
calls when the stakes were highest. There were no great tragedies or
catastrophes on his watch, and his record says a lot.
Second and directly related to his judgment, Ike vehemently
believed in personal responsibility and accountability. Ms. Eisenhower
retells the story of the famous note Ike crafted in case the Normandy
invasion failed, where he accepted full responsibility for the decision
and results. She also concisely retells the U-2 shoot down, and how Ike
accepted responsibility for the embarrassment. I was also impressed
with how Eisenhower dealt with a very subtle compromise of Operation
Overlord planning. Close to D-Day, one of Ike’s senior officers hinted
to a woman he desired to impress that he would be in France by midJune. Eisenhower immediately relieved the officer. In an age when
compromising legitimately protected state secrets has become sport, I
admire Ike’s swift, resolute action. Regarding his integrity and objectivity,
Ms. Eisenhower notes President Eisenhower repeatedly stated during
his presidency that there would be no favoritism or nepotism, and
reportedly, the majority of his advisers, staffers, and appointees were
professionals rather than amateur or career politicians.
Third, without using the term, Ms. Eisenhower also highlights Ike’s
profound stoicism. Ike believed some personal battles, some trials of
mind and heart, should be fought privately. This belief was old school
self-help, which is alien in a contemporary culture where leaders and
celebrities relish publicly broadcasting all their fears, disabilities, and
foibles. Across his youth, West Point years, and Army career, Ike learned
to control himself—his passions, his anger, his selfishness. His stoicism
became part and parcel of his exceptionalism.
It is a pity that in contemporary vernacular, the title Boy Scout has
acquired an almost negative connotation denoting a person who is naïve
or foolishly virtuous. The character traits Ms. Eisenhower highlights
in her grandfather are those of the ideal Scout and are embodied in the
Scout Law—“A Scout is: Trustworthy, Loyal, Helpful, Friendly” (US
Boy Scouts, “Scout Law”). Reading about Ike’s humble beginnings,
religious upbringing, and close-knit family reminded me of a famous
old quote of our national character being great because it was good. Ike
was great because he was good, with good judgment and core attributes
from which his leadership flowed.
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At the beginning and ending of the book, Ms. Eisenhower appears
to have another subtle objective in mind in addition to creating a
superb primer on General and President Eisenhower. She engages in
very mild sociopolitical commentary. Essentially, she critiques a culture
and political class that is transfixed by the moment and buffeted by
the present with very little deep deliberation for the long-term—the
strategic—what is good collectively for the entire country. Like my
parents, she waxes nostalgic for a previous period in US history—the
era of her youth, the era when her grandfather was president. She misses
the values and principles that caused a generally united, albeit imperfect
nation, to “Like Ike.”

George W. Goethals and the Army: Change and
Continuity in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era
By Rory McGovern
Reviewed by Dr. John K. Hawley, engineering psychologist,
US Army Futures Command

Lawrence: University Press
of Kansas, 2019
328 pages
$34.95

R

ory McGovern’s biography of George W. Goethals is a wellresearched account of an important military officer and his career
during the historical periods referred to as the Gilded Age and the
Progressive Era, roughly 1880 to 1920. Goethals managed two significant
efforts during this period—the construction of the Panama Canal and the
reorganization of the Army’s World War I logistics enterprise. McGovern
addresses the changes forced upon the Army by the rise of the United
States as an international power following the Spanish-American War
and uses Goethals’s career as a lens through which to examine the Army’s
response to change during that period.
Goethals entered West Point in 1876 when the academy was less
an educational institution than a mechanism for military acculturation.
The prevailing view at the time was that the best form of education was
experiential. Beyond West Point, there was little opportunity to receive
what is now known as professional military education. This view was less
true for the Army Corps of Engineers, of which Goethals became a part.
Engineering was emerging as a professional discipline, but professional
military education was still mostly experiential. Goethals, however, was
fortunate. His early assignments led to his development as a competent
civil engineer. McGovern notes Goethals’s career progression was more
a matter of good fortune than anything done systematically by the Army
to foster his professional development.
Goethals’s success across his early assignments eventually brought
him into contact with W. H. Taft, then Secretary of War. About the same
time, the United States had committed to the construction of the Panama
Canal. For a variety of reasons, building the canal was a troubled project.
US President Teddy Roosevelt wanted a construction manager who
would not quit when the going got tough. That requirement suggested a
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military officer. Roosevelt consulted Taft who suggested Goethals, and
Roosevelt concurred. Acting through Goethals, the Army took charge
of canal construction in 1907. Roosevelt’s directive to Goethals was to
“make the dirt fly,” and he did (96). The canal opened for traffic on
August 15, 1914.
Completing the canal was a “feather in the Army’s cap” and a
major career and professional accomplishment for Goethals (206). At
the height of canal construction, Goethals managed a workforce nearly
half the size of the entire Army, and he served as governor of the Canal
Zone from 1914 until September 1916 when he returned to the United
States to retire from the Army. The chapter titled “Making the Dirt
Fly” was the best researched and most solidly presented portion of the
book and is good reading for anyone interested in the history of the
canal project (84).
The section of the book addressing organizational change and
the Army’s response to that change requires a rewind to the period
immediately prior to the canal project, the Spanish-American War of
1898. The Spanish-American War thrust the United States onto the
world stage as a major power. That said, US conduct of the SpanishAmerican War was an amateurish affair on many accounts. Public and
political reactions to the haphazard way in which the war was conducted
resulted in several postwar investigations.
These inquiries led to Elihu Root being appointed Secretary of War.
Root had no military background, but he quickly recognized the need
for serious military reform affecting the Army. The resulting Root
Reforms had two primary thrusts: enhanced professional military
education in the form of the Army War College and a reformed Command
and General Staff College and the establishment of a general staff to
direct and coordinate planning across the Army. These reforms were
fiercely resisted in the upper echelons of the Army’s officer corps, most
notably by the then-powerful bureau chiefs. The institutions intended to
enable reform were created, but they were provided no ability to generate
the desired changes.
The United States entered World War I in April 1917, and
Goethals reentered public service to support the war effort. He was
eventually appointed the Army’s Quartermaster General responsible
for reorganizing the logistics aspects of a then-failing war effort. As
in previous conflicts, the Army’s organization and war preparation
efforts were not up to the challenges of World War I: quickly building
an expeditionary force facing high-intensity, industrial-age warfare.
Building on the organizational and managerial skills he developed
during the Panama Canal construction project, Goethals quickly
reorganized the Army’s logistics enterprise to meet those challenges. As
McGovern points out, Goethals’s efforts are an interesting case study
of politics, bureaucratic infighting, organizational dysfunction, and
resistance to change.
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Although the events described in the change and continuity portions
of the book occurred more than 100 years ago, the echoes of those
troubles are still with the Army today. In that sense, the book is relevant
to the current period. The Army’s institutional culture is very strong,
and culture is hard to change.
McGovern correctly notes large, hierarchical organizations
that promote primarily from within tend to be resistant to change.
Substantive change often requires a strong exogenous shock, such as
those associated with the Spanish-American War or the failing war
effort in late 1917. As the Army’s responses to the Root Reforms of 120
years ago illustrate and caution, institutional culture can lag and impede
change initiatives. Cultural change cannot simply be commanded.
Consistent and visionary leadership in the wake of crises that lead to
change initiatives is essential. Such leadership was absent in the wake of
the Root Reforms, and the subsequent change efforts foundered. That
said, McGovern’s treatment of Army change and continuity during the
historical period covered is rather shallow and not the best researched
or presented aspect of the book.

The Impeachers: The Trial of Andrew Johnson
and the Dream of a Just Nation
By Brenda Wineapple
Reviewed by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, professor emeritus, US Army War College

W
New York: Random House,
2019
543 pages
$32.00

ithin the last several years, a number of new books have been
published on the process of impeaching an American president.
Brenda Wineapple’s outstanding The Impeachers is distinct from the others.
She examines in depth the first US presidential impeachment and all
the characters involved—without using her research as groundwork for
discussing contemporary political issues. Despite Wineapple’s focus on
the 1800s, readers cannot help but notice the striking similarities between
President Johnson and President Trump even though both men faced
different political cultures and contexts. There are limits, however, to
the parallels. Johnson, who came to power after Lincoln’s assassination,
was never elected president and was viewed by many Americans as
an accidental head of state. He did not have a powerful political base
supporting him, and he faced a hostile Republican Party in Congress that
regularly overrode his vetoes on the most important legislation.
Johnson was widely known to be racist. He had previously owned
slaves and was offended by the idea of black people rising above menial
labor. Despite his Tennessee roots, he did side with the Union during
the Civil War and was the only senator from a Confederate state to
oppose secession. Wineapple maintains Johnson’s motives for these
actions were complex and centered on his dislike of the Southern
planter elite he believed treated him in condescending ways because of
his impoverished childhood and background as an indentured servant
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and tailor. Johnson also feared black equality more than he resented the
Southern aristocracy, and Wineapple argues that as president Johnson
sought to return former slaves to conditions very much like slavery
because of his racial prejudice and fear free blacks would compete for
jobs usually held by poor whites.
Johnson opposed civil rights legislation, tried to limit the effectiveness
of institutions created to help ex-slaves, and discounted violence by the
Ku Klux Klan as isolated incidents. He wildly used his pardon power in
ways that allowed wartime Southern politicians and senior Confederate
officers to return to power. This approach surprised many Washington
observers since Johnson was known to resent the Southern aristocracy.
Wineapple clarifies this paradox by pointing out that while Johnson’s
resentment ran deep, he also coveted the respect of Southern elites, and
he enjoyed it when they requested pardons from him.
Johnson also sought to limit the power of the Army to protect blacks
and pro-Union whites in the former Confederate states, placing him in
conflict with Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, who sought to use the
Army to protect black Americans and others cooperating with federal
authorities in the South. Johnson eventually removed Stanton from
office and fell into a carefully laid trap. Congress had previously passed
the constitutionally questionable Tenure of Office Act which denied the
president the ability to fire Senate-confirmed cabinet members without
the agreement of the Senate. Johnson’s violations of the Tenure of
Office Act became the core of the House of Representative’s Articles
of Impeachment, although Article 11 was a catchall involving Johnson’s
contempt for Congress and refusal to execute important laws passed by
Congress. Johnson was impeached by the House of Representatives in
February 1868 with his trial in the Senate ending in late May 1868.
The impeachment trial was the most sordid and complex political
machination imaginable. As the first presidential impeachment, there was
no precedent to draw upon. Congress improvised its procedures based
on the brief and somewhat vague principles outlined in the Constitution.
Many involved had personal agendas, as Wineapple shows. Underlying
these concerns was a strong belief among Republicans that if they could
wait until the November election, General Ulysses S. Grant would
almost certainly be voted into office as a strong Republican president.
Ultimately, Johnson avoided removal from office by one vote.
Republican Senator Edmund G. Ross, who had previously promised
to vote against Johnson, decided at the last minute to support him.
Wineapple suggests bribery might have been the decisive factor for
the changed vote, although she also quotes an observer as stating the
married Ross had become “infatuated to the extent of foolishness” with a
beautiful much-younger woman who was an adamant Johnson supporter
(359). Johnson completed the remaining months of his presidency as a
discredited and largely powerless lame duck, returned to Tennessee after
the expiration of his term without attending the inauguration of General
Grant, and sought for many years to regain his former position as a US
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senator—then elected by state legislators. Johnson finally gained enough
support in the state legislature in 1875 to return to his Senate position
and served just under five months before suffering a fatal stroke.
Wineapple concludes Johnson was impeached for his efforts to
restore the Union with the old Southern elite in place and most black
Americans returned to slavery-like conditions. The first presidential
impeachment was an extremely political process and did not look
remotely like an objective legal proceeding. Johnson was impeached for
political and moral reasons. Wineapple believes this may be the most
interesting lesson from the first presidential impeachment, and the
dominance of politics in future impeachment trials will be extremely
likely if not inevitable.
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Defense Studies
Post Wall, Post Square: How Bush, Gorbachev,
Kohl, and Deng Shaped the World after 1989
By Kristina Spohr
Reviewed by Dr. Ronald J. Granieri, associate professor of history,
US Army War College

W

hile history did not end in 1989, something began. Determining
what that “something” might be has bedeviled the analysis
of world affairs ever since. The year most famous for the fall of the
Berlin Wall, with all the symbolism attached to it, marked for many
Europeans and most Americans the end—or at least the beginning of
the end—of the Cold War. Events in 1990–91 then marked the start of
President George H. W. Bush’s new world order, which he suggested
would be based on democracy, freer trade, and multinational cooperation.
At the same time communism collapsed in Europe and sent shock
waves to Moscow, communism triumphed in China. Anyone who lived
through the first months of 1989 remembers many analysts expected
to see fundamental change in Beijing, not Berlin. The decision by the
Chinese communist leadership on June 4 to send tanks into the Square
of Heavenly Peace appeared to bring all such dreams to an end.
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As disparate as the events in Berlin and Beijing were, Kristina
Spohr believes it is clear in retrospect that the contemporary world
has lived in their dual shadow ever since. State socialism collapsed in
Eastern Europe, but the Chinese model of state capitalism survived the
challenge and has shaped the course of China and modern geopolitics.
The hopefulness of the 1990s may have given way to the grim realities
of 9/11 and the Global War on Terror, and now to the even-grimmer
realities of pandemics and lockdowns, but there is no doubt the current
multipolar world emerged from the collapse of Cold War bipolarity
and the “unforeseen consequences of the design flaws in the new order
improvised with such haste and ingenuity by the shapers of world affairs
in 1989–92” (9).
Spohr, one of the finest of a new generation of international
historians who have made their careers in the post–Cold War world,
undertakes the daunting task of bringing these different stories
together. In her massive and deeply researched book, she attempts to
place the events and leaders in Europe, North America, and Asia into
a common context to understand the “troubled birth” of the post-Wall
and post-Square order as we ponder the implications of the order’s
current demise (9).
Spohr mines a range of archives and sources in multiple languages
to develop her narrative. Highlighting the interplay of personalities
and policies, she weaves the actions of Bush, Mikhail Gorbachev,
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Helmut Kohl, and Deng Xiaoping—the main actors as her title
suggests—with the significant roles played by other world leaders,
from Margaret Thatcher and François Mitterrand to Václav Havel,
Boris Yeltsin, and Li Peng.
Spohr helps readers develop a truly global understanding of the
tumultuous era from 1989–92 and see how connected the events
appeared to actors at the time—especially readers who may not have
experienced these events directly. Events in Beijing, combined with
memories of failed popular uprisings in Eastern Europe in previous
years, encouraged political leaders across the Atlantic to keep their
expectations for change in Europe modest in fall 1989 and may have
lulled some Eastern European communist leaders, especially Gorbachev,
into a false sense of security about their ability to manage change. East
German leader Erich Honecker openly speculated about a “Chinese
solution” to the protests in Leipzig and other cities in October 1989
before being dissuaded from such reckless violence by more reformminded colleagues (149). But even these colleagues, once they had
pushed Honecker into retirement, underestimated the degree to which
the rejection of violent repression meant the end of the East German
regime altogether.
Similarly, Kohl and his colleagues in Bonn, who had spoken
generally about their desire for German unification, scrambled to
respond when protesters began chanting “We are one people!” (150).
Kohl surprised many critics with his willingness to improvise, but the
path to German reunification was far from smooth. While the happy
European revolutions of 1989 would not have been possible without the
enthusiasm of the crowds, the aftermath required the negotiating skills
of leaders who themselves were not sure how things would turn out.
Spohr also helps readers understand the global reverberations of
those heady moments in 1989. The revolutions in Europe had hardly
settled down when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990,
providing a further push toward a different international system, just
as the failure of Gorbachev’s Soviet Union to save their former client
provided further fuel for plotters to try to overthrow Gorbachev in
August 1991. Nor did the surprising swift victory over Iraq guarantee
re-election for Bush. In his “A Europe Whole and Free” speech in Mainz
on May 31, 1989, Bush pursued a complex strategy, embracing German
reunification and the development of a Europe “whole and free” while
also trying to maintain Gorbachev in power and positive relations
with China. American domestic politics ultimately caught up with the
global statesman.
Rejecting a man they considered aloof and too focused on
international affairs, American voters elected Bill Clinton, who
during the campaign rejected Bush’s willingness to “coddle dictators
from Baghdad to Beijing” only to become a strong advocate once in
office of Chinese integration into the World Trade Organization (574).
Furthermore, Bush’s last acts in office included dispatching US troops to
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help war-torn Somalia—the first of many ill-fated efforts by Washington
to use its influence as the world’s surviving superpower to bring about
humanitarian political change.
As if the obvious number of foreshadowed events in her narrative
were not enough, Spohr works in references to Donald Trump at
the beginning and end of her book, both to remind readers of the
consequences of decisions made in the 1990s and to reflect upon the
changes in American leadership over the decades since. “Bush and his
fellow managers of the 1989–91 post–Cold War transition had kept their
eyes on the global balance,” Spohr concludes. “They also understood
that US power had to be exercised within a framework of political
alliances and economic interdependence” (598). That attitude also
shaped, in varying degrees, the policies of Bush’s successors. Trump,
however, had already signaled his rejection of this approach in a March
1990 interview in Playboy. Asked how President Trump would govern,
Trump declared: “He would believe very strongly in extreme military
strength. He wouldn’t trust anyone. He wouldn’t trust the Russians; he
wouldn’t trust our allies; he’d have a huge military arsenal, perfect it,
understand it” (599).
Trump’s plans for the future seemed out of step with the careful
diplomatic approach of the leaders of his time. His rise to power,
though, is indicative of how that careful approach sowed the seeds of its
own destruction. Spohr does not say if a new era has begun in the last
three years, but she does show the world has come a long way from the
optimistic autumn of 1989.

Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy: Religion, Politics, and Strategy
By Dmitry Adamsky
Reviewed by Dr. Robert E. Hamilton, professor of Eurasian studies,
US Army War College, and retired US Army colonel

W

ill a more religious Russia be harder to deter and more willing to
coerce adversaries? Will the rise in religiosity in Russia influence
the Kremlin’s decisions on when to go to war and how Russia conducts
itself in war? And will the unique nexus between the Russian Orthodox
Church and Russia’s nuclear forces enable the nuclear forces to win
budget battles against rivals in the coming era of budget austerity?
These are some of the questions Dmitry Adamsky raises in Russian
Nuclear Orthodoxy.
Adamsky is not the first scholar to notice orthodoxy has become
a key component of Russia’s post-Soviet geopolitical identity. But his
argument that the Russian Orthodox Church and the nuclear community
have formed a uniquely strong bond is new and deserves serious
consideration. If this bond is real, it bears directly on the answers to the
questions posed above. The dual phenomena of rising religiosity and the
unique bond between the Orthodox Church and the nuclear community
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could raise the profile of nuclear weapons in Russian national security
strategy, directly affect Russia’s willingness to use force in a crisis, and
influence how it uses that force.
Adamsky notes correctly there is a lack of evidence in international
relations research that military clergy restrain states from going to war
or moderate their conduct in war due to moral and ethical considerations.
In Russia’s case the extreme conservatism and nationalism of the
Orthodox Church may have the opposite effect. The church has long
seen its role as shielding Russia from the supposed threat posed by a
“decadent and secular” West. And Russia’s nuclear deterrent has long
been a staple of its national security strategy.
The marriage between the two thus echoes the words of National
Security Council (NSC)-68 published in 1950, which warned of the
threat of a nuclear-armed Soviet Union “animated by a new fanatic faith,
antithetical to our own” (The Executive Secretary, “NSC-68: A Report
to the National Security Council,” Naval War College Review 28, no. 3
(May–June 1975): 53). The faith then was Marxism, and the faith now is
Russian Orthodoxy. The two are different in their views of history and
a just world order but are alike in exhorting their followers to extreme
measures to carry out their visions, and in that married to one of the
world’s largest nuclear arsenals, they make Moscow a dangerous and
unpredictable adversary.
Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy is exhaustively researched, logically
organized, and surprisingly readable—especially for a book taking
on a topic of this magnitude. Adamsky’s use of Russian and English
interviews, scholarly and journalistic sources, and official records
provide a firm foundation for building his argument. The book traces
the evolution of the relationship between the church and the nuclear
community over the three decades of Russia’s post-Soviet history.
In each decade, Adamsky examines three themes. The first theme is
the general development of the church-state relationship in Russia. The
second theme is the more specific development of the “faith-nuclear
nexus”—the relationship between the church and Russia’s nuclear
weapons community (29). The third theme is strategic mythmaking
or the deliberate “reading of religious connotations into history” that
sought to prove “a causal link between the spiritual support of the
church and battlefield successes” (150).
Over these three decades, the partnership between the
church and the nuclear community, which began as a grassroots
movement in the 1990s, eventually acquired support from the top. The
Russian military in the 1990s was in profound shock and systemic
crisis, and the church was just emerging from decades of enforced
atheism and persecution at the hands of the Communist Party. In this
environment, the two institutions developed a relationship that served
both. The church could provide remedies for the military problems
of motivation and discipline and fill the ideological vacuum left by
the collapse of Soviet communism. And for the church, the military
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represented a way to expand its influence by reaching out to all social
groups and reestablishing a close relationship with the government.
Sustained lobbying from Patriarchs Alexey II and Kirill in the 2000s
turned the Russian Orthodox Church into a key player in Russian politics.
By the end of the decade, “nuclear churching” became Kremlin policy,
with support from the top supplementing the initial grassroots movement
of the 1990s (168). During this decade, the church met all four of its main
goals: the introduction of religious instruction in public schools, the
revival of the military chaplaincy, the restitution of pre-Soviet church
property, and the marginalization of “nontraditional” denominations.
An actual doctrine of nuclear orthodoxy also emerged in this
decade. With the political, economic, and social crises of the 1990s
behind it, Russia began the search for a new national ideal. Among the
views vying for attention in a variation on the traditional competition
between Slavophiles, Westerners, Atlanticists, and Eurasianists was
that of Egor Kholmogorov. Kholmogorov, the author of the nuclear
orthodoxy doctrine, was an ultraconservative who won the For
Feminism “Sexist of the Year” poll in 2014 for advocating punching
women who utter the word “sexism” (Gabrielle Tetrault-Farber,
“Publicist Who Advocated Punching Women in the Face Named ‘Russia’s
Sexist of the Year’,” Moscow Times, March 12, 2015). Kholmogorov’s
doctrine rested on two postulates: “to stay Orthodox, Russia should
be a strong nuclear power” and “to stay a strong nuclear power, Russia
should be Orthodox” (161).
The last 10 years, which Adamsky calls the “Operationalization
Decade,” have solidified and institutionalized the marriage between the
Orthodox Church and the nuclear community in Russia (7). During
this decade, Russia’s nuclear arsenal gained additional prominence
in Russian national security doctrine; simultaneously, the church
provided a foundation for Russia’s new geopolitical identity. Adamsky’s
identification of and explanation for this nexus between the church and
the nuclear community in Russia may not be the only answer to the
questions this book raises. Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy, however, provides
richer and more accurate answers to these questions and enhances
readers’ understanding of some important phenomena in international
relations and military strategy.
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Why We Fight
By Mike Martin
Reviewed by Anthony King, chair of war studies, Warwick University

M
London: C. Hurst & Co.,
2018
328 pages
$29.95

ike Martin’s Why We Fight belongs to a growing genre of literature,
books written by junior officers based on their experiences of the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This canon includes Patrick Hennessey’s
The Junior Officers’ Reading Club, Patrick Bury’s Callsign Hades, Charlotte
Madison’s Dressed to Kill, Evan Wright’s Generation Kill, Craig Mullaney’s The
Unforgiving Minute, Emile Simpson’s War from the Ground Up, and Martin’s
first book on the Helmand conflict, An Intimate War. There is nothing
new about subaltern literature. Because they tend to be very literate and
have experienced close combat firsthand, lieutenants and captains have
written many important memoirs of the wars in which they served.
Siegfried Sassoon, Wilfred Owen, Edmund Blunden, Robert Graves, and
Ernst Jünger produced major works about the First World War. Even
junior officers of the Vietnam War produced important contributions to
this genre with Philip Caputo’s A Rumor of War, Bing West’s The Village,
and, perhaps, the finest of all, Karl Marlantes’ Matterhorn and What It Is
Like to Go to War.
Why We Fight is unusual in that it is not a memoir; Martin mentions
his experiences in Afghanistan only obliquely. Instead, it is a general
investigation of why humans go to war at all. In this, Why We Fight is
most like Simpson’s War from the Ground Up. Written by two Afghan
veterans, the two books form an interesting pair. While Simpson (an
idealist) reduces war to its narratives, Martin (a materialist) believes war
is in the genes, and the evolutionary psychology of humans compels
them to fight.
For Martin war is best understood as an evolutionary adaptation.
Humans go to war to protect their genes. Of course, there is an obvious
conundrum here, which Martin seeks to resolve. War is a risky business,
and it has been almost universally prosecuted by young men, whom it
eliminates in large numbers before they have had a chance to reproduce.
Consequently, as a reproductive strategy, it should be irrational for young
men to fight. They are likely to die, while their cowardly but long-living
brothers will have a greater chance of reproduction; paradoxically, on
this account, the weak are, in evolutionary terms, fitter.
If the brave have always died young, then humans should have
become less and less warlike. Martin perceptively notes, however, there
is a secondary social mechanism at work. While young men might be
killed if they go to war, if they shirk their collective duty to defend their
community, they will definitely be excluded by it. They will be ostracized
and may even suffer punishment or death. Consequently, by not going to
war—for all its attendant risks—they reduce their reproductive fitness
more than suffering the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune: “We
fight because losing membership of our in-group—whether because it
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is disintegrating, or because we’re being shunned for not fighting—is
evolutionary suicide” (89). Crucially, by fighting for their community,
soldiers will earn status and a sense of belonging, which Martin identifies
as the two master motivations for going to war.
Martin proves historically the claim that humans fight for status
and membership within their social group and also provides personal
evidence of it. The book is punctuated with italicized autobiographical
passages, which constitute some of the strongest prose in the book. In
one passage, Martin describes how he was asked by his brother why he
had volunteered for Helmand: “I pondered his question for a moment,
and answered from the gut. ‘I want to see how I do,’ I replied, pausing
before adding, ‘I want to prove myself’” (41). Later he describes the
conflict he saw in southern Afghanistan. Against the official narratives,
there was no simple war between the Taliban and the Afghan government
there. Instead, there was a series of internecine struggles between power
brokers, clans, and tribes against their local rivals. In each case, belligerents
were motivated by immediate concerns of collective self-protection and
promotion; by status and group membership, in short (124–25).
Martin’s sociological explanation of why humans are willing to fight
is both powerful and economical, and sociologists, anthropologists,
and many philosophers would certainly concur with him. He does
not find this account sufficient, however, and proceeds, on its basis,
to build a much more complex evolutionary edifice. Although humans
certainly fight for status and belonging, Martin claims these emotional
commitments are underpinned by biochemical mechanisms, particularly
testosterone, which makes humans individually aggressive, violent, and
risk-taking, and oxytocin, which heightens their attachment to their
group. Humans are chemically programmed to love their kin, while
also accepting—even relishing—the risks required to defend them. For
Martin, these two chemicals explain why individuals can risk going to
war for a social group they love.
At the same time, as a result of evolution, the human brain has
become imprinted with a series of subconscious, innate modules which
structure consciousness. These modules allow humans to form extremely
large social groups, extending well beyond any genetic heritage. Martin
identifies three major modules laid down in the Paleolithic Period: moral
codes, religion, and ideology. These modules align individual human
biochemistry to potential vast polities. Instead of just loving their
immediate kin and being willing to fight and die for them, humans are
conditioned by these modules to form oxytocin attachments to their
societies, faith communities, or nations, consisting of thousands, maybe,
millions of individuals. Testosterone ensures humans have been willing
to fight for these attachments.
Why We Fight is an ingenious exposition of a long-standing
philosophical problem and an evolutionary psychological explanation
of war. It is an intriguing and unusual book for a former subaltern to
have written and is an academic and, in places, dense inquiry. Serving
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soldiers may find the book less useful and accessible than other works
by Helmand veterans that deal more immediately with the experience
of combat itself or Martin’s previous book on Helmand. Scholars and
students of war, however, will read the book with great interest and ask
why a British veteran of the Helmand campaign felt obliged to look
beyond immediate strategic and political explanations in the struggle to
understand the war in which he fought.

Culture and the Soldier: Identities, Values,
and Norms in Military Engagements
Edited by H. Christian Breede
Reviewed by Dr. Kellie Wilson-Buford, associate professor of history, Arkansas
State University

Vancouver and Toronto:
UBC Press, 2019
248 pages
$89.95

I

n spring 2015 a small group of senior military officers, defense policy
analysts, and academics gathered at Queens University for a conference
on the cultural dimensions of combat, battlefield operations, and
multinational defense cooperation. The goal of the conference, hosted
by the Centre for International and Defence Policy, was to develop policy
recommendations to improve standards of cultural practice within the
Canadian military and its partner states in addressing current and future
crises worldwide. This unique book was the result of the conference.
Identifying culture as both a force that shapes military identities,
values, and norms and a tool employed by militaries while conducting
operations, Culture and the Soldier makes a compelling case for why cultural
considerations should occupy a more central position in Canadian
defense policy planning in particular and in defense policy planning
more generally. While many studies have theorized about culture’s
impact on the military, very few have analyzed how militaries have
used culture as a tool to accomplish defense goals. H. Christian Breede
does just that and lays the foundation for culture to be understood and
employed in contemporary military engagements.
Part one, three chapters of qualitative research studies, examines
how Canadian culture—its values, identities, and norms—has shaped
the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) as an organization. Chapter one
argues that Canadian culture shaped how the experience of combat
was remembered among Francophone and Anglophone war veterans in
Afghanistan and highlights the challenges a multicultural fighting force
might face when trying to maintain unit cohesion and transition troops
back to civilian life.
Chapter two operationalizes culture as the “attitudes toward and
perceptions of gender roles and the appropriate behavior implied for
all members of the military” and illustrates how evolving gender values
and norms in Canadian civil society led to the CAF’s attempt at gender
integration (21). The CAF’s unwillingness to conceptualize gender as
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the representation of both femininity and masculinity was a key factor
in this unsuccessful attempt at gender integration.
Chapter three highlights the cultural implications for the relationship
between military casualties and society and argues Canadian civil
culture shaped how Canadians ritualized and memorialized military
casualties in Afghanistan, a view which has changed since the Korean
War. Allowing for public expression of casualty rituals coincided with
increased public support for the mission. Interestingly, this chapter
rejects Breede’s definition of culture as vague and defines culture as
the ascribed meanings given to symbols, heroes, and rituals. Despite
the contested definitions of culture presented, part one offers intriguing
examples of how Canadian culture has shaped the Canadian military.
Part two broadens its focus to analyze the ways militaries,
governments, and security sector agencies have used culture as a tool to
conduct operations. Chapters four and five explore the role of culture
in the conduct of Russia’s “hybrid war within the grey zone” and
reveal how the Kremlin and Russian security sector agencies leveraged
propaganda and manipulated their corporate images to achieve foreign
policy goals (84).
Where chapters four and five operationalize culture as popular
beliefs and public perceptions about current events that organizations
can manage and manipulate, chapter six defines culture as the
different and often competing meanings militaries and humanitarian
nongovernmental organizations ascribe to the words “security” and
“success.” The chapter illustrates how efforts to enhance cooperation
during crises have often resulted in short-term gains but long-term
setbacks in humanitarian effectiveness. Chapters seven and nine
highlight the necessity of both cultural education and a “social license
to operate” for troops deployed in any country not their own as
precursors to successful operations and the mental well-being of the
troops involved (197). Chapter eight examines the role of international
security organizations such as NATO and the George C. Marshall
European Center for Security Studies in fostering epistemic communities
based on alliance and cooperation.
The strengths of this volume are its interdisciplinary scope,
varied research methodologies, and contributor backgrounds that
range from international relations, security studies, anthropology, and
sociology to political science and literature. Notably absent from this
exciting amalgam of scholars are historians whose work could provide
important and necessary historical context for the various military
engagements addressed.
Perhaps a side effect of the volume’s interdisciplinarity is its somewhat
confusing organization. While part one focuses exclusively on the CAF,
part two ranges in focus from Russia and Ukraine to Canada, the United
States, and international security organizations and security schools and
centers. Additionally, part two’s nearly 150 pages more than double part
one’s 60 pages, leaving a significant imbalance of evidence and analysis.
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The result is a very focused and compelling argument for how culture
has shaped the CAF in the past few decades with little application to
other militaries on the one hand and a varied and more generalized
analysis of how militaries, governments, and organizations have used
culture as a means to achieve specific end goals on the other.
The qualitative nature of the volume’s research does not undermine
its importance in providing a useful template for future studies of
culture as both a force and a factor in militaries and military operations
worldwide. Despite its limitations, this volume of defense policy analysis
is critical reading for anyone interested in the cultural dimensions of
combat for the Canadian military and its partner states.

Lessons Unlearned: The U.S. Army’s Role in Creating
the Forever Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
By Pat Proctor
Reviewed by Dr. George Woods, professor of strategic leadership,
US Army War College

Columbia: University of
Missouri Press, 2020
500 pages
$40.00

I

n this time of great power competition and as depicted in the current
US National Defense Strategy, Lessons Unlearned presents a contrary
view of how the US Army sees itself. Author Pat Proctor confronts the
conventional view that the Army must build itself into a formidable,
technologically superior force for high-intensity conflict to counter
threats that emanate from Russia or China. He argues the US Army’s
culture prevents it from accepting anything else. He states the lessons that
should have been learned—from the series of low-intensity engagements
from the late 1980s through the terrorist attacks on the United States on
September 11, 2001—were ignored or never given a chance to become
institutionalized due to the Army’s cultural bias, thus resulting in the
decades-long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Army has failed to posture itself for success on two measures.
First, it fails to embrace responsibility for engaging in the political
dimension to reestablish failing or failed countries in which it must
operate. Second, it repeatedly fails to create the capabilities to operate
in low-intensity environments with needed capabilities like civil affairs,
psychological operations, engineers, military police, and other such
capabilities required in a low-intensity context. Consequently, the US
Army remains prepared for the short-term high-intensity fight, but
vulnerable to asymmetric threats that have caused the nation to be
embroiled in the “forever wars in Iraq and Afghanistan” as a result (4).
Proctor’s exhaustingly thorough analysis includes a chapter on the
lessons captured during operations in Somalia and Haiti and their effect
on ongoing modernization efforts, in this case Force XXI. Emphasizing
the Army’s reluctance to embrace the political dimension in both
campaigns as well as the effect of operations in urban environments
vis-à-vis nonstate actors created significant vulnerabilities. First, it
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negated US technological advantages, exposing US forces to vicious
street fighting and being outnumbered by lightly armed citizens.
Second, it complicated processes for ending the fight and reestablishing
stability in the country in crisis. While the lessons in Somalia were being
captured, the Army concurrently proceeded with its future within the
Force XXI framework.
In envisioning the force of the future, lessons from Somalia and in
the soon-to-follow campaign in Haiti had not yet had time to influence
new ways of thinking. Conflict was conceived to be war and operations
other than war. Although the Army was to be prepared for both, Proctor
clearly states that “transformation” effort in the Force XXI construct
clearly presented a high-intensity bias (9). Proctor, however, feels there
may have been a glimmer of hope as two organizations emerged that might
have enabled a fair dialogue about low-intensity capabilities the Army
needed to embrace. The Peacekeeping Institute established in 1993—
and the predecessor to today’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations
Institute—joined the Army-Air Force Center for Low-Intensity Conflict
(A-AFCLIC) previously established in 1986 at Langley Air Force Base.
Those hopes were soon dashed in the next phase Proctor covers in the
chapter on Bosnia and Herzegovina and the transformation effort to
succeed Force XXI, the Army After Next focus.
While serving as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1996,
General Shalikashvili shared his vision for the US Armed Forces of
2010 in his Joint Vision 2010. The vision was wholeheartedly embraced
by General Reimer, the then serving Army Chief of Staff. Crafting the
supporting Army Vision 2010, Proctor holds General Reimer most
accountable for the demise of low-intensity conflict. Proctor faults
General Reimer for virtually expunging low-intensity dialogue within
the Army, as exemplified by decisions he made that withdrew Army
participation in the A-AFCLIC—which ultimately disbanded in 1996.
Concurrently, education in low-intensity conflict at Army professional
military education institutions waned and virtually disappeared from
the curriculum, particularly in the Command and General Staff College
and the US Army War College curricula. Altogether, these decisions
and outcomes served as evidence of the Army’s cultural blindness and
set the conditions for unpreparedness in operations and campaigns
that followed.
In the final chapter of analysis, Proctor presents further evidence
of the Army’s ill-preparedness for low-intensity conflicts. He uses
the campaign in Kosovo to show the Army’s inability to own its
responsibilities for operating effectively in this environment to achieve
the nation’s end. And in spite of General Shinseki’s original and
unexpected vision of the Interim and Objective Force concept unveiled
early in his tenure of office as General Reimer’s replacement, it, too,
became a concept that morphed into a more-deployable version of
high-intensity capability vice a force postured to also wage effective lowintensity conflict operations. Then the attacks on New York City and
the Pentagon occurred, embroiling the US Army in a seemingly endless
TOC

138

Parameters 50(4) Winter 2020–21

campaign in two countries accused of harboring terrorists guilty of the
attacks or the ones to follow.
This does not end well. So, why would one choose to read this book?
If institutional culture is the reason for the US Army’s unpreparedness,
then what should one understand about the culture? First, cultures persist
over time. And over time many of its followers rarely, if ever, question
why they do the things they do. They become entrenched in the culture’s
practice; however, cultures are rife with implicit assumptions informed
by the norms they have practiced for decades, if not longer, and these
assumptions are often taken for granted and seldom challenged.
Consequently professionals should read thought-provoking works
like this one. Although readers may not agree with Proctor’s analysis
or the conclusions he draws from it, he creates an opportunity for
readers to reflect and reexamine, to consider critically the conclusions
drawn, and to accept the kernels of truth applicable—all trademarks of
critically thinking professionals who owe it to their constituents to give
Lessons Unlearned due consideration.
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Regional Studies
India and Nuclear Asia: Forces, Doctrine, and Dangers
By Yogesh Joshi and Frank O’Donnell
Reviewed by Dr. Arzan Tarapore, nonresident fellow, National Bureau of
Asian Research, Washington, DC

T

he United States has made a strategic bet on India. With the seemingly
unstoppable growth in Chinese power and influence in the region,
America has aggressively courted a deeper strategic partnership with India
and calculated a rising India aligned with US interests will better maintain
a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. While Washington is
largely focused on India’s conventional military capabilities and posture,
India also boasts a burgeoning nuclear weapons capability, which is the
subject of India and Nuclear Asia: Forces, Doctrine, and Dangers.

Washington, DC:
Georgetown University
Press, 2018
256 pages
$111.00

Written by two young and accomplished scholars, this accessible and
thoroughly researched book fills an important niche in the Indo-Pacific
literature and should be required reading for American military leaders
and strategic analysts concerned with the area. Joshi and O’Donnell
systematically examine the contemporary nuclear balance between India
and Pakistan and China, its chief rivals. Their opinionated analysis is
informed but not weighed down by theory and history and advances
two major policy recommendations in a logical and clearly structured
fashion: for India, Pakistan, and China to increase transparency through
dialogue and for India to conduct a public defense policy review.
Joshi and O’Donnell’s core analysis focuses on Indian, Pakistani,
and Chinese nuclear capabilities and doctrines. They comprehensively
survey the status of India’s fissile material capabilities, delivery systems,
command and control, and missile defense and assess the historical
evolution of Indian nuclear doctrine and its approach to global
nonproliferation regimes.
They also analyze the implications of Pakistani and Chinese
nuclear capabilities and doctrine for Indian nuclear strategy. Pakistan,
for example, may have lowered the threshold for nuclear use with the
introduction of tactical nuclear weapons such as the 60-kilometer
range Nasr missile. “India refuses to accept that this threshold has
been lowered” and continues to develop plans for rapid mobilization of
conventional strikes (71). Similarly, the authors argue China’s military
reforms have bolstered its conventional active defense doctrine of
“seizing the initiative as early as possible, including initiating rapid
escalation at the outset of a conflict” through lavish use of conventional
missiles (95). In the Indo-Pacific and Indo-Chinese dyads these recent
developments have raised the risk of inadvertent escalation to nuclear
use, which is a recurring theme of the book.
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As Joshi and O’Donnell observe, several factors bedevil Indian
nuclear strategy and the analysis of it. India, unusual among nuclear
powers, faces twin nuclear rivals which pull its nuclear strategy in
different directions. For India, China is by far the more sophisticated
and comprehensive nuclear threat, demanding longer range and more
redundant Indian forces. Pakistan, however, remains the more immediate
danger, given the frequency of militarized crises and the centrality of
nuclear threats to Pakistani doctrine.
Another major complication in their analysis of Indian nuclear
strategy is the rapid evolution in capabilities and doctrine, which presents
an analytic target that is not only opaque but also fast moving. India
is on the cusp of deploying its first intercontinental ballistic missile,
the 5,000-kilometer Agni V, which can potentially reach all major cities
in China, and is also rapidly developing a missile defense capability
through indigenous technology and the acquisition of the Russian S-400
antiaircraft missile system.
Alongside its rivals, China and Pakistan, India is fielding a
new nuclear ballistic-missile submarine. As Joshi and O’Donnell
make clear, these and other new capabilities in the hands of India
and its rivals are rapidly changing the dynamics of the regional
nuclear triangle in ways their strategists and US analysts cannot yet
fully appreciate.
While Joshi and O’Donnell admirably tackle some issues, other
questions remain unaddressed, especially two issues that are particularly
salient for American defense leaders. First, they downplay a potential,
hotly debated paradigmatic shift in Indian nuclear doctrine that
moves away from “No First Use” and toward preemptive counterforce
targeting against enemy nuclear forces. This perspective may simply be
a matter of timing.
Much of the best evidence for the shift—including, most starkly,
an August 2019 statement by the serving defense minister—emerged
after this book was written. In chapter 5, Joshi and O’Donnell
acknowledge India is increasingly debating the unrevised 2003 nuclear
doctrine and moving away from existing doctrine may be closer than
they suggest. India could simply pepper its doctrine with ambiguity,
without publishing new doctrine, and this action would have massive
implications for regional nuclear stability.
Second, while the book’s scope is limited to nuclear strategy,
readers may also benefit from the exploration of parallel developments
in India’s overall security strategy. The Indian government led by Prime
Minister Narendra Modi has taken added risk in its crises with Pakistan
and has ratcheted up its crisis responses in an effort to create space for
conventional options. Again, the starkest evidence came after this book
was written, when India launched an unprecedented air strike against a
terrorist target in Pakistan in February 2019. This deliberate generation
of risk will influence how India and Pakistan act in the next inevitable
crisis and may over time shape their nuclear deterrence models.
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As Joshi and O’Donnell argue persuasively, the risk of inadvertent
escalation between India and its rivals is growing. India and Nuclear Asia:
Forces, Doctrine, and Dangers is an excellent introduction for leaders and
analysts seeking to understand those risks.

Black Wave: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the FortyYear Rivalry That Unraveled Culture, Religion,
and Collective Memory in the Middle East
By Kim Ghattas
Reviewed by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, professor emeritus, US Army War College

I

n Black Wave, journalist Kim Ghattas has produced an insightful study
of the rise of political, religious, and cultural intolerance in various key
Middle Eastern countries as well as adjacent Pakistan and Afghanistan
since the late 1970s. The black wave in the book’s title is highly nuanced,
but is summed up by Ghattas as the “intellectual and cultural darkness
that slowly engulfed [the region] in the decades following the fateful
year of 1979” (3).

New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 2020
400 pages
$30.00

Indeed, that year was an inflection point defined in the region by
three momentous events—the Iranian revolution, a regime-threatening
uprising in Mecca, and the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan.
Ghattas maintains all these events were important and produced
changes that rippled throughout the entire region, dramatically
increased religious intolerance, and fed into a new and more virulent
level of sectarian strife among Sunni and Shia Muslims. Throughout the
book, Ghattas includes personal stories about individuals struggling for
freedom of thought and the more liberal interpretations of Islam. Many
individuals were assassinated or marginalized in response to their efforts
against extremist influence.
The most important 1979 event was the Iranian revolution. Ghattas
notes Iran’s last shah was overthrown by a coalition of groups and
not simply the followers of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, whom
she characterizes as a cunning, ruthless, and power-hungry man. She
maintains in addition to leftists and other anti-monarchists opposing
the shah, there were also a number of moderate clerics, some of whom
died under suspicious circumstances and consequently left Khomeini
unchallenged for clerical leadership.
Initially, the Saudis were uncertain about the meaning of this change.
They had previously worried about the shah’s regional ambitions but saw
him as a competitor who would only take the rivalry so far. The new
regime puzzled the Saudi leadership, but the establishment of an Islamic
Republic appeared to be a manageable problem, and Saudi Arabia’s
leaders were relieved Iran had not turned to a communist government.
Still, there were warning signs. Khomeini’s past writings were
clearly unfriendly to them, and his hostility soon manifested itself in
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efforts to export revolution beyond Iran’s borders and brush aside the
pro-American monarchies. Khomeini’s public statements and Iranian
propaganda made it clear Saudi Arabia had an unbending enemy. As
Ghattas notes, Iranian propaganda directed at the Saudi Shias was
particularly worrisome and helped to foster unrest.
Simultaneously with the increased concerns about Iran, the Saudis
had to cope with an unexpected shock in November 1979 when a large
group of well-armed rebels led by a former Saudi national guardsman
seized the Grand Mosque at Mecca and maintained control of it for more
than two weeks. The rebels proclaimed they were acting in the name of
an Islamic messiah (the mufti), who once in power would restructure
religious, economic, and foreign policy under a purified Islamic regime.
Saudi leaders were horrified the situation might spin out of control,
leading to a wider following for the rebels.
Unfortunately, using force at the holiest site in Islam was a problem.
Before they did so, the royal family sought the public approval of the
senior Saudi clergy and especially the ultraconservative blind sheikh,
Abdelaziz bin Baz. When they received this support and the military
response went forward, the rebels were defeated, but the mosque and its
environs were severely damaged in the battle. The political power of the
Saudi royal family was also harmed.
According to Ghattas, before 1979, the Saudi royal family was able
to dominate the clerics. After 1979, Ghattas maintains the religious
establishment “had become king” by helping to prop up a wounded
regime (206). The Iranians, for their part, took full advantage of the
situation and continuously accused Saudi Arabia of being an unfit
custodian of Islam’s two most holy mosques in Mecca and Medina. In
actions that infuriated Riyadh, the Iranians called for the creation of a
special Islamic Commission to take control of the holy sites.
Ghattas sees the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as the third key
1979 event that reverberated throughout the region. She maintains,
for Saudi Arabia, helping the Afghan rebels fight Soviet forces was a
tremendous opportunity to reclaim some of the prestige and legitimacy
lost during the siege of Mecca. The Saudis, like the US leadership,
provided considerable assistance to the hard-line rebels and also worked
with Pakistan under Prime Minister Zia ul-Haq.
Ghattas characterizes Zia as a weak dictator who prolonged and
energized his regime by seizing control of the Afghan issue while
thoroughly infusing Pakistani society with ultraconservative Islam.
Western leaders, who might have objected to Zia’s authoritarianism in
other circumstances, were then too distracted with the Afghan War to
do so. Ghattas further shows that after Zia’s death and the end of the
Afghan War, generous Saudi funding continued to nurture the system
through less obvious but more pervasive involvement including a
religious publishing empire and a strong network of hard-line schools
and seminaries.
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Throughout this book, Ghattas displays a strong command of the
details of her subject matter and considers the spin-off effects of the
Saudi-Iranian rivalry for countries such as Egypt and Lebanon. She
suggests the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was linked
to Saudi and Iranian competition on questions of Islamic purity and
activism. She also mentions periods of moderation and détente between
Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic, but points out that these episodes
have been ephemeral. Ghattas suggests there is a moderate political
and religious identity throughout the Islamic world that will eventually
defeat the extremists because of the bravery of good people, but this
revolution remains to be seen.
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Technology and War
Power to the People: How Open Technological
Innovation is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists
By Audrey Kurth Cronin
Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, instructor at the Safe Communities Institute
at the University of Southern California

O

ne of the world’s leading experts on security and terrorism, author
Audrey Kurth Cronin is currently a professor of international
security at American University’s School of International Service. She
has been a faculty member at the US National War College, has served in
the US executive branch, and has an Oxford University graduate degree.

New York: Oxford
University Press, 2020
440 pages
$29.95

Power to the People is the by-product of a major multiyear endeavor
supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation which draws upon
the Power to the People Terrorism Innovation Database (P2P-PVID)
developed by Cronin, George Mason University, and American
University graduate research assistants (431). Three datasets were
created focusing on dynamite manufacture, adoption, and use (1867 to
1934); AK-47 manufacture, dissemination, and use (1947 to present);
and contemporary drone and related autonomous systems manufacture,
dissemination, and use. For transparency and validation purposes,
the data is available at audreykurthcronin.com, which also serves as
Cronin’s marketing site (273–81).
The book includes an introduction, three sections comprised of
nine chapters, and a conclusion followed by two appendices, notes,
books cited, an index, and acknowledgements for the detailed main
body contexts (269–72). The book is heavily referenced with more than
100 pages of notes and book citations. My analysis of this information
confirmed Cronin undertook a comprehensive literature review related
to technology, war, and terrorism. A peppering of pictures, drawings,
and maps can be found throughout the book.
Addressing a number of themes and issues, Power to the People is an
intellectual and well-written tour de force—at times dense, yet thankfully
less academic, in its writing style and in the amount of historical and
contemporary information packed into its pages. First, Cronin “explores
how individuals and groups who engage in political violence have
repeatedly made use of emerging technologies to wreak havoc, and how
they’re likely to do so in the future” (2). She ties this issue into the book’s
first section which “introduces predominant ways of thinking about the
innovation and diffusion of military technology and demonstrates their
shortfalls as regards the current era” and “examines consistent patterns
of the diffusion of lethal technology to violent nonstate actors in the
modern era” (14).
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Second, Cronin places “current technological advances into the
historical context of key innovations used” and answers the question
“why certain kinds of emerging technologies are rapidly adopted by
rogue actors” with an emphasis on leveraging the dynamite and AK-47
datasets (2). She ties this issue into the book’s second section which
shows how these two innovations ultimately “drove global waves of
nonstate violence, in both cases culminating in major upheaval in the
international order” (14).
Third, Cronin leverages the drone dataset developed and focuses
“on technologies that were developed with good intentions, such as
digital media and drones . . . But some of them can be fashioned into
relatively low-cost, powerful, and precise weapons” (5). She argues
“Today’s drones, advanced robotics, 3D printing, and autonomous
systems have more in common with dynamite and Kalashnikovs than
they do with military technologies like the airplane and the tank” (14).
Cronin’s core insights are clustered around five themes—“powerful
economic incentives for diffusion, technological optimism and a
boom in tinkering, new communications technologies are powerful
incentives to violence, militaries are facing the innovator’s dilemma and
disruptive private armies and the ISIS precedent” (257, 256–62). Her
protectionist guidance provided against this identified threat is based on
the presumption: “The most effective way to respond to the fast-moving
changes of an open revolution is to align all the participants, including
government, industry, and individual citizens, around incentives for
developing protections” (264). Her guidance is focused on the profit
motive for protections, that regulation is not necessarily strangulation,
and building stronger national security (264–68).
The only disappointing element of the book is its theoretical
embargo of John Robb’s well-publicized Brave New War: The Next Stage
of Terrorism and the End of Globalization (Wiley, 2007). Robb, a colorful
military analyst and entrepreneur, detailed his open-source warfare
construct—modeled on the open-source movement in software
development—13 years prior to Cronin’s elegant work but has been
ignored, or possibly overlooked, for his vital defense community
contributions. In Cronin’s defense, Robb’s construct runs parallel to her
and James Moor’s “‘open’ and ‘closed’ technological revolutions” focus
dating back to at least 2005, and Cronin’s subsequent focus on state
military power (285).
The reviewer fully endorses Power to the People as a first-rate effort
and sees wisdom in the antidisruptive, protectionist-focused strategic
guidance proposed for democracies derived from Cronin’s key
perception that:
We must also be mindful of the scale and breadth of vulnerability we have
built into our societies. The Internet of Things provides an avenue of access
into millions of Internet-connected devices and appliances. With artificial
intelligence, single individuals will have a shot at building armies without
the need to collect large numbers of human beings. Semi-autonomous and
autonomous weapons systems will enable small forces to hold their own
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against vastly superior forces. On our current trajectory, without both better
defensive measures and greater regulation of risk, the result will be wars of
attrition that democracies cannot win (267).

At the same time, Cronin’s promotion of such a dead-hand approach
will at best only temporarily stave off the epochal shift in war and
conflict that is upon the world—initially waged by nonstate actors and
now increasingly conducted by authoritarian regimes. Senior members
of the defense community would do well to integrate Cronin’s guidance
with approaches from Brave New War that, while of a lesser pedigree and
a more marginal budget, make up for these deficiencies with a devilish
creativity and willingness to seize the future rather than attempt to
primarily fight it in the manner Cronin advocates.

America’s Covert War in East Africa:
Surveillance, Rendition, Assassination
By Clara Usiskin
Reviewed by Dr. An Jacobs, senior lecturer of international relations,
Nottingham Trent University, and visiting fellow, Institute of Diplomacy
and International Governance, Loughborough University London

A

merica’s Covert War in East Africa is a breath of fresh air—a
positive anomaly in the crowded counterterrorism literature.
Usiskin challenges readers with an emotive, self-confessed descriptive
and fragmented writing style. The book is not designed to serve as
an academic manuscript, nor does it provide an in-depth analysis of
security questions or counterterrorist activity in East Africa. Instead,
the book includes narratives on issues largely absent in mainstream
counterterrorism literature (1–5).
Due to its fragmented nature, the book’s main argument is
difficult to summarize—or to even detect. The book focuses on the
forgotten or hidden consequences of the Global War on Terror—the
“collateral damage”—emphasizing issues of rule of law and human
rights (5). Usiskin enhances awareness of these consequences and takes
readers on a journey across the lesser-known effects of the Global War
on Terror.
For example, Usiskin discusses the functioning of various extralegal US prisons designed for the detainment and interrogation of
“high-value detainees” and includes research on the rumors of the US
detention and transit of “high-value detainees” on the British island
of Diego Garcia (27). She studies US involvement in the design of
counterterrorism policies in the region and the impact of these policies
on civil society, human rights defenders, and journalists. She explores
US cooperation with East African states with regard to counterterrorism
efforts, as well as the human rights abuses committed by the US, UK,
and East African governments in this context.

London: C. Hurst & Co., 2019
288 pages
$24.95
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Usiskin also considers extrajudicial killings—of predominantly
Muslims—in Kenya as a consequence of the war on terror and how
especially Somali refugees in Kenya are negatively impacted by
counterterrorism policies. She looks at the link between counterpiracy
and counterterrorism and delves into the application of technology and
communication as part of a “holistic US counterterrorism strategy,”
including how drones are employed for surveillance and targeted
killings and how the use of spyware in counterterrorism undercuts
democratic practices (90).
While these topics merit an important place in the book’s broader
narrative, a few chapters stand out and deserve further attention.
“A Zanzibar Ghost,” for example, is quite the opening chapter. In a
strongly emotive and gripping tone, Usiskin tells the story of a man
from Zanzibar who is exposed to the US rendition program as a result
of a counterterrorist operation. Her vivid retelling of the man’s brutal
interrogation, torture, and various human rights abuses draws readers
in. Subsequent chapters build upon this theme, albeit in a somewhat
less-poignant manner. These chapters cover the rendition process—the
often unlawful transportation of terror suspects from one country to
another for interrogation—in more detail and further highlight the
related practices of torture and brutality.
Other fascinating sections of the book cover the impact of
counterterrorism on democratic practice and civil society, highlighting
how a “rule by law” system and a clamp down on the freedom of
expression have “stifled civil society” and set out to silence human
rights defenders and journalists, demonstrating the failure of rule
of law (141–50). Kenya’s frontline position in the Global War on Terror
has had a particular impact on the fate of Somalian refugees in Kenya,
who are facing the dual threat of Al-Shabaab on the one hand and
prosecution by Kenyan authorities on the other, “perpetuating a longestablished dynamic of exclusion and discrimination” by securitizing
refugees from Somalia and “othering” Somali Kenyans (157, 163).
Usiskin further explores the impact of the Global War on Terror
on democracy by focusing on the capacity of the US and Kenyan
governments to spy on Kenyan residents by checking private online
activity and by illustrating how surveillance powers—extended
under counterterrorism legislation—can be used to act against civil
society. With a specific focus on Kenya and Ethiopia, she explores
how spyware and hacking tools such as FinFisher play a vital part in
limiting political opposition and free speech “to carry out politicallymotivated prosecutions of civil society actors under domestic
counterterrorism legislation” (184).
Usiskin’s most significant strength throughout the book is her ability
to bring complex stories alive through a combination of the personal
accounts of victims, her own narratives, and a wealth of information
from reports and government documents. It is obvious Usiskin has
been in the thick of it herself, having spent extended periods in the
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region and having been exposed to abuse of government power herself,
which resulted in short periods of detainment and even deportation
from Kenya and Uganda for her work on ongoing human rights abuses
(83–88). Her expertise as a human rights investigator, her extensive
research on the Global War on Terror, and her experience in the
region provide readers with invaluable insights into the covert world of
rendition, secret detention, and targeted killings in East Africa. Without
a national security clearance or access to classified information, Usiskin
has obtained fascinating information and presents it in a very clear and
compelling style.
Despite the impactful nature of the book, it also has shortcomings.
The most important one being its lack of coherence and a consistently
applied analytical framework. Although it was never Usiskin’s intention
to provide this framework, with such a wealth of data, it seems a shame
not to draw meaningful conclusions. The book’s greatest merit, however,
is that it goes beyond the “intended consequences” of counterterrorism
and explores its “real-life” impact, which is often painful and complex (5).
Usiskin “hope[s] readers will go on to engage with other points of view,”
and she definitely succeeds in achieving this objective (2). Enhancing
awareness and giving voice to people who have not been heard is perhaps
the most meaningful contribution America’s Covert War in East Africa will
make to the education of senior members of the defense community,
who are generally exposed to a different counterterrorism narrative.
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Military History
Command: The Twenty-First-Century General
By Anthony King
Reviewed by David G. Fivecoat, leadership consultant and
retired US Army colonel

A

nthony King has produced a thought-provoking book. He examines
the change in division command since 1901 in the American,
British, French, and German armies in World War I, World War II,
Cold War counterinsurgencies, Desert Storm, Iraq, and Afghanistan and
current initiatives the armies are undertaking to transform their division
headquarters. Building upon Martin van Creveld’s Command in War,
John Keegan’s The Mask of Command, and Peter F. Drucker’s The Effective
Executive and using dozens of examples, King argues division command
has transformed from a more individualistic command in the twentieth
century to a more collectivized command in the last decade.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2019
504 pages
$25.99

The division has existed as a military formation since the French
Revolution. In the last 120 years the division has typically included
10,000 to 25,000 soldiers under the command of a major general.
The division was, and is, the Landpower formation of choice—with
a mature leader a division is quickly deployable yet robust enough to
handle joint, combined, and multinational operations with significant
combat power. Examining the division in the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries is a worthy task and should have been undertaken sooner. It
may be worthwhile for future writers to focus on one nation’s divisions,
doctrine, and actual command practices over the past 120 years to
develop a more detailed analysis of how the division and its command
have evolved.
One of King’s most important contributions is the concept that
command at any level is comprised of three facets: mission definition,
mission management, and leadership. Because I liked the concept so
much, I read the chapter twice. Prior to D-Day, for instance, US Major
General Maxwell Taylor defined the mission of the 101st Airborne
Division as being able to surprise the enemy by conducting a parachute/
glider assault, seize objectives, and defend against counterattacks. Once
the mission was defined, Taylor managed the division’s preparation
for and execution of the D-Day invasion and provided leadership
to the Screaming Eagles. Defining the mission for a division in a
counterinsurgency is more challenging—from my experience, the
mission definitions of division commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan
ran the gamut. Few commanders took on a broad mandate for the
mission, most took a narrow view, and some failed to even consider it.
The mission management and leadership styles of division commanders
varied in the post-9/11 invasions and counterinsurgencies as well.
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King’s second major contribution is the idea that the role of the
division commander has transformed—from the concept of an
individualistic, or heroic, division commander pre-9/11 to a more
collectivized commander since 9/11. He defines individualistic
command as a division commander, with a small staff, monopolizing
the responsibility for determining the mission, managing the execution,
making decisions, and providing leadership to the division. He uses
examples of General Erwin Rommel, commander of the German 7th
Panzer Division during the invasion of France in World War II; Major
General Julian Ewell, commander of the US 9th Infantry Division in
the Mekong Delta Region during the Vietnam War; General Sir Rupert
Smith, commander of the UK 1st Armored Division during Desert
Storm; and others to illustrate the individualistic command concept.
I think most military professionals will recognize this style of
division command.
More problematic to recognize is the idea of collectivized
command. The Oxford English Dictionary defines collectivize as “organize
(something) on the basis of ownership by the people.” King defines
collectivized command as “commanders, their deputies, subordinates,
and staff bound together in dense, professionalized decision-making
communities” that collectively determine the mission, manage the
solution, and provide leadership to the division (18). Here he examines
British Major General Nick Carter’s leadership of Regional Command
South in Afghanistan from 2009–10 and recent initiatives by the
US 82nd Airborne Division, the UK 3rd Division, and the French
divisional headquarters.
I agree with King that the post-9/11 division headquarters has
grown in size and developed a more bureaucratic process around
decision making. Larger headquarters have an insatiable appetite for
more information, more meetings, and more work from themselves
and their subordinate units. I have found little evidence in practice,
accounts of recent division actions in other books, and even in Command
where division commanders have collectivized the process of mission
definition, management, or leadership.
The most collectivized command process I know is the council of
war, used most famously in the American Civil War by Union General
George Meade at the Battle of Gettysburg on the night of July 2, 1863.
Although King does use General Stanley McChrystal’s networked and
collaborative approach to running the US Joint Special Operations
Command from 2003–8, this organization is not a division, and
McChrystal’s approach was not collectivized. King disappointingly cites
no solid examples of division commanders bringing their team of staff
and commanders together for a collectivized approach to decide on the
mission or how to manage the solution. Most telling, King’s interviews
with General David Petraeus, General Sir Rupert Smith, and General
James Mattis all rebuff his theory that collectivization happened in the
divisions they led.
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Like King, I believe the command of the division headquarters is
changing, and I appreciate him for recognizing the change and starting
the discussion. In the end, King’s conclusion misses the mark. The change
may be that divisions have simply grown from their former nimble roots
into large, bureaucratic, and unwieldy organizations. Perhaps divisions
and their commanders are embracing a more networked approach,
using reachback or trying to flatten the organization. The supporting
evidence King cites does not convince me the division command has
been collectivized.
All in all, Command is a good book since it made me think deeply
about the division and division command. Even with the noted
shortcomings, it is a worthwhile read for commanders and leaders at
all levels who need to think about how they define the mission of their
units or organizations, manage planning and execution, and lead.
It is also valuable for military officers and other senior leaders who
are thinking about the history and the future of the division and
division command.

Subordinating Intelligence: The DoD/CIA
Post–Cold War Relationship
By David P. Oakley
Reviewed by Dr. Genevieve Lester, De Serio Chair of Strategic Intelligence,
US Army War College

T

he intelligence function is crucial to informed policy decisionmaking in all aspects of government. The priorities of the national
agencies—the producers of this intelligence—however, change over
time in response to changing threats, political context, individual
relationships among senior administration leadership, and budgetary
constraints. Subordinating Intelligence examines the relationship of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with the Department of Defense and
considers how the relationship evolved in the period between the Cold
War and the beginning of the Global War on Terror.

Lexington: University Press
of Kentucky, 2019
264 pages
$50.00

There are at least two sides to the debate regarding the relationship
between military requirements and national intelligence. On the one
hand, the lack of appropriate intelligence support to military operations
has resulted in failures and the loss of life on multiple occasions. On
the other hand, supporting military operations can crowd out longerterm, strategic intelligence needs and alter the balance of the CIA’s
responsibilities—from supporting national policy makers to prioritizing
the needs of combat support agencies such as the National Security
Agency or the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. This change in
balance risks the CIA’s independence and can weaken its ability to focus
on its core mission (105). David Oakley offers a balanced discussion of
both sides of this calculus, although the argument leads to the CIA’s
minimization and the military’s ascension.
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Oakley argues that a series of presidential decisions led to the CIA
being ultimately “subordinated” to military operations (8). He shows
how this relationship developed, focusing on the intensity of change
in the post–9/11 security environment. He develops his argument with
illustrative historical episodes beginning with early interoperability
failures, such as the unsuccessful attempt to free US hostages from Iran
(1979), the invasion of Grenada (1983), and the bombing of the barracks
in Lebanon, also in 1983, that focused on the need for improved Joint
operations and intelligence support to military operations (12–13).
The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization
Act of 1986, with its singular reforms to the Department of Defense,
emerged from this friction among the services. As Oakley points out,
there was an increasing awareness that intelligence was crucial to this
next stage of improved Joint operations. This vulnerability was further
highlighted during Operation Desert Storm, a quick victory for the
military that highlighted gaps in intelligence support for military
operations (31–32). During this period the then President George
H. W. Bush pushed for greater intelligence support for the military;
the Clinton administration issued Presidential Decision Directive 35,
which made intelligence support of military operations a top priority
of the Intelligence Community (152). Obviously, these developments
intensified when the CIA’s focus turned to counterterrorism and
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, reducing the CIA’s strategic
emphasis on the state-level threat and reinforcing its subordination
to the military (155).
While the book is slim, it pursues a line of argument vigorously. A
broader discussion of the context, particularly the developing political
environment, could have helped guide readers through some rather
arcane territory and idiom. Even with that criticism, Subordinating
Intelligence fills an important gap in the literature on military operations
and intelligence. Military requirements and intelligence tend to be much
more focused on the order of battle and tactical operations. In contrast,
the literature on national intelligence does not delve deeply enough
into the military side and almost not at all into the integration of the
two functions.
Oakley’s unique exploration of the relationship between
the Department of Defense and the CIA is crucial to building a
broader discussion of the issues from both the practitioner and the
scholarly perspectives. Finally, as the military changes its focus from
counterterrorism to near-peer competition with rival nation-states, the
CIA will again be pushed to adapt to the new contingencies, and the
relationship between the agency and the military will shift again. Oakley
provides a valuable service in outlining the processes and interests that
will drive this adaptation today and in the future.
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Hitler’s First Hundred Days: When Germans
Embraced the Third Reich
By Peter Fritzsche
Reviewed by Dr. Jay Lockenour, chair and associate professor,
Department of History, Temple University

O

ne is tempted to review Hitler’s First Hundred Days as the final
installment of a trilogy that began with Fritzsche’s 1990 work,
Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilization in Weimar Germany,
followed in 1997 by Germans into Nazis. All three works grapple with the
fall of the Weimar Republic, the rise of the National Socialist German
Workers Party (NSDAP), and that party’s rapid establishment of a
monopoly on political power. Anyone who has taught a course on the
Third Reich knows students demand answer to difficult questions: “How
did this happen?” Was it a culture of authoritarianism? Was it ideology or
anti-Semitism? The Great War? The economy?

New York: Basic Books,
2020
432 pages
$32.00

Fritzsche’s answer has evolved over the years. He still downplays
the role of the economy and the Great Depression in terms of
electoral motivation. He still cautions against emphasizing antiSemitism, though it plays a more decisive role in this study in establishing
the dictatorship. The Nazis did not establish control through political
campaigning. They won a plurality in 1932, not a majority, and that
plurality seemed to be shrinking as 1932 ended. The first 100 days,
from January 30 to May 9, 1933, saw the Nazis turn that plurality into
a dictatorship in which, Fritzsche argues, most Germans felt the Nazis
were better able to satisfy their desire for national unity, political peace,
and an end to crisis.
The “trilogy” also traces the evolution of historiographical trends
from the 1980s to the present. Rehearsals was part of a wave of regional
studies at the time and spoke the sociological language of class and
electoral analysis. Hitler’s First Hundred Days, while focused on Berlin,
moves around Germany more expansively and is more attentive to
mythmaking and culture.
Fritzsche offers explanatory concepts that require readers to
sometimes grapple with paradox. He describes the attitude of many
Germans to the events of the 100 days as “no, yes,” a contradiction that
effectively demonstrates the combination of reservation and enthusiasm
Fritzsche found in diaries, memoirs, jokes, and other everyday materials
of the period: no to the violence in the streets, yes to the destruction of
the Communist Party; no to the uneducated thugs of the NSDAP, yes
to national unity; no to 1918, yes to 1914 (95, 120).
That last juxtaposition is important to Fritzsche’s argument in its own
right. Part of the Nazis’s success can be explained by their being on the
correct side of the mythmaking around both dates. For many Germans
1918 stood for defeat, the November Revolution, and—though signed
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in 1919—the Treaty of Versailles. Many nationalists, and not just the
Nazis, saw that defeat as the unjust result of a “stab in the back” by Jews,
socialists, and other shadowy groups who waged the revolution and
established the Republic. For many Germans, and not just nationalists,
1914 represented the Burg frieden, the period of national unity when all
parties of the Kaiser’s Reichstag supported the credits necessary to fight
the war. The Nazis promised to take Germany back in time from 1918
and crisis to 1914 and unity.
Between January 30 and May 9, the Nazis exploited opportunities
and staged events to accomplish that time travel. The Reichstag fire,
the March elections and the preceding Day of the Awakening Nation,
the Day of Potsdam, the boycott of Jewish businesses, the Law for the
Restoration of the Professional Civil Service, the Day of National Labor,
and the book burning—technically day 101—demonstrated the sense
of unity and the need to act in a state of crisis sometimes created
by the Nazis and led Germans to accept “normality” as defined
by the NSDAP (266).
Terror, murder, and arrest cowed the enemies of the NSDAP,
but Fritzsche is also attentive to the role new technologies and simple
administration played in helping the Nazis secure control. Radio played
an especially important role in carrying Hitler’s message—and only
Hitler’s message—to the nation as a whole, but so did paperwork.
Forms necessary to prove one’s “Aryan” ancestry and to keep one’s
job taught Germans (who did not already know it) the language of
Nazi anti-Semitism—of insiders and outsiders—that became a part of
everyday life.
Though Fritzsche makes an argument about Germany as a whole
and does include evidence from Hanover, Lower Saxony, East Prussia,
and other regions, the book’s center of gravity is Berlin, and Fritzsche’s
affection for Berlin is palpable. The city at first seems a strange place to
locate a study of Germany’s embrace of the Third Reich. “Red Berlin,”
with its large, organized, Marxist working class, should have been the
place where the Nazis struggled most to find support. Electoral analyses
show the NSDAP received lower percentages of votes in cities than in
small towns and lower percentages from the working class than from
the middle class.
Of course, Berlin is the capital of Germany, and many of the events
in Hitler’s First Hundred Days happen in and around the city. Choosing
Berlin gives Fritzsche a physical landscape upon which to tell his story.
Readers get to know the streets and neighborhoods through which the
Nazis marched, in which they fought their battles with the socialists
and communists. And the fact that the process Fritzsche describes
takes place in “Red Berlin” as well as in Northeim—the location of
W. S. Allen’s path-breaking The Nazi Seizure of Power, which shares many
of this book’s strengths—makes his argument even more convincing.
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Beyond Pearl Harbor: A Pacific History
Edited by Beth Bailey and David Farber
Reviewed by Dr. Michael E. Lynch, senior historian,
US Army Heritage and Education Center

T

he TV series Star Trek: The Next Generation included an episode
titled “Darmok,” where the crew encountered a civilization that
communicates only in phrases that refer to events that are so ingrained
in the culture they have become metaphors. Such is the same with Pearl
Harbor for Americans. Yet that cultural metaphor lies uneasily next to
another belief entrenched into the national psyche: the United States is
not an imperialist nation, unlike the Japanese empire that had launched
the vicious surprise attack. With this common narrative in mind, Beth
Bailey and David Farber have curated a collection of 10 fine essays that
examine the attack on Pearl Harbor from different viewpoints but all
through the lens of imperialism. The essays broaden and deepen the
narrative of a well-known topic in a relatively short work that melds
military and social history and gives voice to British, Australian, Chinese,
Japanese, and insular American sources by examining the attack from the
other-than-common American viewpoint.

Lawrence: University Press
of Kansas, 2019
224 pages
$29.95

In the first essay, “The Attack on Pearl Harbor . . . and Guam,
Wake Island, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong
Kong,” Bailey and Farber set the stage for the examination to follow
(1). Their review of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Day of Infamy”
speech is an insightful look at the art of strategic communications by
a master communicator. Their description of the differences between
Hawaii and the other American territories helps explain the legal basis
for the difference in approach to the attacks on them.
This essay provides a seamless transition to Daniel Immerwahr’s
“‘American Lives’: Pearl Harbor and the War in the US Empire” (39).
He examines what it meant to be an American and how the United
States assessed its overseas possessions unevenly. In one memorable
phrase, he claims that “Roosevelt, in other words, was making a
calculation. He was rounding the Philippines down to foreign and
rounding Hawaii up to American” (41, italics in original). In a phrase
that carries even more resonance today, he argues that “War is a time of
danger and sacrifice, a time when risks are apportioned. Who bore those
risks had a lot to do with who got recognized as ‘American.’ It was a
question of who was in and who was out—of whose lives mattered”(43).
Immerwahr concludes by describing the liberation of American overseas
territories in the Aleutians, Guam, and the Philippines by soldiers who
were unaware the civilian population being liberated was also American.
Christopher Cappozola in his essay argues that the “politics of
anticipation” for the Japanese attack in the Philippines drove a series
of authoritarian regimes. These regimes used the potential for an
attack to consolidate power and attract money from the United States
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(158–68). This argument is less convincing with regard to post-war,
post-independence authoritarian regimes.
Twin essays by Jeremy Yellen and Samuel Hideo Yamashita examine
Japanese attitudes toward the attack, including public and private
responses and how the mood was reflected in the popular press. They
note some skeptics, but the attitude among the Japanese people was
nearly uniformly positive. In another chapter, Yujin Yaguchi argues
the Japanese media, since the war, has refashioned the narrative, so
Pearl Harbor becomes the first step toward rapprochement and the
eventual alliance of commercial superpowers, rather than a clash
between empires.
Rana Mitter and Nicole Elizabeth Barnes examine the Chinese
perspective on the attack that elevated Chinese prospects in numerous
ways. Mitter argues the attack caused political and military leaders to
think differently about the nation’s identity. “Those changes heralded
the initial moves that would propel China into a new position in the
postwar world” (103). China’s alliance with the Western allies gave it an
advantage over the Japanese with whom it had been at war since 1937.
The attack, however, also exposed the ongoing rift between Chinese
nationalists and Chinese communists that led to civil war shortly after
World War II ended.
Barnes provides a fascinating examination of the development
of Chinese medical care during the war. The entry of the United States
into the war in the Pacific pulled occupying Japanese forces away from
China, which eventually stopped the air raids that were decimating
the Chinese population. Chinese medical facilities were then able to
shift their focus from combat-related injuries to pre- and post-natal
care and preventive care, which increased the overall health of the
Chinese population.
The attack also changed China’s network of support, in which the
United States and the United Kingdom became its primary benefactors,
replacing other nations in the Asian rim. Kate Darian-Smith in “Pearl
Harbor and Australia’s War in the Pacific” notes that Pearl Harbor, the
fall of Singapore, and the subsequent bombing of Darwin (known as
Australia’s Pearl Harbor) signaled a shift in Pacific Rim alliances—with
Australia becoming more closely aligned with the United States.
Pearl Harbor, as a simple metaphor for a singular American event,
has obscured the different views of the attack from around the Pacific
Rim. As American defense interests in the Pacific grow daily, strategic
leaders would profit from a fresh look at a familiar subject. Most
histories focus on the attack itself and the diplomatic and intelligence
events leading to it.
The phrase “America Empire” falls hard on American ears; the
revolt of the 13 colonies against the British Empire is deeply embedded
in the nation’s cultural memory. The irony of vehemently deriding the
evils of empires while simultaneously maintaining overseas possessions
in Hawaii, Guam, Wake Island, and the Philippines was lost on
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most Americans. Yet the views of residents living in these American
territories as well as the views of their Pacific neighbors are important
to our understanding of the strategic effects of the attack. Beyond Pearl
Harbor provides a deeper, broader, and more strategic view of what has
traditionally been assumed to be a purely American event.

The World at War, 1914–1945
By Jeremy Black
Reviewed by Dr. Michael S. Neiberg, chair of war studies, US Army War College

T

he frustrating and ultimately unsuccessful process of making peace
in 1919 caused many contemporary observers to predict the war of
1914–18 would mark the first round of a much-longer conflict. Some
of these famous observations have questionable provenance and may
well be apocryphal, but two that can be easily corroborated are worth
mentioning here.
The British journalist Charles à Court Repington was pessimistic—
maybe prescient is a better word—enough to use the phrase “First World
War” in his diary as early as September 1918. He also used it as the title
of a one-volume history of the war he published highlighting his fear of
a second world war breaking out as soon as the great powers could rearm
and recover (The First World War [London: Constable, 1920]).

New York: Rowan and
Littlefield, 2019
349 pages
$98.00

In a similar vein, American General Tasker H. Bliss wrote to
his wife in April 1919. He shared his worry that “The wars are not
yet over. I don’t like the treaty and it seems to me that it means another
30 years’ war, winding up with about the same grouping of states as
before” (Tasker H. Bliss, “Letter to Nellie Bliss” in Bliss Papers, April
1919, US Army Heritage and Education Center).
In the years immediately following 1945, the historiographical and
popular trend separated the two World Wars. In the West, this division
helped to underscore the seemingly undeniable and overwhelming
Western triumph in the Second World War in contrast to the muddy,
ambivalent semivictory of the first. The Holocaust, the atomic bomb,
and the sheer scale of war from 1939 to 1945 provided more reasons
to separate the two conflicts. In the United States, one needs to go no
further to prove this point than to see the contrast between the massive
World War II Memorial on the National Mall and the small memorial to
the men of Washington, DC, that is the only remembrance of the First
World War on America’s most sacred ground of national memory.
Jeremy Black’s latest book, The World at War, 1914–1945, engages
with recent formulations that treat the two World Wars as part of
one unified historical dynamic. This so-called long war thesis sees
the period 1914–45—sometimes continuing to the end of the Cold
War in 1991—much as Repington and Bliss saw it. In a narrative and
essentially chronological treatment, Black wrestles with the strengths
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and weaknesses of the long war concept. While acknowledging it has
grown in popularity in recent years, Black ultimately rejects the long war
concept as too Eurocentric.
Black primarily employs a comparative methodology. He is less
concerned with constructing a narrative arc from 1914 to 1945 than
in engaging in a juxtaposition of patterns between the war of 1914–18
and the war of 1939–45. This method provides for a direct comparison
and contrast of the two wars, but the jumping around, sometimes even
within the same paragraph, might confuse readers less familiar with
some of the book’s details.
More helpfully, Black sees the World Wars as part of a much-wider
periodization. He places the European wars within the wider context of
the end of empires, beginning with the 1898 Spanish-American War. The
1914–18 war ended four major terrestrial empires—namely, the AustroHungarian, Ottoman, German, and Russian empires—replacing them
with the nation-states that dominate Europe and the Middle East today.
The Second World War fatally undermined the overseas empires of both
the vanquished and, more significantly, the nominal victors of France
and Britain.
Such an analysis, Black argues, has the advantage of decentering
the “German question” from the wars. This is not to say Black finds
Germany irrelevant; it occupies more of the book than any other country.
Rather, he argues readers may miss wider patterns not as easy to discern
by focusing too much on Germany.
Black’s central argument against the long war thesis centers on
events in Asia. The crucial dynamic there, he contends, begins with the
Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95—or even as far back as the First Opium
War of 1839–42. The result was the rise to power of China and the
United States as the two most dominant states in the region, an outcome
few would have dared to predict at the turn of the twentieth century.
The strength of the book lies in its challenge to see the period 1914–45
in ways different from how scholars and popular culture normally
present it.
A Canadian memorial to the Montreal Fusiliers at Dieppe, France,
to commemorate the 1942 disaster there begins its list of the regiment’s
campaigns not with Dieppe itself but with the Second Battle of
Ypres in 1915. Whether or not the men of 1942 understood themselves
as finishing the work of their fathers in 1915 may, as The World at War,
1914–1945 challenges us to consider, be the wrong question to ask.
Instead readers might ask whether they understood the irony that their
imperial service represented, in the wider scheme of history, a critical
element in bringing about the end of empires.
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The Red Army and the Second World War
By Alexander Hill
Reviewed by Dr. Reina Pennington, Charles A. Dana Professor of History,
Norwich University

T

his fascinating study of the Red Army adds new dimensions to
the understanding of Soviet military success in the Great Patriotic
War. Although part of the Cambridge University Press Armies of the
Second World War series, this book is not an overview of events on the
Eastern Front or another history of the war. Readers are expected to
have studied at least one of the key histories by John Erickson, David
Glantz and Jonathan House, Evan Mawdsley, or Chris Bellamy. Hill
identifies the key factors contributing to Soviet military effectiveness,
shows how the problem of Soviet reach frequently exceeded its
grasp, and makes a convincing case for the ongoing qualitative
improvement which “transformed [the Red Army] into a more effective
fighting force” (3).

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2017
754 pages
$36.95

The book can be broken down into thirds: about 200 pages each
devoted to the prewar period, to 1941–42, and to 1943–45. Hill’s intense
evaluation of the effects of prewar experiences and how they shaped the
Red Army facing the Germans in 1941 is a strength of the book. The
chapters on Khalkhin Gol and Finland are particularly interesting. Few
general histories highlight this context so essential for understanding
Soviet choices, strengths, and weaknesses going into the war. Hill also
provides a clear view of the constantly changing conditions of the war:
1944 was a whole different ball game than 1941, and the differences are
detailed in the “The Ten ‘Stalinist’ Blows of 1944” and other chapters.
Hill uses a wide variety of Russian language sources and draws upon
primary accounts in the post-Soviet era as well as scholarly studies. Many
personal stories add human interest and on-the-ground realism to the
issues illustrated. Another great strength of Hill is his use of archival and
documentary sources: his 2009 The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union,
1941–45: A Documentary Reader is a good companion volume.
Hill provides thought-provoking analysis of the role of cavalry in
the war, communications, rear support services, the development of
reconnaissance and deception techniques, and the process by which
Soviet military leaders carefully sought lessons learned and attempted to
translate these lessons learned into a more-effective military effort. He
stresses Stalin’s role in escalating the price paid in lives and resources.
To ensure Germany’s defeat, Stalin drove his commanders to conduct
offensives without adequate preparation or resources. Even so, the Red
Army grew better over time. The army reduced its loss ratios, and its
soldiers fought stubbornly and with increasing skill. The Red Army often
had quantitative advantages, and Hill details these advantages while also
analyzing the qualitative improvements vital to military success.
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The detailed conclusion sums up Hill’s key arguments, emphasizing
by the end of the war, both Soviet weapons and the Red Army as a whole
were “well-conceived but not overly complex” and “relatively simple,
robust and at the same time effective” (566). The Red Army did not solve
all its problems, but played to its strengths and demonstrated a resilience
which produced one of the most dramatic instances of strategic reversal
in military history. Hill also offers a very useful comparison of British
and Soviet experiences, pointing out “many issues noted here for the
Red Army were not peculiarly Soviet” (572). Ultimately, “By the end of
the Great Patriotic War the Red Army was certainly in many ways a very
different creature than it had been” before—an army that had become
more efficient and more effective (562).
The accessibility of the book could be improved. The chapters
average 20 to 30 pages with no subheadings even though most chapters
focus on two or three main topics. Paragraphs sometimes extend for
two or more pages, and the text is often packed with lists of units and
numbers of weapons, personnel, and casualties which would be easier
to understand in chart form. There are no charts, and maps are few and
overly basic. The publisher could have upgraded these aspects of the
book. The illustrations, glossary, bibliography, and index, however, are
nicely done, and the paper quality holds up to highlighting and notetaking, always a plus.
The story of the Eastern Front from 1939–45 is almost
overwhelming—on a scale as to be almost incomprehensible. Hill’s
new source-based and in-depth analysis of important and sometimes
neglected aspects of Red Army successes and failures successfully drills
down and adds several more layers to the comprehension of the role
of the Red Army in the Second World War. The Red Army and the Second
World War is a must-have addition to the library of serious students of
the Eastern Front.

The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire
By A. Wess Mitchell
Reviewed by Dr. James D. Scudieri, research historian,
US Army Heritage and Education Center

T
Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2018
403 pages
$27.95

he Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire examines the strategic
statecraft of the Habsburg Empire, Austria, as a standalone security
actor—from the end of the Spanish dynastic connection by 1700 and
before the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary from 1867. Author
A. Wess Mitchell is not an academic historian, but a State Department
security professional. The preface and first chapter make four main
claims for Habsburg strategy, with the three central themes of secure
buffers, an army in being combined with frontier fortresses, and allied
coalitions. Austria’s preeminent challenge was “interstitial,” i.e. response
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to threats in time and space, so as to avoid simultaneous wars on
multiple fronts (ix).
Part I concerns strategic constraints. A central position demanded a
careful accounting of geography’s diplomatic and military implications,
hence Austria’s investment in comprehensive mapping. No surprise,
the demographic, ethnic complexity of the empire affected domestic
political power, economics, and future territorial acquisition. Mitchell
categorizes Austria as never “a normal Great Power” with its
“complicated constitutional order” and “contested nature” of “domestic
power” (79–80). Preservation of the army was central to survival of the
dynasty and state.
Institutions evolved to deal with threats, variously France, Turkey,
Russia, and Prussia. Increasingly sophisticated structures maximized
peacetime planning and reduced wartime reaction. They incorporated
Byzantine and Renaissance elements and just war traditions. Mitchell
assesses these as Austrian equivalents of the US Quadrennial Defense
Review and National Security Strateg y.
Part II covers the “Habsburg Frontier ‘Defense Systems’” in three
eras (119). The 1690s to the 1730s witnessed a rare Austrian emphasis on
the military and the mobile field armies that launched counteroffensives
against the Turks after the final, failed Turkish Siege of Vienna in 1683.
Military efficacy rested upon Eugene of Savoy as commander of forces
with organizational and technical superiority over the Ottoman Turks.
The 1740s to the 1750s marked a more sustained threat against the
state. The War of Austrian Succession in 1740–48 challenged Queen
Maria Theresa’s right to rule. There was no commander of Eugene’s
talent, and the army could not match the tactical articulation of the
Prussians. Next was the Seven Years War from 1756–63. Now Wenzel
Anton von Kaunitz-Rietberg, premier diplomat for four decades, worked
Prussia’s diplomatic isolation, except for Britain, a daunting paymaster,
but no land power. Maria Theresa had led and encouraged major army
and other governmental reforms. A far superior army emerged, but
Frederick’s operational finesse within interior lines, and luck, saved
Prussia. Perhaps diverging if not conflicting allied war aims played
the greater role. Two concurrent Silesian Wars showcased Austrian
determination to recover Silesia and humble Prussia. Throughout
Austrian leaders kept the southeastern front facing the Turks quiet via
appeasement and military borders.
The 1770s to the 1790s reconfirmed a preventive strategy. Austria
both checked Russian ambitions and courted Russian assistance.
Napoleonic France, 1804–14, was the toughest of Austria’s foes, as
Napoleon exploited the methodological seams in traditional Austrian
strategic security systems. French armies were also bigger and better.
Archduke Charles Louis John Joseph Laurentius, Duke of Teschen, did
become the closest combination of both reformer and talented general.
Of greater note were Klemens von Metternich’s efforts to turn the tide.
He played for time, returned to war in 1809, and triumphed by 1814 with
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Napoleon’s abdication. After allied victory over Napoleon’s Campaign
of the Hundred Days in 1815, Metternich incorporated a defeated France
into a European Concert to guard a new balance of power.
Part III covers 1815–66, with Austria clearly a second-rate power.
Mitchell views Metternich’s work as largely successful from 1815–48,
especially the sequential suppression of the Revolutions of 1848 with
Russian assistance. Two other aspects merit emphasis.
First, conditions now greatly compromised traditional systems,
especially the ability to orchestrate sequencing and duration. Austria
thus looked beyond immediate borders. A new Deutscher Bund of 39
Germanic states replaced the 300-odd states in the eighteenth century.
Mitchell compares the relationship to 39 distinct status of forces
agreements. An Italian League linked Austria’s possessions there,
though Mitchell sees the area as Austria’s Achilles’ heel.
Second, and Mitchell is most emphatic on this point, Austria’s
defeats in the Franco-Austrian War of 1859 and the Austro-Prussian
War of 1866 were not inevitable. He believes Austrian leaders erred
grievously by overestimating the viability of the military instrument as
a primary policy tool. First, the military wielded greater influence in
the state. Second, the army became anti-intellectual and enamored with
an offensive doctrine tactically and operationally. While fiscal realities
likely impacted events, the military leaders devoted too little effort to
force modernization.
Strategic inflexibility replaced sophisticated diplomacy, beginning
with resort to the bellicose armed neutrality against Russia when pitted
against a coalition in the Crimean War of 1853–56. Future Russian
enmity was virtually assured. Worse, Austria at war turned to strategic
offensives which ill-suited Austrian capability and capacity, and which
went against traditional security approaches. Austrian strategy for
decades used strategic defensives to buy time, in part for allies to rally.
The early losses at Solferino in 1859 and Sadowa (Königgrätz) in 1866
were fast and decisive with Austria alone. Austria had played to enemy
strengths. Incidentally, in 1859 the French had accomplished no less
than a swift strategic force projection using steamships and railroads.
In 1866 Prussia executed national will on its time table. Mitchell shows
how these scenarios warranted more traditional strategic approaches but
Austrian leaders rejected them.
Chapter 10 on the Habsburg legacy underlines the Austrian view of
hard power as secondary. The army was not an instrument of annihilation.
The diplomatic element showcased the Austrian state as a category apart
with “necessity status” as Austria represented a nonthreatening quest for
order (309). Austria’s alliances showcased its willingness to help smaller,
weaker partners deter rising hegemons.
Finally, in the epilogue Mitchell articulates 13 broad principles of
Habsburg strategic statecraft to inform today’s challenges that merit
particular attention. Comparative analysis remains a double-edged
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sword, but will raise elementary questions about America’s role in the
world and who constitutes threats and why.
The Grand Strateg y of the Habsburg Empire is not light reading—329
pages of text and 45 pages of endnotes—but Mitchell has balanced a
modest look at primary sources with an examination of a very wide
selection of secondary literature. While the discussion is exhaustive, the
result is a sweeping case study in ends, ways, and means.

Pax Romana: War, Peace, and Conquest in the Roman World
By Adrian Goldsworthy
Reviewed by Dr. Jason W. Warren, defense contractor supporting information
and cyber defense and security policy

I

n 51 BC, Julius Caesar, commander and political czar of Roman efforts
in Gaul, ordered the hands of captured Gallic insurgents lopped off
as a means to dispirit any hope of further resistance (410). As historian
Adrian Goldsworthy demonstrates in Pax Romana, this atrocity and others
like it were part of Rome’s method for gaining empire. Usually these
violent and heavy-handed approaches occurred early in the pacification
of conquered peoples and not throughout the duration of occupation.
Rome opted for a mixture of cooperation for mutual benefit, threats,
and occasional violence, such as Caesar’s, to establish a lasting peace still
noteworthy for its longevity to this day.
In this expansive and accessible account Goldsworthy, in his
politesse British style, implicitly pushes back on the prevailing
argument that empire is a negative, especially for conquered peoples.
His refreshing argument shows how, after an initial period of resistance
and submission, almost all subdued tribes accepted empire and the
benefits of Roman rule, indeed often citizenship. The advantages were
many, including improved administration, a disruption of brigandage,
the absence of internecine warfare, and above all, the status of being
a friend of powerful Rome. This reviewer is reminded of the accurate
Monty Python comedy sketch from The Life of Brian, “What Have the
Romans Ever Done for Us?” where the long list of improvements on
Roman-Britain is then listed, with the retort of the would-be insurgents,
“well besides that.” The legion was therefore used sparingly, and stood
sentinel on the borders of barbarism, far from the core of empire.
Goldsworthy goes to great lengths to maintain a balanced telling of
events, refusing to gloss over occasional brutal imperial management.
This balance obviates potential scholarly criticism about the upheavals
and loss of freedom that subject peoples experienced. On the whole,
he determines empire was best for the vast majority of individuals who
came within its bounds.
Rome also chose monarchy and empire, as was the case when the
Roman Senate only briefly debated a return to empire after Caligula’s

New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2016
528 pages
$32.50
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assassination in 41 AD (179). In an implicit comparison to other
empires, Rome also chose to limit the boundaries of its empire, with
a few notable exceptions such as Dacia and Mesopotamia, following
Augustus’s advice to his stepson Tiberius after the defeat of the legions
in the Teutoburg Forest (174–75).
As was the case with his stellar How Rome Fell, Goldsworthy brings
to life how individual agency shaped the course of the Pax. Rome
successfully harnessed the ambition of talented leaders who amalgamated
tribes and territory as much for personal gain as for the glory of Rome.
This method of empire building existed whether during the Republican
empire, the civil wars, or through the general peace, until the upheaval
of the third century AD.
Unfortunately, Goldsworthy forgoes the opportunity to delve
deeper into issues of human nature, as to why such peace is so rare,
something he connects with his growing up during the relative
quietude in the United Kingdom after the Second World War
(preface). Goldsworthy labors to identify the unique nature of such
a long peace, but fails to expand on this thesis—is man’s nature
therefore one of Hobbesian violence and hence contrary to the
widespread belief in the West that peace is the natural state of being?
Such useful examinations are absent, as with Goldsworthy’s obvious
failure to juxtapose American republican empire since at least 1919,
and all of its attendant consequences for world history and peace.
Where Goldsworthy sees such connections with the past as problematic,
such an approach undermines the gaining of historical insights better
to contextualize foreign policy decisions today (7–8). Just as the Pax
Romana was noteworthy, so is this account for scholars and students
alike, albeit coming up slightly short in this regard.
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